Lack of Consent as the Constituent Element of Rape An analysis of the International Obligations of Norway and how they affect the definition of Rape in the General Civil Penal Code of 1902 by Kjøllesdal, Ada Molne
2 
Lack of Consent as the 
Constituent Element of Rape  
An analysis of the International Obligations of Norway and how they affect the 
definition of Rape in the General Civil Penal Code of 1902 
Candidate number: 216 
Submission deadline: 01.06.14 
Number of words: 38 732 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 II 
 
Abstract 
The incorporation of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and the Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) into the Human 
Rights Act, and transformation of the Rome Statute into the Norwegian Penal Code of 
2005(NPC) has actualized the impact of international tendencies in regard of positive obligations 
under the Conventions to penalise any non-consensual activity as rape. Failure to comply with 
these international obligations provides different outcomes for the Member State Parties. At the 
present, the current definition of rape in Section 192 of the General Civil Penal Code of 1902 
(GCPC) is in conflict with the international obligations of Norway, as it does not penalise non-
consensual sexual activity as rape. The ECtHR stated in M.C v. Bulgaria that the Member State 
Parties have a positive obligation to penalise any non-consensual sexual act cf. Articles 3 and 8 
of the ECHR. Failure to comply with this obligation may give rise to damage liability for the 
State of Norway towards individuals subject to non-consensual sexual activity. The Committee of 
CEDAW urged Norway in its Eight Periodic Report of Norway to: “Adopt a legal definition of 
rape in the Penal Code so as to place the lack of consent at its centre, in line with the Commit-
tee´s general recommendation No. 19, and the Vertido case.” In the light of relevant domestic 
statutory law and case law, this recommendation can be interpreted as a specific provision under 
CEDAW and thus a positive obligation for Norway to undertake. Failure to comply with this ob-
ligation might contribute to continued discrimination of women in law and practice. The Rome 
Statute was transformed into the Norwegian Penal Code (NPC) of 2005 chapter 16 penalising 
rape as war crimes and crimes against humanity. Rape is not specifically defined, but the prepara-
tory works held that the specified provisions were to be interpreted in the light of, and in accord-
ance with the international obligation. The definition of rape as a war crime and as a crime 
against humanity is at the present unresolved. There are currently pending cases before the Inter-
national Criminal Court expected to bring clarity as to how rape is defined in the light of the 
Rome Statute. During the late 1990´s and beginning of the 21st century, three definitions of rape 
were issued by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). Current trends of international law seem to 
favour the non-consensual definition of rape held by the ICTY in the Kunarac case. The object 
and purpose of transforming the Rome Statute into chapter 16 of the NPC was to prosecute war 
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crimes and crimes against humanity under Norwegian jurisdiction. Failure to revise or expand the 
definition of rape in the GCPC might prevent Norwegian Courts from convicting people accused 
of crimes against humanity and war crimes, contrary to the object and purpose of chapter 16 of 
the NPC. The situation with two different definitions of rape in Norwegian Criminal Statutes may 
be considered unsatisfactory. Even if there were no conceptual or systemic arguments decisively 
against maintaining this dual system, the International criminal solution may provide additional 
policy arguments in favour of redefining rape in the domestic Penal Code. The Convention on 
preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence (Istanbul Convention) 
confirms the international trend towards regarding lack of consent as the constituent element of 
rape. Case law, and reports from the ECtHR, Committee of CEDAW, ICTY, ICTR and ICC 
shows that these supranational organs refer to one another in deciding the common denominator 
of rape. The Constitution of Norway and the Supreme Court´s strict practice of the principle of 
legality limit the scope of the immediate affect of International Obligations in the realm of crimi-
nal law, in favour of the accused. Fulfilment of the International Obligations of Norway is thus 
based on the consensus of the State.  
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1 Introduction 
1.1 The Subject Matter of the Thesis  
The subject matter of this Master Thesis is Lack of Consent as the Constituent Element of 
Rape. An analysis of the International Obligations of Norway and how they affect the Def-
inition of Rape in the General Civil Penal Code of 1902.  
 
The current definition of rape in Section 192 litra a and b of the General Civil Penal Code 
(GCPC) have four alternative elements that together with sexual activity is defined as rape. 
Any person can be held liable for rape if that person “engages in sexual activity by means 
of violence or threats” cf. Section 192 litra a, or “engages in sexual activity with any person 
who is unconscious or incapable for any other reason of resisting the act” cf. Section 192 
litra b.1   
 
The Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women criticized this defini-
tion of rape in their eight periodic report of Norway on 16 February 2012.2 The Committee 
urged Norway to “adopt a legal definition of rape in the Penal Code so as to place the lack 
of consent at its centre, in line with the Committee´s general recommendation No. 19, and 
the Vertido case”.3 The Committee´s report gave the author a notion to look into the Inter-
national Obligations of Norway concerning rape, in order to see how they define rape, and 
to analyse if, and in case, how they can affect the definition of rape in Section 192 of the 
GCPC.  
 
Norway does not have a lack of consent-based definition of rape at the present. As a conse-
quence of the UN Committee´s Eight Periodic Report of Norway, and the signature of the 
                                                
1 GCPC 1902 p. 76 
2 CEDAW/C/NOR/8 p. 5-6   
3 CEDAW/C/NOR/8 p. 6  
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Istanbul Convention on 7 July 2011, the Norwegian Ministry of Justice and Public Security 
proposed to expand the definition of rape in Section 192 of the GCPC into another letter, 
litra d, adding “lack of consent” to the sexual activity as rape. The official hearing finished 
on June 1 2013, and the outcome is still to be made.4   
 
Rape affects a broad spectre of areas of life in relation to psychological and somatic health 
such as level of functionality, ability to work, social support and life quality.5  A prevalence 
study published by the Norwegian Centre for Violence and Traumatic Stress Studies 
(NKVTS) on 25 February 2014, report 1/2014, concluded that physical violence and rape 
constitute serious public health problems.6 Rape is one of the worst sufferings a human 
being can inflict upon another.7 It is therefore of great importance that the crime of rape is 
defined correct in order to ensure that victims of rape can have a fair chance of achieving 
justice for the evil they have suffered.  
 
1.2 The Method and Structure of the Thesis 
The analysis of the International Obligations of Norway is based on the Vienna Convention 
on the law of treaties of 23 May 1969, and general principles for interpretation of law de-
veloped by the respective judicial bodies that enforce the international obligations of Nor-
way, as is today the Norwegian judicial method.8 Norway has not ratified the Vienna Con-
vention. However, the Convention expresses largely what is to be considered customary 
international law,9 and will therefore be used as means of interpretation in the analysis of 
the various international obligations of Norway concerning rape.  
 
                                                
4 Høringsnotat p. 22-34 E-bok 
5 Thoresen, Hjemdal (2014) p.127 
6 Thoresen, Hjemdal (2014) p. 26-27 
7 Prosecutor v. Kunarac (655)  
8 Echoff (2011) p. 18 
9 Ruud (2006) p. 74, 85 
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First, the current definition of rape in the Section 192 litra a and b of the GCPC will be 
presented. Relevant case law from the Supreme Court of Norway, preparatory works, Arti-
cle 96 of the Constitution of Norway and its relevant case law will be referred to as to give 
the reader an understanding of how rape is defined and interpreted in Norway today.  
 
Secondly, the International Conventions Norway is bound by through the Human Rights 
Act Section 3 will be presented in order to see how they define rape, and in case, how this 
definition affects the definition of rape in the GCPC. The relevant Conventions under the 
Human Rights Act are the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and the Con-
vention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW).  
 
Third, International Criminal law and the definition of rape as crimes against humanity and 
war crimes in chapter 16 of the Norwegian Penal Code of 2005 (NPC) will be subject to 
analysis. The provisions in chapter 16 of the NPC are built upon the Rome Statute, where 
rape is not specifically defined. Practice under the International Criminal Court (ICC), and 
case law from the International Tribunal on the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the Interna-
tional Tribunal of Rwanda (ICTR), and the impact these Conventions, Tribunals and Court 
have on the definition of rape in the GCPC will then be sought brought into clarity.  
 
Finally, the Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence against 
women and domestic violence (Istanbul Convention) will be subject to analysis as it has 
already had an impact on the definition of rape in Section 192 of the GCPC.10 This regional 
Convention clearly states that the constituent element of rape is lack of consent.  
 
1.3 Definitions 
”Lack of consent” is not clearly defined. The definition of “lack of consent” will therefore 
be sought brought into clarity with the progressive analysis of the International Obligations 
                                                
10 Istanbul Convention of 7 July 2011, Høringsnotat 
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of Norway, how they define rape, and in case how these definitions will affect the defini-
tion of rape in the GCPC. Other Norwegian legal expressions differing from International 
law will be explained progressively as to avoid misunderstandings. Any inaccuracies in 
translation whether it be Norwegian into English or Swedish into English, is entirely mine.  
 
1.4 Demarcation of Thesis 
In Norway there are four conditions of punishment that must exist before criminal liability 
can be established:  
 
“(1) A penal provision must cover the action.  
(2) No ground of impunity must exist, such as self- defence or emergency.  
(3) The offender must have incurred subjective guilt (mens rea).  
(4) The act must have been committed by a responsible person.”11  
 
This thesis will only discuss criteria (1), and then only de lege ferenda whether Norway is 
bound to change or ad “lack of consent” to the objective criteria of Section 192 in the 
GCPC in order to make its definition of rape compatible with the Country´s International 
Obligations. The analysis will therefore demarcate towards any other potential issues that 
might rise from Norway´s potential obligation to change or expand its definition of rape. 
An exemption is made in regard to Norway´s potential damage liability towards individuals 
exposed to non-consensual sexual activity in chapter 3.2.5. 
 
The International Covenant for Civil and Political Rights Articles 7 and 17 are similar to 
Articles 3 and 8 in the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms (ECHR), and therefore only the ECHR will be subject for analysis in this the-
sis.12 
                                                
11 Andenæs (1965) p. 94 
12 NOU 2008:4 p. 20 
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2 The Current definition of Rape in the General Civil Penal Code  
2.1 The constituent elements of Rape in Section 192 of the General Civil 
Penal Code 
2.1.1 Introduction  
The current definition of rape in Section 192 litra a and b of the General Civil Penal Code 
of 1902 (GCPC) have four alternative elements that together with sexual activity is defined 
as rape. Any person can be held liable for rape if that person “engages in sexual activity by 
means of violence or threats”13 cf. Section 192 litra a, or “engages in sexual activity with 
any person who is unconscious or incapable for any other reason of resisting the act” cf. 
Section 192 litra b. “In deciding whether the offender made use of violence or threats or 
whether the aggrieved person was incapable of resisting the act, importance shall be at-
tached to whether the aggrieved person was under 14 years of age” cf. Section 192 subsec-
tion 1.14 A person can also be held liable of rape after Section 192 litra c, if he or she “by 
means of violence or threats compels any person to engage in sexual activity with another 
person, or to carry out similar acts with himself or herself.” The constituent elements of 
rape are the same in Section 192 litra c and a, therefore only litra a and litra b will be dis-
cussed in the following. The prime interest of Section 192 is to protect the individual´s 
sexual autonomy.15 Rape as defined in Section 192 of the GCPC, are through preparatory 
works, case- law, judicial theory and policy considerations given a certain content with the 
result that there is seldom doubt of the legal content.16 
                                                
13 GCPC 1902 p. 76 
14 GCPC 1902 p. 76 
15 Andenæs (2004) p. 108 
16 Andenæs (2004) p. 106  
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2.1.2 Section 192 litra a in the General Civil Penal Code 
2.1.2.1 Introduction 
In Norway, the preparatory works are important means for statutory interpretation, as the 
Courts of Norway consider preparatory works as relevant for statutory interpretation.17  
 
Section 192 in the GCPC was revised in the year of 2000.18 From the preparatory works in 
Ot.prp.nr.28 (1999- 2000) it was held in chapter 16 concerning the definition of rape, that 
rape occurs by the use of different means in order to force sexual activity with another per-
son that is exposed to coercion.19 “Coercion” was removed as an element of the crime from 
Section 192 as it could lead to an unwanted focus20 on the aggrieved party´s behaviour in 
deciding whether the sexual activity was rape or not.21 It was held that Section 192 litra a 
where any person who “engages in sexual activity by means of violence or threats” were to 
be interpreted as before, only that there was no longer a demand that there had to be used 
coercion in order to engage in the sexual activity. However there had to be causation be-
tween the sexual activity as understood in “by” means of violence or threats. In that way 
the use of coercion was implied in the causation, in order to achieve the sexual activity.  
 
2.1.2.2 Section 192 litra a, “violence” or “threats” 
The preparatory works in Ot.prp.nr.28 (1999-2000) stated that what “violence” or “threats” 
entail is relative. Whether the conduct of the offender entails both of these is to be deemed 
according to the situation. In order to determine whether “violence” has been used, there is 
demanded less intensity in the assault when the victim is a minor, or in other ways is in a 
vulnerable position towards the offender. The preparatory works referred to a Supreme 
                                                
17 Eckhoff (2011) p. 79 
18 L11.08.2000 nr. 76 i kraft straks. § 192 
19 Ot.prp.nr.28 (1999-2000) ch. 16.1.1. p. 111 
20 Andenæs (2008) p. 142 
21 Strl. 1902 § 192   
 7 
Court verdict22 of which “violence” had occurred when the perpetrator had held his 16-
year-old niece tightly against himself, before having an intercourse with her. In Rt. 1991 
page 824, the accused had pushed his previous co-habitant into an armchair before he for-
cibly had intercourse with her. As the “violence” which constituted the crime was not in 
particular grave, the accused was sentenced to one year and eight months of prison cf. Rt. 
1991 page 824.  
 
NOU 2008:4 page 19 holds that “violence” is to be deemed in accordance with the factual 
circumstances of the case. Typical acts of violence mentioned were strikes, stranglehold, or 
that the perpetrator pushes the aggrieved party down or holds the aggrieved party´s legs 
and arms. “Violence” is also considered occurred when the aggrieved party has been una-
ble to get away from the perpetrator. There is no demand that the aggrieved party must 
have tried to resist the act. Other factors can be taken into consideration such as where the 
sexual activity has taken place, the aggrieved party´s relationship with the perpetrator, and 
if the aggrieved party had certain reasons to fear the perpetrator. However, there has to be 
causation between the “violence” used and the sexual activity in order to amount to rape.23  
 
“Threats” can involve conduct causing the victim serious fear for his or her life and health, 
but also other kinds of threats. There is no demand that the “threats” used has to be of a 
punitive character. Threats can involve setting out false accusations of the victim, or threats 
of reporting crimes the victim could have previously committed to the police. The less seri-
ous the threat is, the less likely it is that the threat had causation with the sexual activity.24  
 
The offender does not have to use violence or threats himself against the aggrieved party. It 
is enough that he is aware of that the aggrieved party is subject to coercion or threats, and 
that the aggrieved party would not have consented to the sexual activity under normal cir-
                                                
22 Rt. 1989 979 
23 NOU 2008:4 p.19 
24 Ot.prp.nr.28 (1999-2000) 
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cumstances.25 Rt. 2006 page 1319 makes it clear that in incidents where the offender knows 
that a third-person by the use of violence or threats has caused the aggrieved party to be at 
the offender´s “disposal,” and have taken advantage of this, the offender will be held liable 
for rape under Section 192 litra a.26 The offender in Rt. 2006 page 1319 had leased his 
house to sex-traffickers. He had an agreement with one of the main traffickers that he could 
have sex with two of the trafficked women after his own choice. He was aware that the two 
women were held in captivity and that they were too afraid to resist.27 The offender´s de-
fence argued that the accused was convicted wrongly for violating Section 192 litra a, and 
should rather have been accused for violating Section 192 litra b. The Court concluded that 
the man had violated Section 192 litra a, as the accused had taken advantage of the coercive 
circumstances the women were under.28  
 
2.1.3 Section 192 litra b in the General Civil Penal Code 
2.1.3.1.1 Introduction 
Section 192 of the GCPC was revised in the year of 2000.29  Before the revision, any per-
son who engaged in sexual activity with a person who was unconscious or incapable for 
any other reason of resisting the act was held liable after Section 193 of the GCPC. Section 
193 did not define the crime as rape and had a milder maximum sentence. As a result of the 
revision, the constituent elements of Section 193 was moved to form a new Section 192 
litra b.30 The preliminary consideration was to state that engaging in sexual activity with 
any person who is unconscious or incapable for any other reason of resisting the act, can be 
as serious as those incidents that traditionally had been deemed as rape cf. Section 192 litra 
                                                
25 Andenæs (2008) p. 142 
26 Andenæs (2008) p. 142 
27 Rt. 2006 1319 (11) 
28 Rt. 2006 1319 (13) 
29 Ot.prp.nr.28 (1999-2000) p. 111, Lov av 11 August 2000 nr. 76 
30 Ot.prp.nr.28 (1999-2000) p. 111, Lov av 11 August 2000 nr. 76 
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a. The understanding of “unconscious” or “incapable for any other reason of resisting the 
act” was to be interpreted as Section 193 had previously been practiced. 
 
2.1.3.2 Section 192 litra b, “unconscious”  
“Unconscious” entails hypnosis, insomnia, as well as illness or other external means that 
has caused the victim to become unconscious. It is also irrelevant if the victim´s uncon-
sciousness is self-caused for example by intoxication. There is however a borderline of 
which Rt. 2003 page 687 is an example of. The question before the Supreme Court was 
whether section 192 litra b entailed an incident where a man continues the sexual activity 
with a woman who in the beginning consents to this, but after a while falls asleep. The man 
had been found guilty by the Court of Appeals for having sexual relations with a woman 
who was “unconscious or of other reasons incapable of resisting the action” cf. Section 192 
litra b of the GCPC. The accused claimed in his appeal to the Supreme Court that what he 
had done was not rape according to Section 192 b of the GCPC, as she had consented to the 
sexual activity while being awake. In her judgment which the other joined, Judge Coward, 
held that the wording of the law31 – “engages in sexual activity with any person who is un-
conscious or incapable for any other reason of resisting the act” (Section 192 litra b), could 
be interpreted as to entail the situation of which the appellant had been convicted for. Judge 
Coward held however that this kind of situation was not discussed in the preparatory 
works, and that the lawmaker most likely had not considered this kind of situation when 
revising the law. Judge Coward also remarked that this incident had never been considered 
in previous Supreme Court verdicts. In legal literature she found some comments concern-
ing prior consent, but not in particular concerning those incidents where the sexual activity 
had been commenced before the afflicted loses her consciousness. Judge Coward put there-
fore weight to policy considerations, and consideration of the consequences of statutory 
interpretation. Judge Coward held that on one side this situation would no doubt have been 
experienced as offending by the aggrieved party after the sexual activity. If this incident 
                                                
31 Rt. 2003 687 (13-19)  
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were not entailed in Section 192 litra b, it would lead to that the aggrieved party would not 
have legal protection for any given time to choose consciously to engage or not engage in 
sexual activity. The offender would often have said to be acting clearly reproachable. How-
ever, it was a question of using very serious statutory sections towards that what the law-
giver defines as rape - a crime punishable with up to ten years in prison. The situation in 
the current case was in Judge Coward´s opinion so different from those cases sections con-
cerning rape was supposed to entail, and of which had usually been deemed as rape. At the 
same time this current situation was not an unpractical one, neither in established relation-
ships, nor in youth groups as was the situation of the current case: a couple starts sexual 
activities that is mutually consensual but the one person falls asleep, due to intoxication or 
tiredness, without the other stopping the sexual activity. Judge Coward concluded: I´ve 
reached my conclusion that there is such a great difference between the degree of offense 
and blameworthiness compared to what typically is deemed as rape after Section 192, that 
it would be to go too far to entail these incidents. This must be the rule with some guide-
lines. Partly must freedom from liability depend on that the offender would not have exe-
cuted more intrusive actions after the person´s partner had fallen asleep. If the accused in 
our case for instance had proceeded with an intercourse with the afflicted after she had fall-
en asleep, it would have been a criminal offense, and then after section 192 litra a. Another 
reservation, which practically is probably not as important, is to be made for those inci-
dents where the unconsciousness occurs because of an epileptic attack, an accident or simi-
lar incidents.32  
 
Judge Coward held that these precisions were without concern for this case. As the facts of 
the case had unanimously been taken into account by the Court of Appeals, she therefore 
deemed that after her interpretation of the statutory law in regard to the facts of the current 
case, the sexual activity did not constitute a criminal offense. In accordance with her voting 
the Supreme Court unanimously acquitted the accused, as his conduct was not considered 
rape under Section 192 litra b of the GCPC.  
                                                
32 Rt. 2003 687 (13-19) 
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2.1.3.2.1 Section 192 litra b, “incapable for any other reason of resisting the act”. 
 “Incapable for any other reason of resisting the act” are scenarios meant to protect people 
who are paralyzed, or having other illnesses that makes them incapable of resisting the sex-
ual activity. Previous case law refers to incidents where the victim suffered from cerebral 
palsy,33 multiple sclerosis,34 deep sleep35, being trapped in a taxi and incapable of resisting 
the attack because of angst,36 and too intoxicated by alcohol that the aggrieved party was 
incapable of resisting the sexual act, although she was conscious.37  If the offender causes 
the aggrieved party to become “incapable for any other reason of resisting the act” by add-
ing a drug to her drink by the intent of having sexual relations with the aggrieved party, he 
will be held liable after Section 192 (1) litra b cf. Section 192 (2) litra b.38 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
33 Rt.1961 547, Rt. 1982 578 
34 Rt. 1983 1345 
35 Rt. 1986 252, Rt. 1989 1309, Rt. 2004 39 
36 Rt. 2003 495 
37 Rt. 1993 963 
38 Rt. 2004 1902 
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2.2 The Principle of Legality of Criminal Law in Norway  
2.2.1 No one may be convicted except according to law 
Article 96 of the Norwegian Constitution prescribes:  
 
“No one may be convicted except according to law, or be punished except after a 
court judgment. (....).”39  
 
“Convicted” is understood as convicted for a crime. “Law” refers to the principle of nulla 
poena sine lege,40 a principle that is understood in accordance with Norwegian legal tradi-
tion that criminal liability and the reaction towards such behaviour can only be established 
by statutory law, also called the principle of legality.41 This means that the judge cannot 
convict anyone for a crime that is not prescribed by written law, also referred to by the 
maxim nullum crimen sine lege scripta.42 Rt. 1952 page 989 is an example of this. A man 
was accused for violating Section 350 of the GCPC by disturbing the “public peace and 
order”. The accused had harassed a married woman for a period of three months that had 
ended an affair with him, by phoning her home multiple times. He was convicted by the 
city court for disturbing the “public peace and order” cf. Section 350, and was sentenced to 
40 days of prison, as a deferred sentence. The Supreme Court unanimously acquitted him. 
The Court did not find that his conduct had violated Section 350 disturbing “public peace 
and order,” as his phone-calls had been directed to a private home. The Court deemed the 
behaviour despicable of which should have evoked criminal liability. As a result of the ac-
quittal, the GCPC was edited a new section 350 a in 1955 criminalizing such harassment.43  
                                                
39 CN 1814 
40 Andenæs (2004) p.  105 
41 Andenæs (2004) p. 104 
42 Cassese (2008) p. 37 
43 Lov av 3 juni 1955 nr. 2 § 390 a 
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2.2.2 No one may be convicted based on customary rules 
The principle of legality in Article 96 of the Constitution prohibits criminal liability from 
being established on the basis of customary rules.44 On the other hand customary rules can 
be used as means for interpretation of criminal liability established by statutory law. The 
Supreme Court of Norway has developed a judicial method prescribing that crimes have to 
be defined within a certain degree of specificity.45 This principle implies that the statutory 
law is to be interpreted as it would have commonly been understood/read by citizens. The 
principle of specificity is in Latin referred to as nullum crimen sine lege stricta, which 
means that criminal offences must be provided for through specific legislation.46 The prin-
ciples of nulla poena sine lege, and nullum crimen sine lege stricta has traditionally been 
reckoned as fundamental principles of the rule of law in democratic societies.47 The under-
standing and practice of nulla poena sine lege, and nullum crimen sine lege stricta in Nor-
way differs from that of common law countries, which prescribes that as long as there is a 
legal rule, criminal liability can be established.48  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
44 Andenæs (2004) p. 104 
45 See for example Rt. 2009 780 
46 Cassese (2008) p. 37-38 
47 Andenæs (2004) p. 105, see also Cassese (2008) p. 37 
48 See also Cassese (2008) p. 36- 41 
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2.2.3 “Law” in Article 96 of the Constitution is practiced more narrow than “law” in 
Article 7 of the European Convention on Human Rights 
 
Article 7 of the ECHR secures that no one is punished without “law”. “Law” within the 
meaning of the Convention can constitute national or international law, or general princi-
ples of law recognized by civilised nations at the time when the crime was committed cf. 
Article 7 nr. 1 and nr. 2. In the Case of Rohlena v. the Czech Republic, the ECtHR in Grand 
Chamber reiterated that Article 7 of the Convention embodies  
 
”the principle that only the law can define a crime and prescribe a penalty (nullum 
crimen, nulla poena sine lege) and the principle that the criminal law must not be 
extensively construed to an accused’s detriment. From these principles it follows 
that an offence must be clearly defined in the law. This requirement is satisfied 
where the individual can know from the wording of the relevant provision and, if 
need be, with the assistance of the courts’ interpretation of it, what acts and omis-
sions will make him criminally liable.”49 
 
The Court´s task is ”to verify that at the time when an accused person performed the act 
which led to his being prosecuted and convicted there was in force a legal provision which 
made that act punishable, and that the punishment imposed did not exceed the limits fixed 
by that provision (…) When speaking of “law” Article 7 alludes to the very same concept 
as that to which the Convention refers elsewhere when using that term, a concept which 
comprises statutory law as well as case-law and implies qualitative requirements, notably 
those of accessibility and foreseeability.”50  
                                                
49 Rholena v. The Czech Republic (27) 
50 Rholena v. The Czech Republic (28- 29) 
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The ECtHR thus interprets “law” as it is practiced in England and other common law coun-
tries.51 In Norway however, the principle of legality is practiced stricter, limiting criminal 
liability only to be prescribed by domestic statutory law cf. Article 96 of the Constitution.  
 
2.2.4 Article 97 cf. Article 96 of the Constitution absolutes the boundaries for 
criminal liability in Norway 
Prohibition against retroactive legislation (nullum crimen sine proevia lege52) is prescribed 
in Article 97 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court of Norway stated in Rt. 2010 page 
1445 that the prohibition against retroactive legislation cf. Article 97 complete the funda-
mental principle that no one can be punished except through statutory law in Article 96. 
This principle presumes that the statutory law has already entered into force before the 
crime is committed.53 Article 97 of the Constitution is based on two preliminary considera-
tions. First, the perpetrator shall have opportunity to know what punitive reaction that can 
possibly threaten him.54 Second, the government authorities – the legislative, executive and 
judicial branch shall be prohibited from placing a punitive reaction on an already commit-
ted action out of their own free opinion.55 The prohibition against retroactive legislation 
read together with Article 96 absolutes the boundaries for criminal liability under Norwe-
gian jurisdiction. 
 
 
                                                
51 Andenæs (2004) p. 105 
52 Cassese (2008) p. 38 
53 Rt. 2010 1445 (84-85) cf. Rt. 1946 198 cf. 207-208 
54 Rt. 2010 1445 (84-85) cf. Rt. 1946 198 cf. 207-208 
55 Rt. 2010 1445 (84-85) cf. Rt. 1946 198 cf. 207-208 
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2.2.5 The Supreme Court of Norway practice a strict contextual interpretation of 
the principle of legality  
The Supreme Court of Norway has practiced the principle of legality with varied strictness. 
The previous commented Rt. 1952 page 989 is an example where the Supreme Court of 
Norway does not hold anyone liable for an action unless it is prescribed by statutory law. In 
three verdicts known as “Passbåt-dommene,”56 in English “the speedboat verdicts,” con-
cerning the interpretation of “ship” in the GCPC Section 422 second paragraph, the Su-
preme Court of Norway interpreted the normal understanding of “ship” extensively. The 
accused in both Rt. 1966 page 916 and Rt. 1973 page 433 claimed that he had not maneu-
vered a “ship” as this would be a boat of significant size after a normal interpretation and 
understanding of the wording of the law. The Supreme Court of Norway denied this in both 
cases, and upheld their verdicts. The Court held in Rt. 1966 page 916 that the primary leg-
islative intent (ratio legis) with Section 422 was to create security and to avoid danger for 
the traffic at sea. Even though the boat at question was a fishing boat with the length of 25 
foot, width of 8 foot and a 15-18 Hk engine, there could be no doubt that maneuvering this 
boat would have a great potential of endangering others and those on-board. The “need” for 
a punitive reaction was therefore emphasized and the verdict upheld.   
In Rt. 1973 page 433, a 17-foot boat made of plastic with an engine of 115 Hk was inter-
preted as a “ship” in accordance with Section 422. The Court emphasized that this was the 
legislator’s intent, and referred to the preparatory works and Rt. 1966 page 916. The prima-
ry legislative intent behind Section 422, and the potential of danger the boat in question 
had, was decisive in determining whether the 17-foot plastic boat was a “ship” as Section 
422 prescribed. The verdict is an example of where policy considerations such as reproach-
able/blameworthy actions has been given weight in the interpretation of the wording of the 
law, in contrast to Rt. 1952 page 989.  
The expanding interpretation of “ship” in Section 422 of the GCPC came to a hold in Rt. 
1995 page 1734 where the question before the Supreme Court of Norway was if a 14-foot 
riverboat with a 4 Hk engine was a “ship”. The accused was acquitted with dissent 4-1, as 
                                                
56 Rt. 1966 916, Rt. 1973 433, Rt. 1995 1734 
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the majority found that the boat in question could not be understood as a “ship” in the un-
derstanding of Section 422. The danger potential of the boat was very small as its maxi-
mum speed would be 5-6 knots. The Court held that the wording and understanding of 
“ship” in Section 422 had a borderline, which was reached in this particular case. The 
Court would therefore not interpret “ship” too extensively even though support of this view 
could be found in the wording of the law, the preparatory works and policy considerations 
such as the legislative intent and the general risk for the public, and the demarcation prob-
lems that might occur of such a restrictive interpretation of “ship.” The first Judge to deliv-
er her opinion of which the other gave their support, said in an obiter dictum that the use of 
Section 422 on smaller boats was a practical important question that should be considered 
by the legislative force. The government took the hint and followed up with a law for 
smaller boats in 1998 (Lov 1998-06-26 nr. 47 Småbåtloven).  
 
Over the years the Supreme Court of Norway has established a clear and strict practice of 
the principle of legality. The “Derivative- verdict”57 and “Violence against a former Cohab-
itant- verdict”58 are examples of this. In Rt. 2009 page 780 the Supreme Court of Norway 
deemed gammabutyrolakton (GBL), which was not enlisted on “the drug-list” with authori-
ty in the statutory provision for drugs,59 not to be considered a derivative of gammahy-
droksybutryat (GHB), which was enlisted cf. the statutory provision for drugs section 2 and 
3.60 GHB had been enlisted on “the drug-list” by an administrative decision on July 12 
2000 cf. the Statutory Provision for Drugs of 30 June 1978 nr.8, cf. Section 2 and Section 
3. The Government held that it was sufficient for criminal liability to be established that the 
Norwegian Medicines Agency both in a letter and in a press release to the accused had 
claimed that GBL was entailed by the drug list, being a derivative of GHB, which was en-
listed. The Supreme Court deemed that this could not serve as a substitute; only an admin-
                                                
57 Rt. 2009 780 
58 Rt. 2011 469 
59 Narkotikalisten  
60 Narkotikalisten  
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istrative decision by the agency would suffice. The Court unanimously found that the 
chemical definition of derivatives had to be used, which held that GBL was not a derivative 
of GHB. Even though GBL by the use of easy means could be turned into GHB, the Su-
preme Court found that an interpretation of the derivative rule in such an expansive way 
would violate ECHR Art. 7. GBL was enlisted on “the drug-list” by an administrative deci-
sion on March 24 2010. 
 
In Rt. 2011 page 469 the question before the Supreme Court was whether violence against 
a previous co-habitant was entailed in Section 219 which at that time was directed against 
“any person who by threats, duress, deprivation of liberty, violence or any other wrong 
grossly or repeatedly maltreats a) his or her former or present spouse, (…) d) any person in 
his or her care.” The Supreme Court found that a present co-habitant was covered by alter-
native d), but that an expansion of criminal liability under Section 219 litra a, to also cover 
a former co-habitant had to be prescribed by statutory law. It was not sufficient that the 
lawgiver had intended such an interpretation of Section 219 litra a, by making a statutory 
definition in Section 5, which made co-habitants equivalent to a former or present spouse 
where the use of a person´s next- of- kin was entailed. The Court held that such an expan-
sion of criminal liability, compared to what followed directly from the wording of Section 
219, had to be prescribed by statutory law cf. Article 96 of the Constitution, ECHR Art. 7, 
and Rt. 2009 page 780 paragraph 21. The Court held that policy considerations such as the 
“need” for a punitive reaction or other policy considerations that could be taken into ac-
count to level previous cohabitants with previous spouses would not suffice. The Prosecu-
tor´s appeal was therefore denied, and the Court of Appeal´s verdict upheld. The accused 
was therefore not convicted for a felony after Section 219 of the GCPC. Section 219 litra a 
was expanded to entail a “co-habitant, and former co-habitant” through statutory law of 
June 24 2011 nr. 32, less than three months after the Supreme Court of Norway in Rt. 2011 
page 469 had executed its strict use of the principle of legality in favour of the accused.  
 
In effect, Article 96 of the Constitution, and the strict practice of the principle of legality 
developed by the Supreme Court of Norway, limits the means for how criminal liability can 
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be established. This is a fundamental organisation of the “checks and balances” between 
Norwegian authorities.61 
 
2.3 Summary and Conclusion 
Any person can be held liable for rape after Section 192 if that person “engages in sexual 
activity by means of violence or threats,”62 or “engages in sexual activity with any person 
who is unconscious or incapable for any other reason of resisting the act.” The protection 
of the individual´s sexual autonomy is the prime interest of Section 192.63 What “violence” 
and “threats” entail is relative and can be deemed in accordance with the factual circum-
stances of the case. Rape as defined in Section 192 of the GCPC, are through preparatory 
works, case-law, judicial theory and policy considerations given a certain content with the 
result that there is seldom doubt of the legal content.64 The Supreme Court of Norway has 
interpreted “unconscious” restrictive cf. Rt. 2003 page 687, refraining from constituting 
criminal liability in a situation which could be entailed by Section 192 litra b after a normal 
interpretation of the wording of the law.  
 
Article 96 of the Constitution prescribes that no one may be convicted except according to 
“law.” “Law” refers to the principle of nulla poena sine lege,65 a principle practiced in ac-
cordance with Norwegian legal tradition establishing criminal liability and the reaction 
towards such behaviour only by statutory law. This principle has also been referred to as 
the principle of legality.66 Today the Supreme Court of Norway practice the principle of 
legality with a strict contextual interpretation of the wording of the law, refraining from 
constituting criminal liability unless statutory law accurately prescribes it cf. Rt. 2009 page 
                                                
61 Andenæs (2006) p. 27 
62 GCPC 1902 p. 76 
63 Andenæs (2004) p. 108 
64 Andenæs (2004) p. 106 
65 Andenæs (2004) p. 105 
66 Andenæs (2004) p. 104 
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780 and Rt. 2011 page 469. The principles set out in Article 96 and Article 97 of the Con-
stitution, interpreted by the Supreme Court is therefore stricter and in favour of the accused 
than required by international law.67 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
67 Cassese (2008) p. 38- 41 
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3 The International Conventions incorporated into the Human 
Rights Act Section 3 and their definition of Rape 
3.1 The standing of the Human Rights Act in domestic Norwegian Law  
3.1.1 Introduction 
Law on strengthening human rights in Norwegian law (the Human Rights Act) was passed 
on May 21 1999.68 The aim was to strengthen human rights in Norwegian law cf. Section 
169. The preparatory works held that the purpose of the Act is to reduce the uncertainty 
concerning the human rights Convention´s legal role in domestic law, to increase the 
knowledge concerning them, and to signalize the importance of the human rights role in 
Norwegian law and community.70  
 
Five Conventions have been incorporated into Section 2 of the Human Rights Act, which 
holds that they “apply to Norwegian law in so far as they are binding on Norway.” Norway 
is a dualistic state, and a special act of implementation is therefore in principle required in 
order for a treaty to apply as part of domestic law.71 Incorporation was chosen for the im-
plementation of the treaty obligations into domestic law.72 Incorporation is characterized by 
the State´s adoption of legislation or other binding provisions, which establishes that the 
treaty shall have direct effect as rules of law for national authorities.73 National authorities 
shall apply the treaty´s authentic text, its travaux préparatoires and international law princi-
ples of interpretation.74   
 
                                                
68 LOV-1999-05-21-30 
69 LOV-1999-05-21-30 
70 NOU 1993:18 p. 166 and Ot.prp.nr. 3 (1998-1999) p. 50 
71 NOU 1993:18 p. 193 
72 NOU 1993:18 p. 91- 98, Ruud (2006) p. 58-63 
73 NOU 1993:18 p. 91- 98, Ruud (2006) p. 58-63 
74 NOU 1993:18 p. 91- 98, Ruud (2006) p. 58-63 
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Only two of the five incorporated conventions will be subject for analysis in this thesis. 
These are the Council of Europe Convention of 4 November 1950 for the protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR), which was incorporated when the Human Rights Act was passed on May 21 
1999, and the United Nations International Covenant 18 December 1979 on the Elimination 
of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) with Protocol 6 October 1999, 
which was incorporated by Act of 19 June 2009 nr. 80, and entered into force on June 19 
2009.75 
 
3.1.2 The Conventions incorporated into the Human Rights Act shall take 
precedence over conflicting provisions in other legislation  
The Conventions incorporated into the Human Rights Act shall take precedence over con-
flicting provisions in other legislation cf. Section 3 of the Human Rights Act. The Human 
Rights Act is therefore Lex Superior to other domestic legislation.76 Lex Superior is a prin-
ciple where legal rules of higher rank take precedence over legal rules of lower rank, in 
case of conflict.77 The Constitution of Norway is Lex Superior to the Human Rights Act, as 
it can be set aside by a decision of the Parliament cf. the Constitution Article 76 and fol-
lowing. The Supreme Court of Norway deem the limits the Constitution sets for the viola-
tion of human rights and the boundaries from which the conventions incorporated through 
the Human Rights Act, as separate legal grounds.78 
 
The preparatory works of the Human Rights Act underlined that the incorporation of the 
human rights conventions into Section 2 would lead to a new legal situation with the supe-
rior aim of strengthening the legal standing of individuals in domestic law.79 One of the 
                                                
75 Kgl.res. 19 June 2009 nr. 696 
76 NOU 1993:18 p. 156-161 E-bok 
77 NOU 1993:18 p. 148- 151 
78 Rt. 2006 262, see also Andenæs (2006) p. 28 
79 Innst.O. nr. 51 (1998-1999), p. 6 
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goals for the incorporation was to influence the state of the law in Norway towards listen-
ing to, and to have an open relationship towards the legal practice of the Court in Stras-
bourg, and other international judicial enforcement organs.80 Norwegian case law, in as 
large extent as possible, is to correspond with what is considered the current international 
legal interpretation.81  
 
Concerning the question of conflicting provisions between an incorporated Convention 
provision and other Norwegian law, the Supreme Court of Norway has stated that this 
question cannot be resolved through a general principle, but has to be decided upon by an 
interpretation of the legal provisions in question.82 The preceding rule in the Human Rights 
Act Section 3 entails that Norwegian Courts will have to follow the Convention provision 
if the interpretation result of the ECHR seems “adequately clear.” This is the rule even if it 
will lead to that incorporated Norwegian legislation or practice should be set aside.83 The 
Constitution of Norway is Lex Superior to the Human Rights Act and criminal liability for 
non-consensual rape cannot be established through harmonisation of the Convention provi-
sions. Compliance with the positive obligations under the Human Rights Act in regard of 
rape can therefore only be ensured by a change or expansion of statutory law cf. Article 76- 
78 of the Constitution.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
80 Innst.O. nr. 51 (1998-1999), p. 6 
81 Innst.O. nr. 51 (1998-1999), p. 6 
82 Rt. 2003 359 (58) 
83 Rt. 2003 359 (58) 
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3.1.3 Article 110 c of the Constitution securing human rights as a source of law of 
significant weight and influence in domestic law 
 
Article 110 c of the Norwegian Constitution read as follows:  
 
“It is the responsibility of the authorities of the State to respect and ensure human 
rights.  
Specific provisions for the implementation of treaties thereon shall be determined 
by law.”84  
 
The preparatory works of Article 110 c holds that the object and purpose of this article is to 
underline the importance of human rights in Norway and thus give a “signal effect” to the 
lawgiver, but not in such a way that individuals can derive any specific rights from it.85 
Article 110 c is meant to have an important symbolic effect, both domestic and internation-
ally, concerning the weight and importance of the human rights. In regard of the responsi-
bility for the authorities of the State to “respect and ensure human rights”, the preparatory 
works stated that those acting on behalf of the State are not only to avoid violation of the 
human rights, but also to take positive measures in order to prevent violations.86 This has 
also been referred to as the principle of double implementation of the Conventions.87  
 
Article 110 c of the Constitution was formulated in such a way as to express central values 
in Norwegian politics of which the Parliament is behind, and of which the Norwegian soci-
ety should be built upon.88 First, it was held that first subsection of 110 c is a binding 
guideline for Norwegian authorities’ politics. They will not have legal admittance to lead a 
                                                
84 CN 1814 
85 NOU 1993:18 p. 156-161 E-bok 
86 NOU 1993:18 p. 158 E-bok 
87 NOU 1993:18 p. 158 E-bok 
88 NOU 1993:18 p. 158 E-bok cf. Innst.S.nr. 163 (1991-1992) s. 5 annen spalte 
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policy that is incompatible with the principle Article 110 c encapsulates.89A breach with 
this obligation can in theory lead to a constitutional responsibility for the Government and 
Parliament.90  
 
The principle of respecting and ensuring human rights in Article 110 c (1) is also intended 
to be an important mean for interpreting statutory laws. Human rights are an important 
source of law with significant weight. This can be derived from “human rights” in Article 
110 c (1), held together with the human rights conventions referred to in a footnote of Arti-
cle 110 c (2), amongst them the ECHR and CEDAW.91 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
                                                
89 NOU 1993:18 p. 159 E-bok 
90 NOU 1993:18 p. 159 E-bok 
91 NOU 1993:18 p. 159 E-bok 
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3.2 The Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms (ECHR) 
3.2.1 Introduction 
The European Convention on Human Rights was ratified by Norway on January 15 1952, 
and entered into force on September 3 1953.92 The ECHR was incorporated into the Human 
Rights Act on 21 May 199993 and given precedence over conflicting provisions in other 
legislation cf. Section 3 of the Human Rights Act.94 The impact of human rights derived 
from the ECHR in the realm of criminal law in domestic Norwegian law has mainly con-
cerned the rights of the accused.95 This might be due to that the defence seek to protect its 
clients interests at the best of their ability, claiming incompliance with Norway´s positive 
obligations under the ECHR when chance occur.96 The Prosecutor only prosecutes people 
for crimes prescribed by domestic statutory law.97 Thus the positive obligations Norway 
undertakes in regard of protecting people subject to crimes is not developed by any leading 
actors in court. This is not to be taken into account for that the State Party has no positive 
obligations under the ECHR in regard of a person subject to crime, for instance rape.98  
 
3.2.2 The dynamic and teleological interpretation of the ECtHR constitutes new 
obligations for the Member States Parties under the ECHR 
The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has developed a teleological method for 
the interpretation of the ECHR. The Court stated in the Case of Tyrer v. the United King-
dom that “the Convention is a living instrument which (…) must be interpreted in the light 
                                                
92 St.prp. 83 (1951)  
93 LOV-1999-05-21-30 
94 NOU 1993:18 p. 156-161 E-bok 
95 NOU 2008:4 p. 20 E-bok, Rt. 2000 996, Rt. 2002 557, Rt. 2003 359   
96 See for example Rt. 2011 800 
97 LOV-1981-05-22-25 § 69 
98 M.C v. Bulgaria 
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of present-day conditions.99 The role of the ECtHR is to ensure that a State´s obligation to 
protect the rights of those under its jurisdiction is adequately discharged cf. “Article 19 of 
the Convention and the principle that the Convention is intended to guarantee not theoreti-
cal or illusory, but practical and effective rights.”100 The ECtHR interprets the wording of 
the Convention autonomous in order to achieve a unanimous standard for the implementa-
tion of the rights that follows from the Convention within the States, which are the High 
Contracting Parties.101  
 
In contrast to other international treaties, the Court emphasises in its interpretation of the 
Convention that it contains rights and liberties for individuals within the member states, 
which are the High Contracting Parties. The Court stated in the Case of Wemhoff v. Ger-
many:102 
“Given that it is a law- making treaty, it is also necessary to seek the interpretation 
that is most appropriate in order to realise the aim and achieve the object of the trea-
ty, not that which would restrict to the greatest possible degree the obligations un-
dertaken by the Parties.” 
 
The ECtHR is not formally bound to follow its previous judgments. The Court considers 
nevertheless that it is in the interest of legal certainty, foreseeability and equality before the 
law that it should not depart, without good reason, from precedents laid down in previous 
cases.103  
 
                                                
99 Tyrer v. The United Kingdom (31)  
100 Eremia v. The Republick of Moldova (50)  
101 Macdonald (1993) p. 73 cf. Rt. 2002 557 nr. 4 
102 Wemhoff v. Germany (8)  
103 Christine Goodwin v the United Kingdom (74) 
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3.2.3 The weight of judgments from the ECtHR as a source of law in domestic 
Norwegian Law 
 
The Conventions incorporated into the Human Rights Act Section 2 shall take precedence 
over conflicting provisions in other legislation cf. Section 3. The preparatory works of the 
Human Rights Act held that one of the goals for the incorporation of the ECHR was to in-
fluence the state of law in Norway towards listening to, and to have an open relationship 
towards the legal practice of the Court in Strasbourg, and other international judicial en-
forcement organs.104 The superior aim was that Norwegian case law in a large extent as 
possible was to correspond with what is to be considered the current international legal 
interpretation.105  
 
Concerning the question of conflicting provisions between an incorporated Convention 
provision and other Norwegian law, the Supreme Court of Norway has stated that this can-
not be resolved through a general principle, but has to be decided upon by an interpretation 
of the legal provisions in question.106 The preceding rule of the Human Rights Act Section 
3 entail that Norwegian Courts will have to follow the Convention provision if the interpre-
tation result that follows from the ECHR seems adequately clear.107 This is the rule even if 
it will lead to that incorporated Norwegian legislation or practice would be set aside.108 In 
Rt. 2008 page 1409 the Court stated that it was a clear lawgiver intent behind Section 3 of 
the Human Rights Act, and that the Conventions incorporated should take precedence when 
in conflict with domestic provisions in order to strengthen the human rights in domestic 
law.109  
                                                
104 Innst.O. nr. 51 (1998-1999), p. 6 
105 Innst.O. nr. 51 (1998-1999), p. 6 
106 Rt. 2003 359 (58), see also Rt. 2000 996 and Rt. 2002 557 
107 Rt. 2003 359 (58) 
108 Rt. 2003 359 (58) 
109 Rt. 2008 1409 (74) 
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The Supreme Court in a plenary session stated in Rt. 2000 page 996 that questions concern-
ing conflicting convention provisions and provisions in other Norwegian legislation cannot 
be solved by one principle, but through a more specific interpretation of the present legal 
rules, and that through harmonisation, a potential conflict may fall away.110 Harmonisation 
is however precluded in order to establish criminal liability under Norwegian domestic law 
due to the principle of legality cf. Article 96 of the Constitution, and the Supreme Court of 
Norway´s strict practice of this cf. Rt. 2009 page 780, Rt. 2011 page 469.  
 
Judicial literature has stated that “[a]ny statement by way of interpretation by the Commis-
sion or the Court is significant, although inevitably the level of generality at which it is 
expressed or its centrality to the decision on the material facts of the case will affect the 
weight and influence of any pronouncement.”111 The Supreme Court of Norway has con-
cluded that the ECtHR does not make a separation between the weight and influence of its 
“ratio decidendi” or “obiter dicta”.112 Any statement by the ECtHR can therefore potential-
ly constitute a positive obligation for the Member State Party cf. ECHR art. 1.  
 
3.2.3.1 Summary and Conclusion  
Case law from the ECtHR has great weight as a source of law in Norway. In Rt. 2008 page 
1409 the Court stated that there was a clear lawgiver intent behind Section 3 of the Human 
Rights Act, and that the Conventions incorporated should take precedence when in conflict 
with domestic provisions in order to strengthen the human rights in Norwegian law.113  
 
                                                
110 Rt. 2000 996 under section ”General Comments” 
111 Harris (1995) p. 18 
112 Rt. 2002 557 nr. 3 
113 Rt. 2008 1409 (74) 
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3.2.4 The constituent elements of rape defined by the ECtHR, interpreted in the 
light of Articles 3 and 8 of the ECHR  
3.2.4.1 The European Convention on Human Rights Article 3 
3.2.4.1.1 Introduction  
The ECtHR has described prohibition against torture to be “one of the most fundamental 
values of democratic societies. Even in the most difficult circumstances, such as the fight 
against terrorism and organised crime, the Convention prohibits in absolute terms torture 
and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (…) Article 3 makes no provision for 
exceptions and no derogation from it is permissible.”114 Prohibition of torture is therefore 
jus cogens, being of a non-derogable nature, even in times of crisis.115 The prohibition of 
torture as jus cogens implies that it has become one of the most fundamental standards of 
the international community.116 It therefore imposes on States obligations erga onmnes, 
towards all the other members of the international community.117 
 
3.2.4.1.2 Rape as ill treatment within the meaning of torture in Article 3 of the ECHR 
The European Convention on Human Rights Article 3 concerning prohibition of torture 
read as follows:  
 
“No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment 
or punishment.” 
 
The Convention itself does not define what lies in “torture”, “inhuman”, or “degrading 
treatment or punishment”.  
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The Court has interpreted treatment as “inhuman” because it was “applied for hours at a 
stretch and caused either actual bodily injury or intense physical and mental suffering, and 
“degrading” because it was such as to arouse in its victims feelings of fear, anguish and 
inferiority capable of humiliating and debasing them.”118 In order to consider whether a 
treatment is “degrading” within the meaning of Article 3, “the Court will have regard to 
whether its object is to humiliate and debase the person concerned and whether, as far as 
the consequences are concerned, it adversely affected his or her personality in a manner 
incompatible with Article 3”.119  
 
Ill- treatment and degrading treatment must “attain a minimum level of severity if it is to 
fall within the scope of Article 3. The assessment of this minimum level of severity is rela-
tive; it depends on all the circumstances of the case, such as the duration of the treatment, 
its physical and mental effect and, in some cases, the sex, age and state of health of the vic-
tim.”120  
 
The ECtHR deemed rape as a particular form of ill- treatment amounting to torture in the 
case of Aydin v. Turkey in 1997. The Court stated that in “order to determine whether any 
particular form of ill- treatment should be qualified as torture, regard must be had to the 
distinction drawn in Article 3 between this notion and that of inhuman treatment or degrad-
ing treatment. This distinction would appear to have been embodied in the Convention to 
allow the special stigma of “torture” to attach only to deliberate inhuman treatment causing 
very serious and cruel suffering.”121 The applicant in this case had been raped by an official 
of the State, while being held in detention. The Court considered that rape of a detainee by 
an official of the State to be an especially grave and abhorrent form of ill- treatment given 
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the ease with which the offender can exploit the vulnerability and weakened resistance of 
his victim.122 The ECtHR concluded that “the accumulation of acts of physical and mental 
violence inflicted on the applicant and the especially cruel act of rape to which she was 
subjected amounted to torture in breach of Article 3 of the Convention. Indeed the Court 
would have reached this conclusion on either of these grounds taken separately.”123 
 
Rape is considered to infringe both the physical and psychological right to personal integri-
ty, guaranteed by Article 3 of the ECHR.124 
 
3.2.4.1.3 Summary and Conclusion 
Rape constitutes ill- treatment amounting to torture within the meaning of Article 3 of the 
ECHR. In the case of Aydin v. Turkey, the ECtHR stated that the accumulation of acts of 
physical and mental violence inflicted on the applicant and the especially cruel act of rape 
to which she was subjected amounted to torture in breach of Article 3 of the Convention.125 
 
3.2.4.2 The positive obligations of the States under Article 3 in regard of the definition of 
rape in the respective Penal Codes of the Member State Parties  
The relevant principles concerning the existence of a positive obligation to punish rape and 
to investigate rape cases was enunciated in the case of M.C v. Bulgaria of 4 December 
2003.126 The applicant alleged that her rights under Articles 3, 8, 13 and 14 of the Conven-
tion had been violated. She claimed that domestic law and practice in rape cases and the 
investigation into the rape of which she had been subject to, did not secure the observance 
by the respondent State of its positive obligation to provide effective legal protection 
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against rape and sexual abuse.127 The applicant, a Bulgarian national alleged that two men 
had raped her on 31 July and 1 August 1995, being 14 years and 10 months old. The ensu-
ing investigation came to the conclusion that there was insufficient proof of the applicant 
having been compelled to have sex.128 Having unsuccessfully tried to appeal the decision of 
dismissing her case, the applicant filed a complaint to the ECtHR. The applicant alleged 
that Bulgarian law and practice did not provide effective protection against rape and sexual 
abuse. She alleged that only cases where the victim had resisted actively were prosecuted, 
and that the authorities had not investigated the events of 31 July and 1 August 1995 effec-
tively. 
 
The Court took a general approach as to the existence of a positive obligation to punish 
rape and to investigate rape cases under the Convention. In regard of the nature and sub-
stance of the applicant´s complaints, the Court found they should be examined primarily 
under Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention.129 The Court reiterated that the obligation of the 
High Contracting Parties under Article 1 of the Convention is to secure to everyone within 
their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in the Convention, taken together with 
Article 3, requires States to take measures designed to ensure that individuals within their 
jurisdiction are not subjected to ill- treatment, including ill- treatment administered by pri-
vate individuals.130  
 
The Court found “in sum” that “the investigation of the applicant´s case and, in particular, 
the approach taken by the investigator and the prosecutors in the case fell short of the re-
quirements inherent in the State´s positive obligations – viewed in the light of the relevant 
modern standards in comparative and international law – to establish and apply effectively 
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a criminal- law system punishing all forms of rape and sexual abuse.” The ECtHR conclud-
ed that “effective protection against rape and sexual abuse requires measures of a criminal- 
law nature.”131 The state of Bulgaria had therefore violated its positive obligations under 
both Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention.  
 
The Court performed a dynamic interpretation of the Convention under the headline “mod-
ern conception of the elements of rape and its impact on the substance of member States´ 
positive obligation to provide adequate protection.”132 States undoubtedly enjoy a wide 
margin of appreciation in respect of the means to ensure adequate protection against rape. 
Perceptions of a cultural nature, local circumstances and traditional approaches are in par-
ticular to be taken into account.133 However, the “limits of the national authorities´ margin 
of appreciation are nonetheless circumscribed by the Convention provisions. In interpreting 
them, since the Convention is first and foremost a system for the protection of human 
rights, the Court must have regard to the changing conditions within Contracting States and 
respond, for example, to any evolving convergence as to the standards to be achieved.”134  
 
In order to reach a conclusion of the modern day conception of rape, the ECtHR used the 
principle of specificity (“Bestimmtheitsgrundsatz”, also referred to by the maxim “nullem 
crimen sine lege stricta”).135 Relevant comparative and international law and practice were 
taken into account. The Court found that the approaches to rape varied significantly from 
one country to another.136 
 
The Court reviewed the definition of rape from several countries such as Belgium, Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Slovenia, the United 
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Kingdom, the United States of America, and other legal systems such as Australia, Canada 
and South Africa.137 Of the European countries, only Belgium, Ireland and the United 
Kingdom defined rape as a non-consensual act.138 
 
The definition of rape in Article 375 §§ 1 and 2 of the Belgian Criminal Code of 1989 dif-
fered from other continental definitions:  
 
   “Any act of sexual penetration, of whatever nature and by whatever means, com-
mitted on a person who does not consent to it shall constitute the crime of rape. 
    In particular, there is no consent where the act is forced by means of violence, 
coercion or ruse or was made possible by the victim´s disability or physical or men-
tal deficiency.”139 
 
Ireland representing the common law tradition had a similar definition of rape in section 2 
(1) of the Criminal Law (Rape) Act 1981 and section 9 of the Criminal Law (Rape) 
(Amendment) Act 1990:  
 
“A man commits rape if (a) he has sexual intercourse with a woman who at the 
time of intercourse does not consent and (b) at the time he knows she does not con-
sent or is reckless as to whether or not she is consenting.” 
“It is hereby declared that in relation to an offence that consists of or includes the 
doing of an act to a person without the consent of the person, any failure or omis-
sion by that person to offer resistance to the act does not of itself constitute consent 
to that act.”140 
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The Penal Codes of continental countries such as the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Hungary, and Slovenia defined rape as when a person coerces another 
person into sexual penetration or a similar sexual act through violence, threats, surprise or 
by taking advantage of the person´s helplessness/incapacity to defend himself/herself.141 
These definitions are similar to the current definition of rape in Section 192 of the GCPC. 
In particular, Denmark and Finland have similar definitions of rape as Norway, as they 
belong to the same “legal family” of Scandinavian law (Skandinavisk rettsrealisme).142 
 
Thirty- seven States in the United States of America had criminalised non-consensual in-
tercourse.143 Lack of consent was also the defining element of rape and sexual abuse in 
Australia, Canada and South Africa.144 
 
The Court took into account the Recommendation of the Committee of Ministers of the 
Council of Europe on the protection of women against violence, which recommended that 
member States should “penalise any sexual act committed against non-consenting persons, 
even if they do not show signs of resistance;”145 This Recommendation has today become 
the Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic vio-
lence (Istanbul Convention), which Norway has signed.146 
 
The ECtHR quoted judgments from the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yu-
goslavia (ICTY), Prosecutor v Furundžija147 and the case of Kunarac, Kovač and 
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Vuković,148 in order to reach a conclusion of how rape should be defined in the light of 
ECHR articles 3 and 8. In Prosecutor v Furundžija,149 the ICTY defined rape as:  
 
“sexual penetration … by coercion or force or threat of force against the victim or a 
third person.”150  
 
The ECtHR noted that the “terms “coercion”, “force”, or “threat of force” from the Fu-
rundžija definition were not intended to be interpreted narrowly. However, the Trial 
Chamber in Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Kovač and Vuković defined rape as:  
 
“the actus reus of the crime of rape in international law is constituted by … sexual 
penetration … where [it] occurs without the consent of the victim. Consent for this 
purpose must be consent given voluntarily, as a result of the victim´s free will, as-
sessed in the context of the surrounding circumstances. The mens rea is the inten-
tion to effect this sexual penetration, and the knowledge that it occurs without the 
consent of the victim.”151 
 
The ECtHR quoted General Recommendation No. 19 of 29 January 1992 on violence 
against women issued by the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Discrimina-
tion against Women in paragraph 24, in order to reach a conclusion of how rape should be 
defined in the light of ECHR articles 3 and 8:  
 
“(a) States parties should take appropriate and effective measures to overcome 
all forms of gender-based violence, whether by public or private act;  
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(b) States parties should ensure that laws against … abuse, rape, sexual assault 
and other gender- based violence give adequate protection to all women, and re-
spect their integrity and dignity. …”152  
 
The ECtHR noted that proof of physical force and physical resistance had historically been 
required under domestic law and practice in rape cases in a number of countries. The Court 
observed nonetheless that the last decades “have seen a clear and steady trend in Europe 
and some other parts of the world towards abandoning formalistic definitions and narrow 
interpretations of the law in this area.”153 “It appears that a requirement that the victim must 
resist physically is no longer present in the statutes of European countries.”154  
 
“In common-law countries, in Europe and elsewhere, reference to physical force 
has been removed from the legislation and/or case- law (…). Irish law explicitly 
states that consent cannot be inferred from lack of resistance (…). In most European 
countries influenced by the continental legal tradition, the definition of rape con-
tains references to the use of violence by the perpetrator. It is significant, however, 
that in case- law and legal theory lack of consent, not force, is seen as the  
constituent element of the offence of rape.”155  
 
The Court observed that Article 152 § 1 of the Bulgarian Criminal Code did not mention 
any requirement of physical resistance by the victim and defined rape in a manner, which 
did not differ significantly from the wording found in statutes of other member States. In 
fact, many legal systems at that time defined rape by reference to the means used by the 
perpetrator to obtain the victim´s submission.156 The Court found it difficult to arrive at 
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safe general conclusions whether every sexual act carried out without the victim´s consent 
is punishable under Bulgarian law, due to the absent of case law explicitly dealing with the 
question.  
 
“Whether or not a sexual act in a particular case is found to have involved coercion 
always depends on a judicial assessment of the facts. A further difficulty is the ab-
sence of a reliable study of prosecutorial practice in cases which never reached the 
courts.”157 
 
The Bulgarian Government was unable to provide copies of judgments or legal commen-
taries clearly disproving the allegations of a restrictive approach in the prosecution of 
rape.158 Also the vast majority of the reported judgments from the Supreme Court con-
cerned rapes committed with the use of significant violence (except those where the victim 
was physically or mentally disabled). The ECtHR stated that although this was not decisive 
to whether or not non-consensual sexual activity was penalised, prosecuted, and ending up 
with final convictions under Bulgarian law, “it may be seen as an indication that most of 
the cases where little or no physical force and resistance were established were not prose-
cuted.”159 
 
Having reviewed international law and other relevant sources, the Court concluded:  
 
“[T]he evolving understanding of the manner in which rape is experienced by the 
victim has shown that victims of sexual abuse – in particular, girls below the age of 
majority – often provide no physical resistance because of a variety of psychologi-
cal factors or because they fear violence on the part of the perpetrator. Moreover, 
the development of law and practice in that area reflects the evolution of societies 
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towards effective equality and respect for each individual´s sexual autonomy. (…) 
the Court is persuaded that any rigid approach to the prosecution of sexual offences, 
such as requiring proof of physical resistance in all circumstances, risks leaving cer-
tain types of rape unpunished and thus jeopardising the effective protection of the 
individual´s sexual autonomy. In accordance with contemporary standards and 
trends in that area, the member State´s positive obligations under Articles 3 and 8 of 
the Convention must be seen as requiring the penalisation and effective prosecution 
of any non- consensual sexual act, including in the absence of physical resistance 
by the victim.”160  
 
In the light of the above, the Court held that their task in the present case was to examine 
“whether or not the impugned legislation and practice and their application in the case at 
hand, combined with the alleged shortcomings in the investigation, had such significant 
flaws as to amount to a breach of the respondent State´s positive obligations under Articles 
3 and 8 of the Convention.”161 The Court concluded that there had been a violation of the 
respondent State´s positive obligations under both Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention, and 
the applicant was awarded 8 000 EUR in non- pecuniary damage.162  
 
The Court reiterated in the Case of Söderman v. Sweden,163 and in the case of I.G v. Moldo-
va164 that the Member States are obliged within the scope of Article 3 to provide efficient 
criminal-law provisions, effectively punishing rape and to apply them in practice through 
effective investigation and prosecution for rape cases, thus establishing the precedence 
enunciated in the M.C v. Bulgaria. 
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3.2.4.2.1 Summary and Conclusion  
Rape has been defined by the ECtHR as ill- treatment amounting to torture within the 
meaning of Article 3 of the ECHR in several judgments. In accordance with contemporary 
standards and trends in the area of criminal law, “the member State´s positive obligations 
under Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention must be seen as requiring the penalisation and 
effective prosecution of any non- consensual sexual act, including in the absence of physi-
cal resistance by the victim.”165 The ECtHR reviews whether or not the impugned legisla-
tion and practice and their application in the case at hand, combined with the alleged short-
comings in the investigation, has such significant flaws as to amount to a breach of the re-
spondent State´s positive obligations under Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention.166  
 
3.2.4.3 Failure to provide sufficient penal provisions concerning rape violates the right to 
respect for private life cf. Article 8 of the ECHR  
 
3.2.4.3.1 The right to respect for private life cf. Article 8 in regard of rape 
The relevant convention provisions in regard of rape under Article 8 were deemed by the 
ECtHR in M.C v. Bulgaria to be:167  
Article 8  
“Everyone has the right to respect for his private … life…”  
 
“Private life” is a concept, which covers the physical and moral integrity of the person, 
including his or her sexual life cf. Case of X and Y v. the Netherlands.168  
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3.2.4.3.2 The positive obligations of a State to ensure respect for private life cf. Article 8 
Concerning the positive obligations of a State to ensure respect for private life, the Court 
stated in the Case of X and Y v. the Netherlands of 26 March 1985:169  
 
“[A]lthough the object of Article 8 is that of protecting the individual 
against arbitrary interference by the public authorities, it does not merely 
compel the State to abstain from interference: in addition to this primarily 
negative undertaking, there may be positive obligations inherent in an effec-
tive respect for private or family life (…). These obligations may involve the 
adoption of measures designed to secure respect for private life even in the 
sphere of the relations of individuals between themselves.”  
 
Concerning both his daughter and himself, the applicant, Mr. X, alleged that the right of 
respect for private life guaranteed in Article 8 had been infringed by the Netherlands. Ms. 
Y had been raped by the son-in-law (Mr. B) of the directress of the privately- run home for 
mentally handicapped children. Due to “a gap” in the domestic Code of Criminal Proce-
dure, neither Ms. Y nor her legal guardian Mr. X could appeal to the Court of Appeal con-
cerning the decision of not to open proceedings against Mr. B for the alleged rape. Mr. X 
claimed that the right to respect for family life in Article 8 entailed that parents must be 
able to have recourse to remedies in the event of their children being the victims of sexual 
abuse, particularly if the children were minors and if the father was their legal representa-
tive. The applicants argued that the requisite degree of protection against the wrongdoing in 
question would only have been provided by means of criminal law.  
 
The Court observed  
“that the choice of the means calculated to secure compliance with Article 8 
(…) in the sphere of the relations to individuals themselves is in principle a 
matter that falls within the Contracting States´ margin of appreciation. In 
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this connection, there are different ways of ensuring “respect of private life”, 
and the nature of the State´s obligation will depend on the particular aspect 
of private life that is at issue. Recourse to the criminal law is not necessarily 
the only answer.”170  
 
The Government had argued that their civil law system would give the applicant sufficient 
remedy for the rape she hade suffered.  The Court disagreed with this, stating that this  
 
“is a case where fundamental values and essential aspects of private life are 
at stake. Effective deterrence is indispensable in this area and it can be 
achieved only by criminal- law provisions; indeed, it is by such provisions 
that the matter is normally regulated. (…) [T]his is in fact an area in which 
the Netherlands has generally opted for a system of protection based on the 
criminal law. The only gap, so far as the Commission and the Court have 
been made aware, is as regards persons in the situation of Miss Y; in such 
cases, this system meets a procedural obstacle which the Netherlands legis-
lature had apparently not foreseen.”171  
 
The Court found that neither Article 248 nor Article 239 para. 2 of the Criminal Code pro-
vided Miss Y “with practical and effective protection.” Having taken into account the na-
ture of the wrongdoing in question, the Court concluded that Miss Y had been a victim of a 
violation of Article 8 of the Convention. The Court awarded Miss Y just satisfaction for 
non- pecuniary damage on an equitable basis cf. Article 50 of 3, 000 Dutch Guilders. It also 
stated that it was “hardly deniable that the Netherlands authorities have a degree of respon-
sibility resulting from the deficiency in the legislation which gave rise to the violation of 
Article 8.”172  
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3.2.4.3.3 Failure to provide practical and efficient criminal- law provisions in rape cases 
may constitute a violation of the respect for private life cf. Article 8  
Effective deterrence is indispensable in rape cases, and can be achieved only by criminal- 
law provisions. Incidents of rape are cases where fundamental values and essential aspects 
of private life are at stake. Failure to provide practical and efficient protection by the Mem-
ber States Parties in their respective Penal Codes may therefore constitute a violation of the 
respect for private life cf. ECHR Article 8.173  
 
The ECtHR stated in the Case of M.C v. Bulgaria that  
 
“Positive obligations on the State are inherent in the right to effective  
respect for private life under Article 8; these obligations may involve the 
adoption of measures even in the sphere of the relations of individuals  
between themselves. While choice of the means to secure compliance with 
Article 8 in the sphere of protection against acts of individuals is in principle 
within the State´s margin of appreciation, effective deterrence against grave 
acts such as rape where fundamental values and essential aspects of private 
life are at stake, requires efficient criminal- law provisions. Children and 
other vulnerable individuals, in particular are entitled to effective protec-
tion.”174  
 
In the case of C.A.S and C.S v. Romania, the first applicant had been raped multiple times 
by a Mr. P.E. from January 1998 to April 1998 at the age of 7. The Court concluded that 
there had been a violation of Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention in respect to the first appli-
cant due to the lack of effectiveness of the investigation and its impact on his private and 
family life. The perpetrator, being a neighbour, was not convicted for his crimes having 
                                                
173 X and Y v. the Netherlands, M.C v. Bulgaria (153) 
174 M.C v. Bulgaria (150), cf. X and Y v. the Netherlands (11-13, 23-24, 27) 
 45 
entered into a plea barging with the prosecution. As a consequence of the rapes the first 
applicant changed school, and in October 2005 his family moved to another city.175  
 
The Court reiterated “it has not excluded the possibility that the State´s positive obligation 
under Article 8 to safeguard the individual´s physical integrity may extend to questions 
relating to the effectiveness of criminal investigation.”176 The Court further noted; “the 
United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child has emphasised that a series of 
measures must be put in place so as to protect children from all forms of violence which 
includes prevention, redress and reparation.”177 Applying these principles to the current 
case the Court stated:  
 
“The failure to adequately respond to the allegations of child abuse in this case rais-
es doubts as to the effectiveness of the system put in place by the State in accord-
ance with its international obligations and leaves the criminal proceedings in the 
case devoid of meaning. The foregoing considerations are sufficient to enable the 
Court to conclude that the authorities failed to meet their positive obligations to 
conduct an effective investigation into the allegations of violent sexual abuse and to 
ensure adequate protection of the first applicant´s private and family life.”178 
 
3.2.4.3.4 Conclusion 
Failure to enact criminal-law provisions that effectively punish rape by applying them 
through effective investigation and prosecution constitutes a violation of the right to respect 
for private life cf. Article 8 of the ECHR. The effectiveness of the system put in place by 
the State in accordance with its international obligations shall not leave the criminal pro-
ceedings in the case devoid of meaning. 
                                                
175 C.A.S. and C.S. v. Romania (7-12) 
176 C.A.S. and C.S. v. Romania (72) 
177 C.A.S. and C.S. v. Romania (72) 
178 C.A.S. and C.S. v. Romania (83) 
 46 
3.2.4.4 Summary and Conclusion 
Whereas Article 3 has given the Court ground to define the constituent elements of rape, 
Article 8 has been used in regard to the efficiency of the criminal investigation and proce-
dural possibility of gaining access to court and possibility to regain redress. Choice of 
means to secure compliance with Article 8 in the sphere of protection against acts of indi-
viduals is in principle within the State´s margin of appreciation. However, effective deter-
rence against grave acts such as rape where fundamental values and essential aspects of 
private life are at stake requires efficient criminal-law provisions.179 The ECtHR stated in 
the case of M.C v. Bulgaria, “the member State´s positive obligations under Articles 3 and 
8 of the Convention must be seen as requiring the penalisation and effective prosecution of 
any non- consensual sexual act, including in the absence of physical resistance by the vic-
tim.”180 In regard of the constituent elements of rape the ECtHR´s interpretation of Article 
3 seems more relevant. However the ECtHR´s interpretation of Article 8 may also shed 
light on the State´s positive obligations concerning the definition of rape in their criminal 
code. The effectiveness of the system put in place by the State in accordance with its inter-
national obligations shall not leave the criminal proceedings in the case devoid of meaning 
cf. Article 8 and the case of C.A.S and C.S v. Romania. The ECtHR review allegations of 
breach on Articles 3 and 8 separately. However, the obligations under Articles 3 and 8 are 
viewed altogether in deciding whether a State´s Criminal Code and practice in regard of 
rape is in compliance with the Convention. A deficiency in the legislation which constitutes 
a breach of Article 3 or 8 may cause financial liability for the State cf. Article 41 of the 
Convention. 
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3.2.5 Conflicting provisions between the definition of rape in Article 3 and 8 of the 
ECHR and the definition of rape in Section 192 of the GCPC cf. the Human 
Rights Act Section 3 
 
The ECHR is a Convention incorporated into the Human Rights Act and shall therefore 
take precedence over conflicting provisions in other legislation cf. Section 3 of the Human 
Rights Act.181 The Supreme Court stated in Rt. 2008 page 1409 that there was a clear law-
giver intent behind Section 3 of the Human Rights Act, and that the Conventions incorpo-
rated should take precedence when in conflict with domestic provisions in order to 
strengthen the human rights in domestic law.182  
 
The ECtHR stated in the case of M.C v. Bulgaria; “the member State´s positive obligations 
under Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention must be seen as requiring the penalisation and 
effective prosecution of any non- consensual sexual act, including in the absence of physi-
cal resistance by the victim.”183 The current definition of rape in Section 192 litra a and b 
of the GCPC have four alternative elements that together with sexual activity is defined as 
rape, and will be discussed as one in the following.184 From a normal understanding of the 
wording of the law “threats”, “violence”, unconscious”, and “incapable for any other rea-
son of resisting the act” differ from “any non-consensual” sexual act (emphasis added). The 
constituent elements of rape in Section 192 set up a demand of a certain type of action in 
order to constitute criminal liability for rape, for example “violence” has to provide causa-
tion with the sexual activity.185  
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The ECtHR observed in the case of M.C v. Bulgaria that Article 152 § 1 of the Bulgarian 
Criminal Code did not mention any requirement of physical resistance by the victim and 
defined rape in a manner, which did not differ significantly from the wording found in stat-
utes of other member States.  
 
The Bulgarian Criminal Code Article 152 § 1 defined rape as:  
“sexual intercourse with a woman 
(1) incapable of defending herself, where she did not consent;  
(2) who was compelled by the use of force or threats;  
(3) who was brought to a state of helplessness by the perpetrator.” 
According to Bulgarian domestic law an accused person may only be found guilty of rape 
if it has been established that he had sexual intercourse with a woman in circumstances 
covered by one of the three sub- paragraphs.186  
 
The constitute elements of rape in Section 192 of the GCPC are similar to the Bulgarian 
definition, yet the ECtHR held in M.C v. Bulgaria that:  
 
“What is decisive, however, is the meaning given to words such as “force” or 
“threats” or other terms used in legal definitions. For example, in some legal sys-
tems “force” is considered to be established in rape cases by the very fact that the 
perpetrator proceeded with a sexual act without the victim´s consent or because he 
held her body and manipulated it in order to perform a sexual act without consent. 
(…) despite differences in statutory definitions, the courts in a number of countries 
have developed their interpretation so as to try to encompass any non- consensual 
sexual act.”187  
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Case law from the Supreme Court of Norway concerning rape does not show a develop-
ment as to try to encompass any non-consensual sexual act cf. Rt. 2003 page 687. This 
might be due to that rape as defined in Section 192 of the GCPC, are through preparatory 
works, case- law, judicial theory and policy considerations given a certain content with the 
result that there is seldom doubt of the legal content.188 As of today, rape cases before the 
Supreme Court of Norway mainly concerns the sentence level (Rt. 2008 page 890), or 
whether the action should be subsumed under litra a or b of Section 192 (Rt. 2006 page 
1319), not whether the sexual act was non–consensual.  
 
In order to establish criminal liability in domestic Norwegian law, the crime has to be pre-
scribed by statutory “law” cf. Article 96 of the Norwegian Constitution. The Constitution 
of Norway being Lex Superior to the Human Rights Act thus prevents Norwegian Courts 
from interpreting criminal liability for non-consensual rape through harmonisation, based 
on case law from the ECtHR as it constitutes “law” under Article 7 of the ECHR.189  
 
The Public Prosecution in Norway does not prosecute a person for a crime unless statutory 
law prescribes it, and the prosecutor believes he is guilty cf. § 69 of the Criminal Procedur-
al Code of 1981. If non-consensual rape is not penalised, no case law will be derived.  
 
A person who has experienced non-consensual rape can in theory try and prosecute the 
offender by herself before court as a civil criminal proceeding cf. § 429 of the Criminal 
Procedural Code of 1981. It is unlikely however that she will succeed, as the Courts of 
Norway do not convict anyone for a crime that is not prescribed by statutory law cf. the 
Norwegian Constitution Article 96, Rt. Rt. 2009 page 780, and Rt. 2011 page 469.  
 
In NOU 2006:10 concerning the rights of the aggrieved party in criminal proceedings, the 
preparatory works held that the main question before the ECtHR in M.C v. Bulgaria was 
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whether Bulgaria´s legislation and investigation of rape cases was in compliance with the 
State´s positive obligations under ECHR art. 8.190 The NOU stated that it followed from 
M.C v. Bulgaria a positive obligation to penalise any non-consensual sexual activity.191 
NOU 2006:10 concluded that the positive obligations under ECHR 8 required effective 
prosecution and investigation of rape cases.192 No further regard was taken into the defini-
tion of rape held by the ECthR under Article 3 of the Convention.193 
 
A report from the Norwegian Director General of Public Prosecution from 2007 with re-
gard to the case of M.C v. Bulgaria, stated that Article 3 and 8 constitutes a positive obliga-
tion for the State to the penalise and effective prosecution of any non-consensual sexual 
act.194 The report concluded that the procedural rights of victims of rape were under devel-
opment under the Convention.195 No further regard was taken into whether the definition of 
rape was in compliance with Article 3 and 8 of the ECHR.  
 
The preparatory works of NOU 2008:4 concerning Human Rights and rape stated that the 
ECHR mainly protect individuals from infringements from the State. In regard to Criminal 
Law it was claimed that the ECHR mainly provide the accused protection against infringe-
ments. As examples, the protection against self-incrimination, the presumption of inno-
cence, and arbitrary imprisonment was mentioned.196 In regard to amongst ECHR Article 3 
and 8, it was stated that it could be no doubt that the Section 192 of the GCPC was in com-
pliance with international demands to protect individuals against sexual offences.197 No 
further regard was taken as to whether the definition of rape in Section 192 of the GCPC 
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was in compliance with ECHR Articles 3 and 8, dynamically interpreted by the ECtHR, 
even though the case of M.C v. Bulgaria was made final on 4 December 2003. 
 
Legal Secretary of the EFTA Court, Mr. Gjermund Mathisen stated in an article from 2006 
concerning the internationalization of Norwegian Criminal law, that human rights will 
leave its marks also on general criminal law. Mr. Mathisen referred to M.C v. Bulgaria and 
its conclusion in regard to the State´s positive obligation after ECHR Articles 3 and 8 to 
establish effective penal provisions against rape, which have to entail “any non-consensual 
sexual act, including in the absence of physical resistance by the victim.”198 
 
A Swedish report analysed the case of M.C v. Bulgaria in SOU 2010:71 page 17-18, in 
order to clarify the positive obligations of Sweden in relation to the constitute elements of 
rape in the Swedish Penal Code.199 Sweden has a similar definition of rape as stated in Sec-
tion 192 of the GCPC as of spring 2014.200 The report concluded that M.C v. Bulgaria did 
not obligate Sweden to define rape in a specific way. On the other hand it was concluded 
that the Swedish material criminal law and interpretation thereof should be practiced in 
order to fulfil the obligations of Article 3 and 8 of the ECHR, as stated in M.C v. Bulgaria. 
These obligations involved that non-consensual sexual activity had to be penalised. It could 
therefore be questioned if the present statutory legislation and practice fully satisfied the 
positive obligations of the Convention.201 The committee did not recommend that lack of 
consent should be the constitute element of rape so as to place the lack of consent at the 
centre of the crime. Instead a new penal provision named “sexual assault” where non-
consent would constitute the element of crime was suggested in order to make up for the 
weaknesses caused by the lack of criminalising non-consensual activity in the Swedish 
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Penal Code.202 Swedish Law Professor Madeleine Leijonhufvud was however of the opin-
ion that the outcome of M.C v. Bulgaria obligated Sweden to revise the definition of rape 
in the Swedish Penal Code.203 Professor Leijonhufvud concluded that Sweden is obligated 
to have a statutory provision that criminalizes non-consensual sexual activity.204 The Swe-
dish Government proposed on 4 February 2013 a change of the definition of rape in the 
Swedish Penal Code. This involved changing the definition of rape in that ”hjälplöst 
tilstånd” was exchanged with ”särskilt utsat situation”.205 This change was purposed to 
clarify that also situations where the person subject to rape reacts with passivity is entailed 
within the definition of rape.	   	  
In contrast, English statutory law and practice has lack of consent as the constituent ele-
ment of rape cf. Section 1 of the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1976, see also DPP v. 
Morgan (1976) AC 182. The case of Julian Assange v. Sweden 2 November 2011, illus-
trates that there are incidents of non-consensual sexual activity that are considered rape in 
accordance with English law, but do not constitute an offence of rape in Norwegian law.  
 
The Swedish Prosecutor alleged that Julian Assange were to be arrested and surrendered to 
Sweden for the purpose of conducting a criminal prosecution or executing a custodial sen-
tence or detention order, due to allegations of sexual violations of two Swedish women 
during 13- 18 of August 2010.206 Mr. Julian Assange had appealed a judgment given on 24 
February 2011 ordering his extradition to Sweden on several grounds.207 The appeal was 
dismissed.208  
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In regard to rape cases, English law holds that if rape is punishable in the issuing Member 
State by a custodial sentence or detention order for a maximum period of at least three 
years as the law of the issuing Member State defines them should give rise to surrender 
pursuant to an European Arrest Warrant (EAW).209 However, the facts set out in the EAW 
must be such as to impel the inference that he did so; it must be the only reasonable infer-
ence to be drawn from the facts alleged. The Court held that it was not necessary to identify 
in the description of the conduct the mental element of mens rea required under the law of 
England and Wales for the offence; it was sufficient if it could be inferred from the descrip-
tion of the conduct set out in the EAW.210 Mr. Assange argued that if the facts of offence 
4211 had been fairly and accurately described in the EAW, it would not have disclosed the 
offence of “rape”.212 Offence 4 of the EAW read:  
 
“On 17 August 2010, in the home of the injured party (SW) in Enköping, Assange 
deliberately consummated sexual intercourse with her by improperly exploiting that 
she, due to sleep, was in a helpless state. It is an aggravating circumstance that 
Assange, who was aware that it was the expressed wish of the injured party and a 
prerequisite of sexual intercourse that a condom be used, still consummated unpro-
tected sexual intercourse with her. The sexual act was designed to violate the in-
jured party´s sexual integrity.”213 
 
Mr. Assange submitted that if the part of SW`s statement relating to 17 August 2010 was 
read in its entirety, a fair and accurate description of the conduct would have made clear 
her consent to sexual intercourse or alternatively a reasonable belief on his part that she 
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consented.214 SW had met Mr. Assange and others during a lunch on 14 August 2010. SW 
contacted Mr. Assange on 16 August 2010 and invited him to her house.  
 
“In the bedroom he took her clothes off; they were naked together on the bed and 
engaged in sexual foreplay on the bed. He rubbed his penis against her. She closed 
her legs because she did not want to have intercourse with him unless he used a 
condom. After a period of some hours, he went to sleep. For a long time she had 
lain awake, but then she also fell asleep. They then had sexual intercourse with him 
using a condom. They fell asleep and woke and had sex again. They had breakfast. 
They had sex again with a condom only on the glans of his penis. Her statement 
then describes in some detail the conduct that forms the basis of Offence 4. She fell 
asleep, but was woken up by his penetration of her. She immediately asked if he 
was wearing anything. He answered to the effect that he was not. She felt it was too 
late and, as he was already inside her, she let him continue. She had never had un-
protected sex. He then ejaculated inside her.”215 
 
The codified statute of Section 1 (1) of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 of England and 
Wales set out the offence of rape: “It is and ingredient of each offence that there is no con-
sent by the person penetrated or assaulted and no reasonable belief by the defendant that 
the person is consenting.”216  
 
The basic definition of consent is set out in Section 74:  
“For the purposes of this part, a person consents if he agrees by choice and has the 
freedom and capacity to make that choice.”217  
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Section 77 defines “the relevant act” for the offence of rape as the defendant intentionally 
penetrating, with his penis, the vagina of another person.218 
 
Section 75 which applies to rape read:  
(1) If in proceedings for an offence to which this section applies it is proved— 
(a) that the defendant did the relevant act, 
(b) that any of the circumstances specified in subsection (2) existed, and  
(c) that the defendant knew that those circumstances existed,  
the complainant is to be taken not to have consented to the relevant act unless suffi-
cient evidence is adduced to rapes an issue as to whether he consented, and the de-
fendant is to be taken not to have reasonably believed that the complainant consent-
ed unless sufficient evidence is adduced to raise an issue as to whether he reasona-
bly believed it.  
(2) The circumstances are that--- 
(d) the complainant was asleep, then she is to be taken not to have consent-
ed to sexual intercourse.219 
The Court considered first what is meant by rape as Mr Assange had contended that there 
had to be a description of what is recognisable as rape as that term is used “in the language 
and law of European countries”.220 “There is, of course, no standard definition of rape”, the 
Court recalled.221 In M.C v Bulgaria the Strasbourg Court concluded that the trend is to 
regard “lack of consent as the essential element of rape.”222 “This is confirmed by a more 
recent study: “Different systems, similar outcomes? Tackling attrition in reported rape cas-
es across Europe” by Lovett and Kelly published by the Child and Women Abuse Studies 
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Unit of London Metropolitan University in 2009. The definitions set out show a wide varia-
tion with coercion being required in some states and lack of consent in others.”223  
 
The Court concluded that the  
 
“intentional penetration achieved by coercion or where consent is lacking to the 
knowledge of the defendant would be considered to be rape. In our view on this ba-
sis, what was described in the EAW was rape. Coercion evidences knowledge of 
lack of consent and lack of reasonable belief in consent. A requirement of proof of 
coercion, if that is what Swedish law requires, is a more onerous test for the prose-
cution to satisfy than the test for consent in the 2003 Act; it necessarily means how-
ever that the allegation that the defendant knew of the absence of consent or had no 
reasonable belief in consent, is made out in the description of the offence.”224  
 
The Court found that there was no inconsistency between the particulars in the EAW which 
set out that helpless state as being asleep, and the classification of rape in Sweden, as the 
Svea Court of Appeal had considered offence 4 and raised no objection to it.225  
 
In reviewing the facts of offence 4 under the law of England and Wales the Court stated  
 
“that a jury would be entitled to find that consent to sexual intercourse with a con-
dom is not consent to sexual intercourse without a condom which affords protec-
tion. As the conduct set out in the EAW alleges that Mr Assange knew SW would 
only have sex if a condom was used, the allegation that he had sexual intercourse 
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with her without a condom would amount to an allegation of rape in England and 
Wales.”226  
 
The Court considered that the essential complaint made about the fairness and accuracy of 
the description of the offence is that it did not set out the context to which was just referred. 
Mr. Assange contended that the offence of rape could not be inferred, as the context makes 
it clear that she consented or he had reasonable belief in her consent.227 The Court disa-
greed, as it was  
 
“quite clear that the gravamen of the offence described is that Mr Assange had sex-
ual intercourse with her without a condom and that she had only been prepared to 
consent to sexual intercourse with a condom. (…) the fact of protected sexual inter-
course on other occasions cannot show that she was, or that Mr Assange could rea-
sonably have believed that she was, in her sleep consenting to unprotected inter-
course. The fact that she allowed it to continue once she was aware of what was 
happening cannot go to his state of mind or its reasonableness when he initially 
penetrated her. Once awake she was deciding whether to let him go on doing what 
he had started. However it is clear that she is saying that she would rather he had 
not started at all and had not consented. (…) It is clear that the allegation is that he 
had sexual intercourse with her when she was not in a position to consent and so he 
could not have had any reasonable belief that she did.”228 
 
The previous commented Rt. 2003 page 687,229 illustrates that non-consensual sexual activ-
ity is not considered rape under Section 192. Unprotected non-consensual intercourse can-
not be considered rape in accordance with Section 192 as it stands today cf. Rt. 2009 page 
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780, Rt. 2011 page 469 cf. Article 96 of the Constitution. This differs significantly from 
English law and practice, where rape is considered to have occurred when the aggrieved 
party simply did not consent to unprotected intercourse, when the perpetrator had no rea-
sonable expectancy that she would have consented to sex without a condom.  
  
As of spring 2014, the author is not aware of that there are any Norwegian Supreme Court 
verdicts that specifically deal with the question of whether the definition of rape in the 
GCPC is in compliance with Articles 3 and 8 of the ECHR, dynamically interpreted by the 
ECtHR. The Supreme Court of Norway has however given weight to international devel-
opment of law in deciding whether a domestic statutory law should be given an additional 
obligation.230 However, the strict practice of the principle of legality by the Supreme Court 
of Norway cf. “law” in Article 96 of the Constitution, expressed in amongst Rt. 2009 page 
780 and Rt. 2011 page 469, prevents Norwegian Courts from interpreting non-consensual 
sexual activity as rape cf. the current definition of rape in Section 192 of the GCPC.  
 
The Ministry of Justice and Public Security proposed in a hearing, which ended on June 1 
2013, that Section 192 of the GCPC should be added an additional litra d to Section 192 
penalizing non- consensual sexual activity.231 The outcome of this hearing is still to be 
made. The proposal of statutory law revision might indicate that non-consensual rape in 
Norway goes unpunished, as it is not currently penalized in Section 192 of the GCPC.232 
This could also explain as to why there are no Supreme Court verdicts concerning non-
consensual rape.  
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3.2.5.1 Summary and Conclusion  
There are conflicting provisions between the definition of rape developed by the ECtHR in 
the M.C v. Bulgaria, interpreted in the light of Article 3 and 8 of the ECHR, and the defini-
tion of rape in Section 192 of the cf. Section 3 of the Human Rights Act. The definition of 
rape as it is prescribed in Section 192 today does not penalize any non-consensual sexual 
acts cf. Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention and M.C v. Bulgaria. The Supreme Court of 
Norway practice a strict interpretation of the statutory “law”, which limits what the current 
definition of rape in Section 192 of the GCPC can entail.233 The Courts of Norway is there-
fore de facto limited from interpreting Section 192 expansively, and cannot penalize an 
action that is not covered by the wording of the provision cf. Rt. 2009 page 780 and Rt. 
2011 page 469. The Courts of Norway and thus the Prosecution of Norway will therefore 
not convict or prosecute anyone for non-consensual sexual activity.  
 
3.2.6 Positive obligation for the Member State Party to penalize any non- 
consensual sexual act 
The positive obligations of the Member State Parties under Articles 3 and 8 of the Conven-
tion must be seen as “requiring the penalisation and effective prosecution of any non- con-
sensual sexual act, including in the absence of physical resistance by the victim.”234 Section 
192 can be brought in compliance with Articles 3 and 8 of the ECHR by two alternatives. 
Either by providing an extra litra d to Section 192 as to penalize non-consensual sexual 
activity, which the Norwegian Department of Judicial Affairs suggested in an official hear-
ing ending on June 1 2013.235 Or to redefine rape entirely by defining the crime of rape as 
having occurred when a person does not consent to the sexual activity, like the Belgian 
definition of rape in Article 375 §§ 1 and 2 of the Belgian Criminal Code of 1989:  
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 60 
   “Any act of sexual penetration, of whatever nature and by whatever means, com-
mitted on a person who does not consent to it shall constitute the crime of rape. 
    In particular, there is no consent where the act is forced by means of violence, 
coercion or ruse or was made possible by the victim´s disability or physical or men-
tal deficiency.”236 
 
Either or, this is a responsibility for the legislative branch cf. the Constitution Articles 76- 
78. These supranational obligations, has been described by Norwegian judicial scholars to 
de facto realize democratic rights for Norwegian citizens, being a result of a democratic 
process.237 One of the main aims of incorporating Conventions into the Human Rights Act 
was to ensure that Norwegian case law in as large extent as possible, correspond with what 
is to be considered the current international legal interpretation.238 In the realm of criminal 
law, changing or expanding statutory law can only ensure this. A potential perpetrator is 
thus secured foreseeability in regard to the punitive reaction that might threaten him, and 
protected against arbitrariness cf. the Constitution Articles 96 and 97, cf. Rt. 2009 page 780 
and Rt. 2011 page 469. Finally, a person subject to non-consensual sexual activity is pro-
vided with protection under the law as the matter is criminalized. One might claim that this 
is democracy de facto.239  
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3.2.7 Potential damage liability for the State of Norway towards individuals 
exposed to non-consensual sexual activity 
3.2.7.1 Legal ground to claim compensation from the State of Norway for damage 
resulting from non-performance of obligation under the ECHR 
The State of Norway was held liable for the lack of protection of a persecuted woman (NN) 
in Rt. 2013 page 588. The Supreme Court found that NN`s rights under ECHR Article 8 
had been violated, but did not conclude as to whether the persecution amounted to a breach 
of Article 3.240 Two criteria were posed as to whether the State of Norway could be held 
liable for lack of protecting NN from persecution. The first question to be decided upon is 
whether the man´s persecution of the woman violated her rights under Article 8 or 3. If the 
answer is yes, the second question is then whether the State of Norway can be held liable 
for failure to fulfil its obligation to protect her.241  
 
3.2.7.1.1 A third party´s non-consensual sexual activity with another person constitutes a 
violation of Articles 3 and 8 under the ECHR 
 
Non-consensual sexual activity initiated by a person (A) with another person (B), consti-
tutes a violation of B´s rights under Article 3 and 8 of the ECHR cf. M.C v. Bulgaria.242  
 
3.2.7.1.2 Has the State of Norway failed to secure its obligation to penalise any non-
consensual sexual act? 
 
Article 1 of the ECHR prescribes: “The High Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone 
within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in Section I of this Convention.” In 
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regard to the definition of rape, “the member State´s positive obligations under Articles 3 
and 8 of the Convention must be seen as requiring the penalisation and effective prosecu-
tion of any non- consensual sexual act, including in the absence of physical resistance by 
the victim.”243 This positive obligation was stated in the case of M.C v. Bulgaria made final 
on 4 December 2003.  
 
The Supreme Court acknowledged in Rt. 2013 page 588 that the obligation to “secure” to 
everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms of the Convention would amount 
to that the State could have an obligation in view of the circumstances to take necessary 
steps to prevent that private individuals infringe each other´s rights under the Conven-
tion.244 
 
The principle of legality cf. Article 96 of the Constitution of Norway, and strict interpreta-
tional practice by the Supreme Court of Norway prevents Norwegian Courts from interpret-
ing Section 192 as to entail non-consensual sexual activity. The responsibility to ensure 
that individual´s are protected against non-consensual sexual activity is therefore political.  
 
The preparatory works of NOU 2008:4 concerning Human Rights and rape stated that the 
ECHR mainly protect individuals from infringements from the State. In regard to amongst 
ECHR Article 3 and 8, it was held that it could be no doubt that Section 192 of the GCPC 
was in compliance with international demands to protect individuals against sexual offenc-
es.245 No further regard was taken as to whether the definition of rape in Section 192 of the 
GCPC was in compliance with ECHR Articles 3 and 8, dynamically interpreted by the EC-
tHR. In contrast, Sweden discussed the implications of M.C v. Bulgaria thoroughly in SOU 
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2010:71.246 As a result, prepositions were posed in order to ensure that the Swedish Penal 
Code was in compliance with the positive obligations under the ECHR.247  
 
The Norwegian Ministry of Justice and Public Security finished an official hearing on June 
1 2013 adding “lack of consent” to the sexual activity as rape in an additional letter d to 
Section 192 of the CGPC. 248 This proposal came as a consequence of the Committee on 
the Elimination of All Discrimination of Women´s Eight Periodic Report of Norway, and 
Norway´s Signature of the Istanbul Convention.249 The State´s positive obligation under 
ECHR Article 3 and 8 was not mentioned.  
 
Legal Secretary of the EFTA Court, Mr. Gjermund Mathisen stated in an article from 2006 
that M.C v. Bulgaria posed a positive obligation on the Member State Party to penalise any 
non- consensual act.250  
 
Claims for compensation for injury resulting from non- performance of an international 
obligation has been acknowledged elsewhere in Europe: 
”For instance, a international decision that a particular statute is in violation of in-
ternational law and that that wrong needs to be removed normally could not be im-
plemented by a national court, but rather would be a task for political brnaches. On 
the other hand, a national court could play a role in securing compensation for vio-
lation of a human right, where that has been determined by an international court.251  
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It cannot thus be said that Norwegian authorities have done what is sufficient in order to 
ensure protection of the sexual autonomy of private individuals who has suffered non-
consensual sexual activity cf. ECHR Articles 3 and 8 and M.C v. Bulgaria. Norway has 
therefore failed to comply with this obligation, as the matter has not been criminalised after 
the case of M.C v. Bulgaria was made final.252 As a result, any person who has been ex-
posed to a non-consensual sexual act can hold the State of Norway subject to liability, as 
the matter is not penalised and effectively prosecuted.  
 
3.2.7.1.3 Compensation for damages to persons subject to non-consensual sexual 
activity 
In Rt. 2013 page 588, NN had already been awarded victims of violence compensation, but 
this could not constitute a separate legal ground resulting to acquittal for the State in regard 
to liability for lack of fulfilling its obligations under the Convention.253 The Supreme Court 
did not decide upon the assessment of damages in Rt. 2013 page 588.254 
 
People having suffered rape under Norwegian jurisdiction can apply for victims of violence 
compensation cf. §1 of the Victims of Violence Compensation Act of 20 March 2001. 
However, there is a primary condition that the person applying for compensation must have 
suffered a criminal offence – “straffbar handling” cf. Victims of Violence Compensation 
Act §§ 1 and 3.255 People subject to non-consensual sexual activity has therefore de facto 
been precluded from applying and receiving Victims of Violence Compensation and thus 
suffered a financial loss. The state of Norway can be held liable for this financial loss. See 
in similar direction Rt. 2005 page 1365 (Finnanger II) where the State of Norway was held 
liable for the financial loss the plaintiff had suffered due to an incorrect incorporation of an 
                                                
252 See also M.C v. Bulgaria (154, 166), Andenæs, Bjørge (2011)  
253 Rt. 2013 588 (64) 
254 Rt. 2013 588 (64) 
255 Voldsoffererstatningsloven §1 cf. § 3 
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EEC directive. As a result the State encouraged people subject to damage liability to set 
forth their claims.256  
 
3.2.8 Summary and Conclusion 
The member States´ positive obligations under Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention require 
the penalization and effective prosecution of any non-consensual sexual act.257 As of today, 
the definition of rape in Section 192 of the GCPC does not penalize non-consensual sexual 
activity. A hearing has been made by the Norwegian Ministry of Justice and Public Securi-
ty as to whether Section 192 of the GCPC should be expanded with an additional letter d 
penalizing non-consensual sexual activity as rape. The outcome of this hearing is still to be 
made. It has been claimed that ECHR mainly constitute rights for people accused for a 
crime,258 M.C v. Bulgaria proves that rights under the ECHR also apply to people who 
have suffered non-consensual sexual activity. The ECtHR defined a regional human rights 
standard in regard of the definition of rape in the case of M.C v. Bulgaria. The ECtHR 
reached this conclusion by analysing the definitions of rape held by a number of Member 
State Parties in their respective penal codes, and the penal codes of other countries around 
the world. A common denominator of penalising non-consensual sexual activity as rape 
was found by the ECtHR in the Recommendation of the Committee of Ministers of the 
Council of Europe on the protection of women against violence, the ICTY judgment of 
Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Kovač and Vuković, and General Recommendation No. 19 of 29 
January 1992 on violence against women issued by the United Nations Committee on the 
Elimination of Discrimination against All Women Article 24. In other words, based on Eu-
ropean political consensus, International Criminal Law, and the global Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, the ECtHR concluded that the 
                                                
256http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dokumentarkiv/stoltenbergii/jd/Nyheterogpressemeldinger/nyheter/2006/kra
v-mot-staten-finnanger-ii.html?id=100272  
257 M.C v. Bulgaria (171 cf. 95, 130- 147) 
258 NOU 2008:4 p. 20 E-bok 
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Member State Parties under the regional European Convention on Human Rights has a pos-
itive obligation to penalise any non-consensual sexual activity.  
 
The Member State Parties of the ECHR represents both the common law tradition and the 
continental law tradition. It can be claimed that the definition of rape held by common law 
countries won ground in the case of M.C v. Bulgaria. It can thus be said that due to the 
prevalence rule in Section 3 of the Human Rights Act, the Norwegian legislative and thus 
judicial branch is prohibited from using cultural and other policy considerations in their 
obligations to penalize non-consensual sexual activity as rape.259 In the realm of Norwegian 
criminal law, full realization of an individual´s right to protection from a third-party´s non-
consensual violation of their sexual autonomy can only be achieved by changing or ex-
panding statutory law. The legislative branch has thus an obligation to penalise non-
consensual rape in order to achieve compliance with Articles 3 and 8 cf. M.C v. Bulgaria 
and Article 1 of the ECHR.260 The impact of supranational obligations in domestic legisla-
tion can thus de facto realize democratic rights for Norwegian citizens. This political re-
sponsibility can be seen as a result of a democratic process.261 A potential perpetrator is 
secured foreseeability in regard to the punitive reaction that might threaten him, and pro-
tected against arbitrariness cf. the Constitution of Norway Articles 96 and 97, cf. Rt. 2009 
page 780 and Rt. 2011 page 469. A person subject to non-consensual sexual activity is pro-
vided sufficient protection under the law as the matter is criminalized.  
 
Norway has failed as a Member State Party of the ECHR to secure legal protection of indi-
viduals, having suffered non-consensual rape. Norway may therefore be liable for damage 
compensation towards individuals subject to non-consensual rape, as they have not been 
able to see perpetrators being brought to justice. The Supreme Court acknowledged in Rt. 
2013 page 588 that the State of Norway can be held liable for damage compensation based 
                                                
259 Ot.prp.nr.8. (2007-2008) p. 27- 31, Andenæs (2008), Rt. 2008 24 
260 CN 1814 §§ 76-78, § 110 c 
261 Graver (2012) p. 100- 110, Sand (2005) p. 15-39  
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on non-performance of obligations under the ECHR. Damage liability for the State due to 
non-implementation of judgements is a general trend in Europe: ”The situation in Europe is 
exceptional, featuring, despite some resistance, a general trend towards empowerment of 
national courts to secure effective implementation of judgments of the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECtHR).262 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
262 Nollkaemper (2013) p. 9 
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3.3 The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
against Women (CEDAW) 
3.3.1 Introduction 
The Norwegian Parliament ratified the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Dis-
crimination against Women (CEDAW) on 21 May 1981.263 187 States has of May 2014 
ratified the Convention.264 The aim of CEDAW is to achieve “full equality between men 
and women,” in every aspect of life cf. the preamble of the Convention.265 Full equality 
between men and women is sought met through the elimination of all discrimination of 
women. “Law” cf. Article 2 of the Convention is one of these areas where the States Parties 
are obliged to seek equality between the sexes. Rape is not specifically mentioned, nor de-
fined in the Convention itself. However, the primary responsible body for monitoring the 
Convention, the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, has de-
veloped a definition of rape in the light of the Convention.  
 
In the preparation of the Human Rights Act of 21 May 1999, the Ministry of Justice and 
Public Security suggested that CEDAW should not be incorporated into the Act.266 Howev-
er the majority of the Standing Committee on Justice requested the Government at that time 
to present a preposition of incorporation of the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
(CRC), and CEDAW.267 CRC was incorporated into the Human Rights Act in 2003.268 In-
terestingly the CEDAW was first incorporated into the Act of Gender Equality269 in 
2005.270 The Act of Gender Equality does not have a rule of precedence when conflict with 
                                                
263 St.prp.nr.72 (1980-81), Innst. S. Nr. 196 (1980-1981) 
264 https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-8&chapter=4&lang=en  
265 See also Ot.prp.nr. 93 (2008-2009), Innst.O.nr.115 (2008-2009) 
266 NOU 1993:18, Ot.prp.nr.3 (1998-1999) 
267 Innst.O.nr.51 (1998-1999) 
268 See Lov av 1 August 2003 nr. 86 
269 Lov av 9 Juni 1978 nr. 45 
270 Lov av 10 Juni 2005 nr. 38 
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other provisions as the Human Rights Act does. The Parliament therefore asked the Gov-
ernment again on 12 May 2005, to consider incorporating CEDAW into the Human Rights 
Act. CEDAW was incorporated into the Human Rights Act by Act of 19 of June 2009 nr. 
80 cf. § 2, about ten years after the Human Rights Act entered into force. The prolonging 
by the Parliament in giving CEDAW the same legal status as other human rights conven-
tions in the Human Rights Act might be taken into an account of being a notion of cultural 
resistance in promoting the full elimination of discrimination of all women.271 The im-
proved domestic legal status of CEDAW shows nevertheless that Norway is willing to 
promote the human rights set out in CEDAW.  
 
3.3.2 The weight of decisions, general comments and reports from the Committee 
on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women as a source of law in 
domestic Norwegian law 
3.3.2.1 The Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women 
The report system for overseeing the realization of human rights in the Contracting States 
has been cited as a reason why human rights, even on an international level, “lacks 
teeth”.272 In contrast to decisions from the ECtHR, decisions or reports from the UN Hu-
man Rights Committees are not legally binding for the Member State Parties. In general it 
has been claimed that there “are inevitably limitations to the jurisdiction of the Committees 
and the jurisprudence produced by them is incomparable to that of regional human rights 
courts as the European Court of Human Rights. Nevertheless, the importance of the Com-
mittees should not be underestimated.”273  
 
                                                
271 See Asbjørn Eides discussion on cultural resistance towards parts of the human rights system in Eide 
(2001) p. 11-12, and Hellum (2013) p. 588- 589 
272 Smith (2012) p. 154 
273 Smith (2012) p. 67 
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The Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (the Committee) is 
established under Article 17 of the Convention with the purpose of considering the progress 
made in the implementation of CEDAW. 274 The Committee´s main purpose is to seek the 
equality of rights between men and women.275 The Committee is not a judicial body, but 
have competency to receive complaints from individuals or groups of individuals alleging 
violations of CEDAW cf. Article 2 of the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elim-
ination of All forms of Discrimination against Women 1999. Norway signed the Optional 
Protocol on 10 December 1999 and ratified the Optional Protocol on 5 March 2002.276  
 
Article 21 of CEDAW provides that the Committee can make general recommendations 
and suggestions based on the examination of reports and information received from the 
States Parties. Like the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the 
Committee may refer to one of the general comments as expressing the contents of a treaty 
obligation when issuing suggestions and recommendations to a particular State Party.277 
 
In order to give effect to the convention, States Parties have agreed to submit periodic re-
ports every four years on the “legislative, judicial, administrative or other measures which 
they have adopted” cf. Article 18 of the Convention.278 The Committee will make general 
observations on the report and invite the State to discuss particular Articles of the Conven-
tion before the Committee draws up its concluding observations which purpose is to give 
the State practical guidance on the implementation of the Convention.279  
 
                                                
274 Smith (2012) p. 76-77 
275 Smith (2012) p. 76-77 
276 https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-8-b&chapter=4&lang=en  
277 Scheinin (2001) p. 45. 
278 See also Smith (2012) p. 77. 
279 Smith (2012) p.  78. 
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3.3.2.2 The weight and impact of decisions, general comments and reports from the 
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women in Norway 
The weight and impact of the decisions and reports from the Human Rights Committees 
was discussed in the preparatory works of the Human Rights Act.280 It was held that there 
are no international obligations prescribed through any of the Conventions, nor the Vienna-
Convention on the Law of the Treaties, that such statements should be followed.281 Howev-
er, the preparatory committee held that there had to be put a distinction between statements 
in regard to a specific state, and the weight such statements has towards other states that are 
obligated to the Convention.282 Even though there is a fundamental distinction between the 
legally binding decisions of the ECtHR for the Member State Parties, and the reports and 
decisions from the UN Human Rights Committees concerning the Member State Parties, it 
was held that the practical consequences does not necessarily need to be too large.283 This 
was due to that Member Parties customarily adjusts to decisions performed by the UN 
Committees, and that there are no other reactions to enforce a State´s responsibility after 
the ECHR other than exclusion of the State from the Council of Europe.284 In regard to the 
weight of decisions and reports in cases where there is another Member State Party of con-
cern, the preparatory committee held that there often will be evident to follow the Commit-
tee´s practice, because it is through the Committee´s practice general principles of the Con-
vention are being developed, and given a specific content.285 The preparatory committee 
concluded that the Convention Organ´s interpretation of the Conventions would be a source 
of law of considerable weight.286  
 
                                                
280 NOU 1993:18 p. 88. 
281 NOU 1993:18 p. 88. 
282 NOU 1993:18 p. 88. 
283 This has been contended  by Ulfstein (2012) p. 552-570 
284 NOU 1993:18 p. 88, see also Rt. 2008 1764 (77). 
285 NOU 1993:18 p. 88. 
286 NOU 1993:18 p. 88. 
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Reports, general recommendations and decisions in individual cases from the Committee 
was described by the Supreme Court of Norway in Rt. 2008 page 1764 as a source of law 
of “significant weight” for the interpretation of a Human Rights Convention.287 The ques-
tion of what impact the Human Rights Committee´s interpretation of the International Cov-
enant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) should have in regard to domestic Norwegian 
law, was formulated as a question of what weight the Committee´s interpretation should 
have as a source of law in domestic law for domestic law-practitioners when interpreting 
the Convention.288 The Court held that in regard to the principles for interpretation of the 
usage of the preceding rule in Section 3 of the Human Rights Act in relation to domestic 
statutory law and the ECHR, the guidelines for interpretation having been drawn out by the 
Supreme Court, would also be valid in regard to the ICCPR and Norwegian law. The IC-
CPR is incorporated through the Human Rights Act Section 2 nr. 3 and is therefore a part 
of domestic law. The question before the Supreme Court was whether a decision denying 
an appeal grounded in the domestic Criminal Procedural Code Section 231 subsection two, 
first comma, where there was not given any reasons for the denial, other than what the 
Criminal Procedural Code demanded that it was clear the appeal would not succeed, was in 
conflict with ICCPR Article 14 nr. 5. The Human Rights Committee had in many decisions 
held that using the method of “leave to appeal” was to be seen as a way to review the con-
viction by a higher tribunal in accordance with SP Article 14 nr. 5. The Supreme Court in 
Grand Chamber ruled that all decisions in regard to refuse an appeal should be reasoned 
based on ICCPR Article 14 nr. 5, Communication No. 662/1995 Lumley v. Jamaica section 
7.3, the decision of July 17 2008 from the Human Rights Committee, and the Committee´s 
General Comment No. 32 from 2007 on page 11-12.289  
 
                                                
287 Rt. 2008 1764 (73-81) 
288 Rt. 2008 1764 (75) 
289 Rt. 2008 1764 (118) 
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Reports to a specific country, in this case Norway, and decisions in individual cases from 
the Committee towards Norway might have more weight as a source of law in domestic 
law.290  
 
In light of the above, the incorporation of CEDAW into the Human Rights Act gives deci-
sions from the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, its general 
Comments, and reports “significant weight” as a source of law in Norway.291 
 
3.3.2.3 Summary and Conclusion  
The preparatory works of the Human Rights Act underlined that the incorporation of the 
Human Rights Conventions into Section 2 of the Human Rights Act would lead to a new 
legal situation with the superior aim of strengthening the legal standing of individuals in 
domestic law.292 The intended result was that Norwegian case law in as large extent as pos-
sible is to correspond with what is to be considered the current international legal interpre-
tation.293 The Supreme Court of Norway approved of these views in Rt. 2008 page 1764 
and stated that an interpretation of a Convention by a UN Human Rights Committee has 
“significant weight” as a source of law.294 The implementation of CEDAW into the Human 
Rights Act Section 2 cf. the preceding rule in Section 3, implicates therefore that CEDAW 
has been given “teeth” based on the consensus of the State Party and the teleological inter-
pretation and development of the rights derived from CEDAW by the Committee. Time 
will show if this cooperation constitutes fine dentistry worthy of any Colgate smile in se-
curing the elimination of all discrimination of women.  
                                                
290 See in this direction Rt. 2009 1261 (41-42) 
291 NOU 1993:18 p. 88 cf. Rt. 2008 1764, Rt. 2009 1261 (41-42) 
292 Innst.O. nr. 51 (1998-1999) p. 6 
293 Innst.O. nr. 51 (1998-1999) p. 6 
294 Rt. 2008 1764 (81) 
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3.3.3 The constituent elements of rape as defined by the Committee on the 
Elimination of Discrimination against Women interpreted in the light of 
CEDAW  
3.3.3.1 Introduction  
Under section ”Violence against women”, in the Eight Periodic Report of Norway, the 
Committee of CEDAW urged Norway to: “Adopt a legal definition of rape in the Penal 
Code so as to place the lack of consent at its centre, in line with the Committee´s general 
recommendation No. 19, and the Vertido case.”295  This can be seen as a specific provision 
under CEDAW and thus a positive obligation for Norway to undertake cf. the Human 
Rights Act Section 3, Rt. 2008 page 1764 and Rt. 2009 page 1261.296  
 
3.3.3.2 A legal definition of rape in the GCPC so as to place the lack of consent at its 
centre, in line with the Committee´s general recommendation No. 19  
The Committee interpreted gender-based violence to be entailed in the definition of dis-
crimination in article 1 of CEDAW in General Recommendation No. 19  “General Com-
ments,” in 1992.297 Violence directed against a woman because she is a woman or that af-
fects women disproportionately is gender-based violence.298 “Gender-based violence may 
breach specific provisions of the Convention, regardless of whether those provisions ex-
pressly mention violence.”299 
 
Further, “discrimination under the Convention is not restricted to action by or on behalf of 
Governments (see articles 2 (e), 2 (f), and 5.) For example, under article 2 (e), the Conven-
                                                
295 CEDAW/C/NOR/8 p. 6 E-bok, Rt. 2009 1261 (44) 
296 See also Merry (2001) concerning state responsibility for failures to protect women from violence, the 
obligation to protect being an internationally recognized human right p. 86-92 
297 General recommendations No. 19 nr. 9 E-Bok 
298 General recommendations No. 19 nr. 9 E-Bok  
299 General recommendations No. 19 
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tion calls on States parties to take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination 
against women by any person, organization or enterprise. Under general international law 
and specific human rights covenants, States may also be responsible for private acts if they 
fail to act with due diligence to prevent violations of rights or to investigate and punish acts 
of violence, and for providing compensation.”300 
 
24. (b) “States parties should ensure that laws against family violence and abuse, 
rape, sexual assault and other gender-based violence give adequate protection to all 
women, and respect their integrity and dignity.”301 (emphasis added) 
 
“(t) States parties should take all legal and other measures that are necessary to pro-
vide effective protection of women against gender-based violence, including, inter 
alia:  
 
(i) Effective legal measures, including penal sanctions, civil remedies and compen-
satory provisions to protect women against all kinds of violence, including inter alia 
violence and abuse in the family, sexual assault and sexual harassment in the work-
place”302 
 
3.3.3.2.1 Conclusion 
Norway has a positive obligation under CEDAW to give adequate protection to women 
being subject to gender-based sexual violence by any person within Norway´s jurisdiction. 
This positive obligation in regard of rape, involves that laws against rape shall give ade-
quate protection to all women, and respect their integrity and dignity. These laws shall 
                                                
300 General recommendations No. 19 nr. 9 E-Bok 
301 General recommendations No. 19 
302 General recommendations No. 19 nr. 24 t-i E-Bok 
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bring effective legal measures, including penal sanctions, civil remedies and compensatory 
provisions to protect women against all kinds of violence.  
 
3.3.3.3 A legal definition of rape in the GCPC so as to place lack of consent at its centre, 
in line with the case of Vertido v. the Philippines303 
In the case of Vertido v. the Philippines, Karen Vertido, a Filipino national claimed to be a 
victim of discrimination against women within the meaning of Article 1 of the Convention 
in relation to the general recommendation No. 19 of the Committee on the Elimination of 
Discrimination against Women. Ms. Vertido argued that the acquittal of the man accused 
for raping her was “grounded in gender-based myths and misconceptions about rape and 
rape victims, and that it was rendered in bad faith, without basis in law or in fact.”304 She 
also claimed that her rights under articles 2 (c), (d), (f) and 5 (a) of CEDAW had been vio-
lated by the State party.305  
 
Article 1 of CEDAW entails a general definition of discrimination against women:  
 
Art. 1. ”For the purposes of the present Convention, the term ”discrimination 
against women” shall mean any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the ba-
sis of sex which has the effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition, 
enjoyment or exercise by women, irrespective of their marital status, on a basis of 
equality of men and women, of human rights and fundamental freedoms, in the po-
litical, economic, social, cultural, civil or any other field.” 
 
                                                
303 The Committee´s definition of rape has also been upheld in the Case of SVP v. Bulgaria  
304 Vertido v. the Philippines p. 5  
305 Vertido v. the Philippines p. 2  
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Karen Vertido was raped by a colleague, J.B.C., on the night of 29 March 1996.306 The 
Regional Court of Davao City acquitted the colleague on 26 of April 2005. Three principles 
derived from previous case law from the Supreme Court was dismissive:  
 
(a) “it is easy to make an accusation of rape; it is difficult to prove but more difficult for 
the person accused, though innocent, to disprove;  
(b) in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape, in which only two persons are usu-
ally involved, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme cau-
tion;  
(c) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot be al-
lowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence of the defense.”307 
 
Ms. Vertido alleged that the guiding principles from the Supreme Court of the Philippines, 
followed by the judge in deciding her case, would involve “that an accusation of rape is not 
easy to make and that to say that a rape charge is more difficult for the accused to disprove 
is unwarranted. (…) this presumption unjustifiably and immediately places rape victims 
under suspicion.”308 
 
The Regional Court of Davao City had challenged the credibility of Ms. Vertido´s testimo-
ny.  
 
“[S]hould the author really have fought off the accused when she had regained con-
sciousness and when he was raping her, the accused would have been unable to 
proceed to the point of ejaculation, in particular bearing in mind that he was already 
in his sixties.”309  
                                                
306 Vertido v. the Philippines p. 3   
307 Vertido v. the Philippines p. 4  
308 Vertido v. the Philippines p. 7  
309 Vertido v. the Philippines p. 4-5  
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The Court found that the testimony of other witnesses, the motel room boy and the friend 
of the accused, corroborated the testimony of the accused on some material points. The 
Court therefore concluded that the evidence presented by the prosecution, in particular the 
testimony of the complainant herself, left too many doubts in the mind of the Court to 
achieve the moral certainty necessary to merit a conviction. Applying guiding principles 
derived from other case law in deciding rape cases, the Court declared itself unconvinced 
that there existed sufficient evidence to erase all reasonable doubts that the accused com-
mitted the offence with which he was charged, and acquitted him.310   
 
Karen Vertido claimed that the Philippines had failed to comply with their positive obliga-
tions in Article 2 litra c, d, and f, of CEDAW, because of J.B.C.´s acquittal.311  
 
Article  2 litra c, d, and f of CEDAW read:  
 
Art. 2. States Parties condemn discrimination against women in all its forms, agree 
to pursue by all appropriate means and without delay a policy of eliminating dis-
crimination against women, to this end, undertake:  
c) To establish legal protection of the rights of women on a equal 
basis with men and to ensure that public authorities and insti-
tutions shall act in conformity with this obligation;  
 
d) To refrain from engaging in any act or practice of discrimina-
tion against women and to ensure that public authorities and 
institutions shall act in conformity with this obligation;  
 
                                                
310 Vertido v. the Philippines p. 4-5  
311 Vertido v. the Philippines p. 5  
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f) To take all appropriate measures, including legislation, to 
modify or abolish existing laws, regulations, customs and 
practices which constitute discrimination against women;312  
 
Ms. Vertido also alleged that the acquittal was grounded in gender-based myths and mis-
conceptions about rape and rape victims in violation of article 5 (a) of the Convention.313  
 
Art. 5. States Parties shall take all appropriate measures:  
a) To modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and wom-
en, with a view to achieving the elimination of prejudices and customary 
and all other practices which are based on the idea of the inferiority or 
the superiority of either of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and 
women;314  
 
A myth and stereotype challenged by Karen Vertido to the Committee was  
 
“to conclude that a rape occurred by means of threat, there must be clear evidence 
of a direct threat. (…) instead of employing a context-sensitive assessment of the 
evidence and looking at the circumstances as a whole, the Court focused on the lack 
of the objective existence of a gun. (…) according to case law and legal theory, it is 
the lack of consent, not the element of force, that is seen as the constituent element 
of the offence of rape. (…) requiring proof of physical force or the threat of physi-
cal force in all circumstances risks leaving certain types of rape unpunished and 
jeopardizes efforts to effectively protect women from sexual violence.”315 
 
                                                
312 CEDAW 
313 Vertido v. the Philippines p. 5  
314 CEDAW 
315 Vertido v. the Philippines p. 6  
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Ms. Vertido further alleged that “the fact that the accused and the victim are “more than 
nodding acquaintances” makes the sex consensual constitutes a fourth myth and stereotype. 
(…) it is a grave misconception that any relationship between the accused and the victim is 
valid proof of the victim´s consent to the sexual act.” 
 
Ms. Vertido claimed that “the Court unjustly imposes a standard of “normal” or “natural” 
behaviour on rape victims and discriminates against those who do not conform to these 
standards.”316 Ms. Vertido claimed that her case was not an isolated one and that there were 
many trial court decisions in rape cases “that discriminate against women and perpetuate 
discriminatory beliefs about rape victims. (…) those insidious judgements violate the rights 
and freedoms of women, deny them equal protection under the law, deprive them of a just 
and effective remedy for the harm they suffered and continue to force them into a position 
subordinate to men.”317  
 
In order to support her accusations, Ms. Vertido presented examples from seven decisions 
of trial courts from 1999 to 2007 as an illustration of the systematic discrimination rape 
victims experience when they seek redress. The following similarities with her case was 
pointed out:  
 
(a) The “sweetheart defence” or a variation thereof, by which it is asserted that the 
sexual act is consensual because intimate or sexual relations existed or exist be-
tween the complainant and the accused;  
(b) The Court´s appreciation of the complainant´s conduct before, during and after 
the alleged rape, with the main line of reasoning being that the complainant did 
not exhibit the “natural” reaction of a woman who claims to have been violated;  
(c) The absence of injury, on the part of both the accused and the complainant;  
                                                
316 Vertido v. the Philippines p. 6  
317 Vertido v. the Philippines p. 8 nr. 3.8  
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(d) The nature, amount or severity, and the perceived effects of the force, threat or 
intimidation as applied to the complainant;  
(e) The understanding of the concept of consent and how it is manifested or com-
municated.”318 
 
The Committee reviewed Mrs. Vertido´s allegations under Articles 2 (c), 2 (f), and 5 (a) of 
the Convention.319 The Committee reached the conclusion that Mrs. Vertido rights under 
the Convention had been violated and thus constituted a breach of the corresponding State 
Party´s obligations to end discrimination in the legal process.320  
 
In regard to stereotyped myths created by the judiciary and the States Parties obligation to 
modify or abolish existing laws that constitute discrimination, the Committee held that:  
  
 “the Convention places obligations on all State organs and that States parties can 
be responsible for judicial decisions which violate the provisions of the Convention. 
It notes that by articles 2 (f) and 5 (a), the State party is obligated to take appropri-
ate measures to modify or abolish not only existing laws and regulations, but also 
customs and practices that constitute discrimination against women. In this regard, 
the Committee stresses that stereotyping affects women´s right to a fair and just trial 
and that the judiciary must take caution not to create inflexible standards of what 
women or girls should be or what they should have done when confronted with a 
situation of rape based merely on preconceived notions of what defines a rape vic-
tim or a victim of gender-based violence, in general.”321 
 
                                                
318 Vertido v. the Philippines p. 8 nr. 3.8.  
319 Vertido v. the Philippines p. 14 nr. 8.2  
320 Vertido v. the Philippines p. 17 nr. 8.9  
321 Vertido v. the Philippines p. 14-15 nr. 8.4.  
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Reiterating General Recommendation No. 19, the Committee held that in “the particular 
case, the compliance of the State party´s due diligence obligation to banish gender stereo-
types on the grounds of articles 2 (f) and 5 (a) needs to be assessed in the light of the level 
of gender sensitivity applied in the judicial handling of the author´s case.”322 
 
The Committee found that it “is clear from the judgment that the assessment of the credibil-
ity of the author´s version of events was influenced by a number of stereotypes”.323 Even 
though a legal precedent was established by the Supreme Court of the Philippines that “it is 
not necessary to establish that the accused had overcome the victim´s physical resistance in 
order to prove lack of consent,”324 the Committee found that to expect Mrs. Vertido to re-
sist in the situation at stake, reinforced in a “particular manner the myth that women must 
physically resist the sexual assault. In this regard, the Committee stresses that there should 
be no assumption in law or in practice that a woman gives her consent because she has not 
physically resisted the unwanted sexual conduct, regardless of whether the perpetrator 
threatened to use or used physical violence.”325 
 
At the time this case was pending before the Committee on 22 September 2010,326 the defi-
nition of rape in the Revised Penal Code of the Philippines Article 233-A read:  
 
“Rape: When And How Committed.  
Rape is committed:  
1. By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of 
the following circumstances:  
(a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;  
                                                
322 Vertido v. the Philippines p. 14-15 nr. 8.4.  
323 Vertido v. the Philippines p. 15 nr. 8.5.  
324 Vertido v. the Philippines p. 16 nr. 8.2.  
325 Vertido v. the Philippines p. 14 nr. 8.2.  
326 Vertido v. the Philippines p. 1  
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(b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise un-
conscious;  
(c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; 
and 
(d) When the offended party is under 12 years of age or is demented, 
even though none of the circumstances mentioned above be pre-
sent.  
2.  By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 
1 hereof, shall commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another 
person´s mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into the genital or anal 
orifice of another person.327  
 
In regard of the definition of rape, the Committee noted that: 
 
“lack of consent is not an essential element of the definition of rape in the Philip-
pines Revised Penal Code. It recalls its general recommendation No.19 of 29 Janu-
ary 1992 on violence against women, where it made clear, in paragraph 24 (b), that 
“States parties should ensure that laws against family violence and abuse, rape, sex-
ual assault and other gender-based violence give adequate protection to all women 
and respect their integrity and dignity.” Though its consideration of States parties` 
reports, the Committee has clarified time and again that rape constitutes a violation 
of women´s right to personal security and bodily integrity, and that its essential el-
ement was lack of consent.”328 (emphasis added) 
 
The Committee concluded that it “is of the view that the State party has failed to fulfill its 
obligations and has thereby violated the rights of the author under article 2 (c) and (f), and 
                                                
327 Vertido v. the Philippines p. 16 footnote under nr. 8.7.  
328 Vertido v. the Philippines p. 16 nr. 8.7.  
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article 5 (a) read in conjunction with article 1 of the Convention and general recommenda-
tion No.19 of the Committee”.329 
 
As a result, the Committee gave the Philippines a general recommendation to review “the 
definition of rape in the legislation so as to place lack of consent at its centre.”330 This in-
volved the removal of “any requirement in the legislation that sexual assault be committed 
by force or violence, and any requirement of proof of penetration, and minimization of sec-
ondary victimization of the complainant/survivor in proceedings by enacting a definition of 
sexual assault that either:  
 
a. Requires the existence of “unequivocal and voluntary agreement” and 
requiring proof by the accused of steps taken to ascertain whether the 
complainant/survivor was consenting; or 
b. Requires that the act take place in “coercive circumstances” and includes 
a broad range of coercive circumstances;”331 
 
3.3.3.4 Summary and Conclusion 
The constituent element of rape as defined by the Committee on the Elimination of Dis-
crimination against Women, interpreted in the light of CEDAW is lack of consent. In order 
to provide adequate protection for women subject to gender-based violence, Norway´s pos-
itive obligation under CEDAW is to revise the definition of rape, and to place lack of con-
sent at its centre, in line with the Committee´s general recommendation No. 19 and the Ver-
tido case. This positive obligation involves the removal of any requirement in legislation 
that sexual assault be committed by force or violence. The State Party is obliged to mini-
mize secondary victimization of the complainant in proceedings by enacting a definition of 
                                                
329 Vertido v. the Philippines p. 17 nr. 8.9.  
330 Vertido v. the Philippines p. 17 nr. 8.9. (b) (i)  
331 Vertido v. the Philippines p. 17 nr. 8.9.  
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sexual assault that either requires the existence of “unequivocal and voluntary agreement”, 
or requires that the act take place in “coercive circumstances” and includes a broad range of 
coercive circumstances.”332 
 
3.3.4 Conflicting provisions between CEDAW and the definition of rape in Section 
192 of the GCPC cf. the Human Rights Act Section 3 
3.3.4.1 Obligation to place lack of consent as the centre of the definition of rape 
CEDAW is a Convention incorporated into Section 2 of the Human Rights Act, and shall 
therefore “take precedence over any other legislative provisions that conflict with them” cf. 
Section 3.333 The State Parties of CEDAW “undertake to adopt all necessary measures at 
the national level aimed at achieving the full realization of the rights recognized in the pre-
sent Convention,” cf. Article 24. The Supreme Court of Norway stated in Rt. 2008 page 
1764 that an interpretation of a Convention by a UN Human Rights Committee have signif-
icant weight as a source of law.334 The positive obligation of Norway under CEDAW is to 
place lack of consent at its centre as the definition of rape, in order to avoid continued dis-
crimination of women.335 This implies that the current definition of rape in the Section 192 
of the GCPC is not in compliance with CEDAW. As of today, Section 192 is very similar 
to the definition of rape in the Revised Penal Code of the Philippines Article 233-A, of 
which the Committee recommended revised in order to avoid continued discrimination of 
women.336  
 
The Norwegian Ministry of Justice and Public Security finished an official hearing on June 
1 2013, suggesting criminalising “lack of consent” to the sexual activity as rape by adding 
                                                
332 Vertido v. the Philippines p. 17 nr. 8.9.  
333 GCPC 1902 
334 Rt. 2008 1764 (81), See also Rt. 2009 1261 (44) 
335 CEDAW/C/NOR/8 p. 6 E-bok  
336 Vertido v. the Philippines p. 17 nr. 8.9. (b) (i)  
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an additional letter d to Section 192 of the GCPC.337  The purpose behind posing a preposi-
tion of expanding the definition of rape in Section 192 was to include a “rest- category” of 
cases where the sexual activity has been non-consensual.338 This proposal of expanding the 
definition of rape came as a consequence of the Committee´s Eight Periodic Report of 
Norway,339 and Norway´s Signature of the Istanbul Convention. Norway is obliged to 
adopt the definition of rape held by the Committee in “good faith.”340 And a “party may not 
invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a trea-
ty.”341  
 
In the realm of criminal law, Article 96 and 97 of the Constitution, and the Supreme Court 
of Norway´s strict interpretation of the principle of legality will draw lines for the 
´justiciability`342 of the rights derived from CEDAW. In order to prosecute people for a 
crime in Norway, the crime has to be prescribed by statutory law. Rape as defined by the 
Committee will therefore not constitute an independent legal ground for holding anyone 
liable for rape in Norway. Rather, the Report will constitute a political pressure on the 
Government and Parliament of Norway to place lack of consent as the constituent element 
of rape.  
3.3.4.2 Summary and Conclusion 
It can be claimed that the State of Norway has given the Committee direct opportunity to 
constitute positive obligations under CEDAW for women subject to discrimination in Nor-
way; in whatever area the Committee may choose under the Convention. The incorporation 
of CEDAW into the Human Rights Act,343 the legal status of “significant weight”344 of the 
                                                
337 Høringsnotat p. 22-34 E-bok 
338 Høringsnotat p. 5-6 E-bok 
339 CEDAW/C/NOR/8 p. 6 E-bok 
340 Vienna Convention Article 26 
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342 See Scheinin (2001) p. 29 
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UN Committee´s interpretation of the Convention, and the “signal effect345” of Article 110 
c of the Constitution to the lawgiver of respecting and ensuring human rights, gives the 
State of Norway no margin of appreciation when it comes to the positive obligation Nor-
way has undertaken to adopt a legal definition of rape in its Penal Code so as to place the 
lack of consent at its centre.  
 
3.3.5 Failure to place lack of consent at its centre as the definition of rape might 
contribute to a continuation of discrimination of women in law and practice 
 The current definition of rape in Section 192 of the GCPC holds anyone liable for sexual 
activity caused by “means of violence or threats”346 or if a person “engages in sexual activi-
ty with any person who is unconscious or incapable for any other reason of resisting the 
act.” This definition of rape might contribute to an assumption “in law or in practice that a 
woman gives her consent because she has not physically resisted the unwanted sexual con-
duct, regardless of whether the perpetrator threatened to use or used physical violence.”347 
By placing lack of consent at the centre as the definition of rape it is therefore understood 
that the constitute element of rape is lack of consent to the sexual activity, not the require-
ment of the use of “violence,” “threats”, or that the aggrieved party is “unconscious” or 
“incapable for any other reason of resisting the act”. These listings simply point to the con-
stituent element of rape that it is non-consensual. In fact, not placing lack of consent as the 
constitute element of rape can result to continued discrimination of women. 
 
The Committee noted in the case of Vertido v. the Philippines that the Convention places 
obligations on all State organs, and that States parties can be responsible for judicial deci-
sions, which violate the provisions of the Convention.348 By articles 2 (f) and 5 (a), the 
                                                                                                                                               
344 Rt. 2008 1764 
345 NOU 1993:18 p. 156-161 E-bok 
346 GCPC 1902 p. 76 E-bok 
347 Vertido v. the Philippines p. 14 nr. 8.2.  
348 Vertido v. the Philippines p. 14-15 nr. 8.4.  
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State party is obligated to take appropriate measures to modify or abolish not only existing 
laws and regulations, but also customs and practices that constitute discrimination against 
women.349 The Committee held in the Vertido case that the ruling by the Philippine Court 
reinforced in a “particular manner the myth that women must physically resist the sexual 
assault.”350 The Committee therefore stressed that there should be no assumption in law or 
in practice that a woman gives her consent because she has not physically resisted the un-
wanted sexual conduct, regardless of whether the perpetrator threatened to use or used 
physical violence.”351  
 
Criminalizing a “rest-category” of non-consensual sexual activity as rape might contribute 
to a continued discrimination in Norwegian law and practice. Rt. 2003 page 687 can here 
serve as an example.352  The man was accused of rape for continuing sexual activity with a 
woman who fell asleep during the sexual activity and was therefore per definition “uncon-
scious” cf. Section 192 b. The Court stated that the facts of the case could be subsumed 
under Section 192 litra b, and a consequence of not doing so would lead to that the ag-
grieved party would not have legal protection for any given time if that person should 
choose consciously to engage or not engage in sexual activity. Yet it was a question of us-
ing very serious statutory sections towards that what the lawgiver defines as rape - a crime 
punishable with up to ten years in prison as this current case was a case where the sexual 
activity was not intercourse. The situation in Rt. 2003 page 687 was in the Court´s opinion 
so different from those cases sections concerning rape is supposed to entail, and of which 
has usually been deemed as rape. At the same time this current situation was not an unprac-
tical one, neither in established relationships, nor in youth groups as was of the current 
case: a couple starts sexual activities that is mutually consented, but the one person falls 
asleep, due to intoxication or tiredness, without the other stopping the sexual activity. Due 
                                                
349 Vertido v. the Philippines p. 14-15 nr. 8.4.  
350 Vertido v. the Philippines p. 14 nr. 8.2.  
351 Vertido v. the Philippines p. 14 nr. 8.2.  
352 See previous analysis in chapter 2, 2.1.3.2.  
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to policy considerations and consideration of the consequences of the statutory interpreta-
tion, the Supreme Court acquitted the man.353 
 
Like Karen Vertido, the 20-year old woman in Rt. 2003 page 687 is likely to have been 
subject to discrimination against women within the meaning of Article 1 of CEDAW, con-
stituting a breach of the corresponding State Party´s obligations to end discrimination in the 
legal process under Articles 2 (c), 2 (f), and 5 (a) of the Convention,354 and in relation to 
the general recommendation No. 19 of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination 
against Women, and the Vertido case. Ms. Vertido had argued that the acquittal of the man 
accused for raping her was “grounded in gender-based myths and misconceptions about 
rape and rape victims, and that it was rendered in bad faith, without basis in law or in 
fact.355 The acquittal of the 24-year-old man in Rt. 2003 page 687 was neither based in 
statutory law cf. Section 192 b of the GCPC, nor the facts of the case as they could be sub-
sumed under Section 192 b. The well-known principle prescribed by statutory law in the 
GCPC Section 40 paragraph one, third comma; “if the offender has acted in a self-induced 
state of intoxication caused by alcohol or other means, the court shall disregard such intox-
ication when judging whether the act was wilful,”356 was disregarded. This principle is fur-
ther underlined in Section 45 of the GCPC; “Unconsciousness that is a consequence of self- 
induced intoxication (caused by alcohol or other means) shall not exclude punishment.”357 
The 24-year-old man was intoxicated by alcohol and amphetamine at the time he engaged 
in the sexual activity with the aggrieved party.358 The aggrieved party was also intoxicated 
by alcohol, and had smoked some weed before she consented to the sexual activity, and 
before she fell asleep. It is interesting that these well known principles, prescribed by statu-
tory law, was not taken into account in this case. The 20-year-old woman consented to the 
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sexual activity in a state of consciousness. What she did not consent to was the sexual ac-
tivity while being asleep.  
 
A report from the Norwegian Director General of Public Prosecution from 2007 concluded 
that myths and misconceptions in regard of rape could influence the outcome of a criminal 
case. It found that members of the Police and the Prosecution shared the view of these 
myths and misconceptions, at least in such a substantial amount that it was described as a 
problem.359 The conditions for sexual activity being deemed as rape according to Section 
192 of the GCPC such as “violence”, “threats”, “unconscious” or “incapable of resisting 
the act” were often factors contributing to create reasonable doubt as to whether the sexual 
activity was consensual, resulting in the acquittal of the accused when he claimed that the 
sexual activity had been consensual.360 Concerning the quality of prosecutorial decisions 
ending with acquittals, three common features were found.361 First, most of the vic-
tims/perpetrators knew each other before the crime was committed. Secondly the scene of 
crime was often the victim´s, the suspect or their common house. Third, the suspect seldom 
denied that sexual activity had occurred, however the suspect claimed that it had been of 
one´s own free will.362 Low prosecution rate, and high acquittal rate were some of the simi-
lar problems in Sweden and Denmark.363 Interestingly both Denmark and Sweden have 
similar definitions of rape in their respective penal codes as that of Norway.364 
 
The current definition of rape in Section 192 has remained unchanged since the year of 
2000. An Official Norwegian Report (NOU) from 2008 “From word to action” concerning 
rape estimated that only 1 % of all perpetrators are convicted for their crime.365 A con-
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servative estimate stated that 8 000- 16 000 people were raped every year.366 The acquittal- 
rate of people prosecuted for rape was estimated to be three times as high compared to oth-
er criminal-offenses.367 The NOU stated that CEDAW had criticized Norway for its low 
conviction rate of reported rapes.368 Amongst the prepositions for change and improvement 
of the rule of law and legal status of victims of rape, the definition of rape in the GCPC was 
not taken into consideration as to whether it should be revised.369  
 
The Norwegian Centre for Violence and Traumatic Stress Studies (NKVTS) published a 
prevalence study on 25 February 2014, report 1/2014, concerning violence and rape in 
Norway. The analysis was performed in the light of the current definition of rape in Section 
192 of the GCPC.370 The NKVTS found that only 3,5 % of the women being raped had 
experienced that their perpetrator had been convicted for their crime.371 In regard to the 
experience with the court system, it was found that only a small minority of rape cases, in 
total 17,5% were known to the police. “The proportion of cases known to the police was 
somewhat higher for severe physical violence.”372 Altogether two women had received 
compensation from the person who had raped them, and one person had applied for victim 
of violence compensation and received it.373 86 % of the women questioned reported that 
someone they knew had raped them.374 The prevalence of lifetime rape was 9,4 % in wom-
en and 1,1, % in men.375 The report found that perpetrators of sexual assault against women 
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were almost exclusively male.376 In fact, the perpetrator of rape was most often a friend, an 
acquaintance, a neighbour, a colleague, or a current or previous romantic partner. The re-
port concluded that severe physical violence and sexual abuse are prevalent in the Norwe-
gian population, and often occur for the first time at an early age. The data did not indicate 
any reduction over time of rape against young women. However, physical violence and 
rape varied with socioeconomic factors. Physical violence and rape were found to be asso-
ciated with mental health problems, and constitute serious public health problems.377 The 
report concluded that  
 
“[p]hysical violence and sexual abuse are probably more important for women´s 
health, because women are exposed to heavier burden of violence and abuse than 
are men. (…) Rape and physical violence are still hidden. Few seek medical atten-
tion, few report the case to the police, and some never tell anyone.”378 
 
The report has already been criticized by Amnesty International for not taking into account 
rapes that occurs when the aggrieved party has been asleep, which makes it likely to con-
clude that more than 1 out of 10 women have experienced rape during their lifetime in 
Norway.379 Siri Thoresen, one of the leaders of the study agreed that this most likely has 
led to an underestimate of the total numbers of people being raped in Norway.380 The report 
gave Norwegian media a notion to state that Norway is under a permanent rape-crisis, un-
like any civilized nation.381 
 
The almost non-existing security under the rule of law for women subject to rape in Nor-
way indicates that Norway has failed to provide women subject to rape adequate protec-
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tion. One might claim that Section 192 is de facto merely symbolic,382 leaving the criminal 
proceedings devoid of meaning.  
 
3.3.6 Summary and Conclusion  
The positive obligations under CEDAW of the State of Norway is to “adopt a legal defini-
tion of rape in the Penal Code so as to place the lack of consent at its centre, in line with the 
Committee´s general recommendation No. 19, and the Vertido case.”383 The Committee 
has defined rape through a teleological interpretation of the evolutionary rights set out in 
CEDAW, cf. the Committee´s General Recommendation No. 19, the Vertido case, speci-
fied as a progressive right and minimum standard in the Eight Periodic Report of Nor-
way.384 The Committee´s recommendation of adopting a legal definition of rape in the 
GCPC as to place the lack of consent at its centre, can be seen as a specific provision for 
Norway in regard to the State`s positive obligations under CEDAW. The development of 
preventing discrimination of women subject to non-consensual rape is only limited by the 
general will of the State of Norway as the fulfilment of this legal protection of women de-
pends on the consensus of the State.385 
 
The current definition of rape in Section 192 of the GCPC might contribute to an assump-
tion “in law or in practice that a woman gives her consent because she has not physically 
resisted the unwanted sexual conduct, regardless of whether the perpetrator threatened to 
use or used physical violence.”386 Placing lack of consent at the centre of rape removes the 
consideration of the existing circumstances, as the crime is simply defined by the fact 
whether the sexual activity was consensual or not. Other non-consensual factors, which 
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constitute the crime of rape in Section 192 of the GCPC as it stands today, should rather be 
factors increasing the punitive reaction towards the perpetrator. 
 
3.4 Summary and Conclusion  
The ECtHR and the Committee of CEDAW define lack of consent as the constituent ele-
ment of rape. There are currently conflicting provisions between the definition of rape in 
Section 192 of the GCPC , the ECHR and CEDAW. In the realm of criminal law, Norwe-
gian Courts are prevented from interpreting criminal liability expansively from provisions 
that is not prescribed by statutory law cf. Article 96 of the Constitution and Rt. 2009 p.780, 
Rt. 2011 p. 469, and Rt. 2010 p. 1445. Compliance with the international obligations of 
Norway can therefore only be ensured by the expansion or revision of the definition of rape 
in Section 192 of the GCPC. The ECtHR stated in the case of M.C v. Bulgaria, “the mem-
ber State´s positive obligations under Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention must be seen as 
requiring the penalisation and effective prosecution of any non- consensual sexual act, in-
cluding in the absence of physical resistance by the victim.”387 The effectiveness of the 
system put in place by the State in accordance with its international obligations shall not 
leave the criminal proceedings in the case devoid of meaning cf. Article 8 and the case of 
C.A.S and C.S v. Romania. The positive obligation of Norway under CEDAW is to adopt a 
legal definition of rape in the Penal Code so as to place the lack of consent at its centre, in 
line with the Committee´s general recommendation No. 19, and the Vertido case. 
Norway has a positive obligation under the ECHR to penalise any non-consensual sexual 
act.388 An obligation of which the proposal of adding an additional letter d to Section 192 
of the GCPC, criminalising “lack of consent” to the sexual activity as rape seems suffi-
cient.389  However, a legal definition of rape in the Penal Code so as to place lack of con-
sent at its centre, in line with the Committee´s general recommendation No. 19, and the 
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Vertido case interpreted in “good faith”390 suggest that this legislative proposal is insuffi-
cient. In order to avoid continued discrimination of women in law and practice, revising the 
definition of rape in Section 192 entirely so as to place lack of consent at its centre is re-
quired.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
390 Vienna Convention Article 26 
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4 International Criminal Law: Lack of Consent as the Constituent 
Element of Rape?  
4.1 Rape as crimes against humanity and war crimes in chapter 16 of the 
Norwegian Penal Code of 2005 
4.1.1 Introduction 
Genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes were implemented as statutory provi-
sions in the Norwegian Penal Code of 2005 (NPC).391 The new Penal Code (NPC) is esti-
mated to enter into force by 2017.392 Chapter 16 of the NPC concerning genocide, crimes 
against humanity and war crimes entered into force by resolution of 7 March 2008 nr. 225 
cf. § 401.393 The specified provisions in chapter 16 of the NPC were in large transformed 
from the Rome Statute.394 The Rome Statute entered into force on 1 July 2002, and is the 
legal basis for the International Criminal Court (ICC).395 The object and purpose of the ICC 
is to help end impunity for the perpetrators of the most serious crimes of concern to the 
international community.396 The preparatory works of the NPC held that it would be easier 
to document that Norway had followed through with its international obligations in a loyal 
and adequate way by specifying these provisions in chapter 16 of the NPC.397 The intention 
of using specified provisions was to point to the fact that the provisions have to be inter-
preted in the light of, and in accordance with the international obligation.398 The preparato-
ry committee held that this interpretation should not be exaggerated, and that national crim-
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inal-politics should be given consideration.399 The Rome Statute, which is also referred to 
as the International Criminal Code,400 is therefore intended to influence the interpretation of 
the specified provisions in chapter 16 of the NPC.401   
 
The preparatory works of chapter 16 of the NPC held that a central source to the principles 
and rules of international law cf. Article 21 litra b of the Rome Statute, would be decisions 
from International Courts in distinct cases, of which the ICTY was mentioned in particu-
lar.402 Rape is penalised in Section 102 (g) and 103 (d) of the NPC, but not specifically 
defined. In its commentary to Section 102 (g) concerning rape, the preparatory works of the 
NPC held that the more narrow definition of rape stated by the ICTY in the Furundžija 
case would cover the actus reus of rape.403 This comment was also referred to in the pre-
paratory works in regard to the definition of rape in Section 103 (d) war crimes.404 The Fu-
rundžija definition is very similar to that of the current definition of rape in Section 192 of 
the GCPC.  
 
However, during the late 1990´s and in the beginning of the 21st century, three definitions 
of rape were issued by the ICTY and the ICTR.405 These definitions were set out in the 
Akayesu Judgment of 2 September 1998, the Furundžija case from 10 December 1998, and 
the Kunarac case from 22 February 2001.406 There are currently cases pending before the 
International Criminal Court that is expected to bring clarity to how rape is defined in the 
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light of the Rome Statute.407 Judicial scholars have described the Prosecutor v. Jean- 
Pierre Bemba Gombo “to be a key ICC case concerning sexual crimes.”408 It is therefore 
likely to conclude that the definition of rape interpreted in the light of the Rome Statute is 
at the present unresolved.409  
 
In order to clarify what the current definition of rape is in regard of crimes against humani-
ty and war crimes, the Rome Statute, Elements of Crimes, and case law from the ICTY and 
ICTR and other relevant international law will be analysed. What is to be considered the 
definition of rape in Section 102 and 103 of the NPC will then be compared to the current 
definition of rape in Section 192 of the CGPC.  
 
4.1.2 The definition of Rape in Section 102 g) and Section 103 d) of the NPC 
interpreted in the light of, and in accordance with the Rome Statute 
4.1.2.1 Applicable law for the interpretation of the Rome Statute 
In regard to applicable law for the interpretation of the Rome Statute, Article 21 read:  
 
1. The Court shall apply:  
a. In the first place, this Statute, Elements of Crimes and its Rules of Procedure 
and Evidence;  
b. In the second place, where appropriate, applicable treaties and the principles 
and rules of international law, including the established principles of the in-
ternational law of armed conflict;  
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409 The development of international law in the matter of criminal responsibility of individuals for war crimes 
and other serious offences is still under way. See Gaeta (2014) p. 765 
 99 
c. Failing that, general principles of law derived by the Court from national 
laws of legal systems of the world including, as appropriate, the national 
laws of States that would normally exercise jurisdiction over the crime, pro-
vided that those principles are not inconsistent with this Statute and with in-
ternational law and internationally recognized norms and standards.  
 
2.       The Court may apply principles and rules of law as interpreted in its previ-
ous decisions.410 
 
The ICC stated in the Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo that as set forth in article 
21 (1) (b) of the Statute, ”the Chamber refers to principles and rules of international law, 
including the established principles of international law of armed conflict. Reference is also 
made to applicable treaties as well as relevant jurisprudence of other tribunals which echo 
principles of the international law of armed conflict.”411  
 
The Statutes of the ICC, ICTY, and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) 
are built upon the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 for the Protection of War Vic-
tims, and of Additional Protocol II thereto of 8 June 1977 Article 3.412 These violations 
shall include, but shall not be limited to:  
 
c) Outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and 
degrading treatment, rape, enforced prostitution and any form 
of indecent assault;413 
 
                                                
410 Rome Statute p. 16-17, Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo (218)  
411 Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo (218)  
412 See amongst Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu p.12-13 E-bok 
413 Cassese (2008) p. 16-17 
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Norway has ratified the Geneva-Conventions of 1949 nr.1, nr.2, nr.3414, and nr.4415. The 
Protocols additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 of August 1949, relating to the pro-
tection of victims of international armed conflicts (Protocol I), and relating to the protec-
tion of victims of non- international armed conflicts (Protocol II), which entered into force 
in Norway on June 14 1982.416 The Geneva Conventions are “essentially designed to regu-
late the treatment of persons who do not, or no longer, take part in armed conflict (civilians, 
the wounded, the sick and shipwrecked, as well as prisoners of war).”417 The Rome Statute 
continues the statutes and treaties of which the ICTY and the ICTR are based upon. Nor-
way is therefore obliged to consider the principles and interests these Conventions seek to 
protect of which the ICTY, ICTR and ICC has interpreted in order to define rape in Section 
102 and Section 103 of the NPC.  
 
4.1.2.2 Rape as a crime against humanity and war crime against a person in the Rome 
Statute Article 7 (1) (g) and Article 8 (2) (e) (vi) and the Elements of Crimes  
Rape is listed in the NPC Section 102 g) as a crime against humanity cf. Article 7 (g) of the 
Rome Statute,418 and in the NPC Section 103 d) as a war crime against a person cf. Article 
8 (e) (vi) of the Rome Statute.419 Rape is not explicitly defined in the NPC Section 102 g) 
and Secion 103 d), nor in the Rome Statute, but defined in the Elements of Crimes.  
 
Article 7 (1) (g) of the Rome Statute concerning rape as a crime against humanity read:  
 
                                                
414 Geneva-convention relative to the treatment of prisoners of war, with annexes, entered into force in Nor-
way 03-02-1952 
415 Geneva-Convention relative to the protection of civilian persons in time of war, with annexes, entered into 
force 03-02-1952 in Norway, see also emeritus.lovdata.no/traktater/  
416 emeritus.lovdata.no/traktater /  
417 Cassese (2008) p. 82  
418 Rome Statute p. 4 E-bok, St.prp.nr. 24 (1999-2000) p. 29, 52-57 E-bok 
419 Rome Statute p. 8 E-bok, St.prp.nr. 24 (1999-2000) p. 29, 52-57 E-bok 
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1. For the purpose of this Statute, ´crime against humanity´ means any of the fol-
lowing acts when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack di-
rected against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack:  
(g) Rape420 
 
Article 8 (2) (e) (vi) of the Rome Statute in regard to rape as a crime of war read:  
 
2. For the purpose of this Statute, ´war crimes´ means:  
(e) Other serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in 
armed conflicts not of an international character, within the es-
tablished framework of international law, namely, any of the fol-
lowing acts:  
(vi) Committing rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, 
forced pregnancy, as defined in article 7, paragraph 2 (f), en-
forced sterilization, and any other form of sexual violence al-
so constituting a serious violation of article 3 common to the 
four Geneva Conventions;421 
 
The actus reus of rape as a crime against humanity cf. article 7 (1) (g) -1 of the Rome Stat-
ute is defined in the Elements of Crimes:  
 
(1) The perpetrator invaded the body of a person by conduct resulting in penetra-
tion, however slight, of any part of the body of the victim or of the perpetrator 
with a sexual organ, or of the anal or genital opening of the victim with any ob-
ject or any other part of the body;  
 
                                                
420 Rome Statute Article 7 p. 3-4 E-bok 
421 Rome Statute Article 8 p. 5-9 E-bok 
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(2) The invasion was committed by force, or by threat of force or coercion, such as 
that caused by fear of violence, duress, detention, psychological oppression or 
abuse of power, against such person or another person, or by taking advantage 
of a coercive environment, or the invasion was committed against a person in-
capable of giving genuine consent. 
 
(3) The conduct was committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack di-
rected against a civilian population.  
 
(4) The perpetrator knew that the conduct was part of or intended the conduct to be 
part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian popula-
tion.422 
 
The Elements of Crimes clarify in footnote 16 to article 7 (1) (g) of the Statute that it is 
understood that a person may be incapable of giving genuine consent if affected by natural, 
induced or age- related incapacity.423 Judicial Scholar Christine Byron comments that: 
“Once more this seems to be a compromise between different approaches taken by judge-
ments of the ICTY and ICTR, with the ´coercion` approach of Akayesu, Celebici and Fu-
rundžija prevailing over the ´consent` approach of Kunarac.”424  Otto Triffterer in his 
commentary on the Rome Statute stated:  
 
“Although the current jurisprudence in the two leading Appeals Chamber judg-
ments, Kunarac in the ICTY and Gacumbitsi in the ICTR, have re-emphasized the 
fundamental nature of the crime as an attack on personal sexual autonomy, they 
have expressed this aspect of the crime by reintroducing the concept of non- con-
sent. However, they have taken some steps to avoid the risk that this new formula-
                                                
422 Elements of Crimes ICC Article 7 (1) (g) -1  
423 Elements of Crimes ICC Article 7 (1) (g) -1 footnote 16  
424 Byron (2009) p. 152 
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tion could place the Prosecutors under an unduly heavy burden and force the victim 
to demonstrate the lack of consent by stating that the circumstances in which crimes 
against humanity took place were almost always coercive. In any event, to the ex-
tent that there might be any weakening of protection in subsequent jurisprudence, 
the Elements of Crimes provide a better aid to the Court in interpreting article 7.”425 
 
Consent is in the Rules of Procedure and Evidence to the Rome Statute of the ICC (RPE), 
Rule 70 described as:  
 
“[I]n cases of sexual violence, the Court shall be guided by and, where appropriate, 
apply the following principles:  
(a) Consent cannot be inferred by reason of any words or conduct of a victim where 
force, threat of force, coercion or taking advantage of a coercive environment un-
dermined the victim´s ability to give voluntary and genuine consent;  
(b) Consent cannot be inferred by reason of any words or conduct of a victim where 
the victim is incapable of giving genuine consent; 
(c) Consent cannot be inferred by reason of the silence of, or lack of resistance by, a 
victim to the alleged sexual violence”426 
 
Rape as a crime of war has identical actus reus in article 8 (2) (e) (vi) of the Statute cf. the 
Elements of Crimes.427 The nexus to rape as a crime of war in article 8 (2) (e) (vi) is de-
scribed in the Elements of Crimes as:  
 
1. The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with an armed con-
flict not of an international character.  
                                                
425 Triffterer (2008) p. 210- 211 
426 Rules of Procedure and Evidence ICC Rule 70 p. 44 
427 Elements of Crimes ICC Article 8 (2) (e) (vi) -1, Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo p. 96-97 E-bok 
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2. The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that established the exist-
ence of an armed conflict.428 
 
Both of these definitions of rape and explanations of genuine consent from the Elements of 
Crimes were repeated in the currently pending ICC-cases of the Prosecutor vs. Katanga 
and Ndjulu-chou (Katanga-case),429 and the Prosecutor v. Jean- Pierre Bemba Gombo 
(Bemba-case).430 Judicial scholars have described the Bemba- case “to be a key ICC case 
concerning sexual crimes.”431 In light of the above, it is necessary to analyse relevant case- 
law from the ICTY and the ICTR in order to bring clarity as to what is to be considered the 
current definition of rape in the NPC Section 102 and 103.  
 
4.1.2.3 Case- law from the ICTY and ICTR and their definition of rape 
The legal framework of the ICC differs from that of the ad hoc tribunals, as it is put under 
regulation 55 of the Regulations, which state that the Trial Chamber may re-characterise a 
crime to give it the most appropriate legal characterisation.432 Nevertheless, in regard to 
crimes against humanity it has been held that case law from amongst ICTY and the ICTR 
has contributed to define the legal contours of the actus reus of crimes against humanity.433 
“In the event, the various categories have been largely spelled out in the ICC Statute, Arti-
cle 7 of which may be held to a large extent either to crystallize nascent notions or to codi-
fy the bulk of existing customary law.”434 
 
                                                
428 Elements of Crimes ICC Article 8 (2) (e) (vi) -1  
429 Prosecutor v. Katanga and Ndjulu-chou  
430 Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombom, Prosecutor v. Jean- Pierre Bemba Gombo  
431 McGlynn (2010) p. 58 
432 Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo p. 71 E-bok 
433 Cassese (2008) p. 109 
434 Cassese (2008) p. 109 
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The ICC has used case law from the ICTY and the ICTR in order to determine the meaning 
of the constitute elements of rape in Article 7 (1) (g) and Article 8 (e) (vi). For example 
with regard to the term “coercion” the ICC Chamber in the Katanga case noted “the find-
ing of the ICTR Trial Chamber in The Prosecutor v. Akayesu that a coercive environment 
does not require physical force.”435 What “genuine consent” cf. Rome Statute Article 7 (1) 
(g) (2) and Article 8 (e) (vi) entail, must therefore be sought brought into clarity through 
previous case-law from the ICTY, ICTR and other relevant international law cf. Rome 
Statute Article 21 (b). 
 
In the case of Kunarac, Kovac, and Vucovic (Kunarac case) from 2001, the ICTY defined 
rape as a non-consensual act of sexual penetration.436 The three accused where charged 
with rape as a violation of the laws of customs of war under Article 3 and as a crime 
against humanity under Article 5 of the Statute of the Tribunal, which explicitly refers to 
rape as a crime against humanity within the Tribunal´s jurisdiction cf. Article 5 (g).437 They 
were also prosecuted for rape as an outrage against personal dignity, in violation of the 
laws or customs of war pursuant to Article 3 of the Statute, including upon the basis of 
common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions.438 In regard of the actus reus of rape, 
the ICTY stated that: 
 
“Consent for this purpose must be consent given voluntarily, as a result of the vic-
tim´s free will, assessed in the context of the surrounding circumstances. The mens 
rea is the intention to effect this sexual penetration, and the knowledge that it occurs 
without the consent of the victim.”439 
 
                                                
435 Prosecutor v. Katanga and Ndjulu-chou (437- 440) 
436 Prosecutor v. Kunarac (438)  
437 Prosecutor v. Kunarac p. 145 E-bok 
438 Prosecutor v. Kunarac p. 145 E-bok 
439 Prosecutor v. Kunarac (460) 
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Interestingly, the Trial Chamber in the Furundžija case from 10 December 1998 concluded 
that the actus reus of the crime of rape was:  
(i) the sexual penetration, however slight:  
a. of the vagina or anus of the victim by the penis of the perpetrator or any 
other object used by the perpetrator; or 
b. of the mouth of the victim by the penis of the perpetrator 
(ii) by coercion or force or threat of force against the victim or a third person440 
 
At that time it was not possible to discern the elements of the crime of rape from the Statute 
of the Tribunal, international humanitarian law or human rights instruments,441 from inter-
national treaty or customary law, the general principles of international criminal law and 
general principles of international law.442 The accurate definition of rape was therefore 
reached through the criminal law principle of specificity, (“Bestimmtheitsgrundsatz”, also 
referred to by the maxim “nullem crimen sine lege stricta”).443 The Trial Chamber in the 
Furundžija case stated that it was necessary to look for principles of criminal law common 
to the major legal systems of the world in order to derive principles from national laws in 
order to define the specific elements of rape.444 The Trial Chamber in the Kuranac case 
from 22 February 2001 agreed that the elements concerning rape listed in the Furundžija 
case constitute the actus reus of the crime of rape in international law.445 
 
“However, in the circumstances of the present case the Trial Chamber considers that 
it is necessary to clarify its understanding of the element in paragraph (ii) of the Fu-
rundžija definition. (…) the Furundžija definition, although appropriate to the cir-
cumstances of that case, is in one respect more narrowly stated than is required by in-
                                                
440 Prosecutor v. Furundžija (185)  
441 Prosecutor v. Kunarac (437)  
442 Prosecutor v. Furundžija (185)  
443 Prosecutor v. Furundžija (177)  
444 Prosecutor v. Furundžija (177)  
445 Prosecutor v. Kunarac (438)  
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ternational law. In stating that the relevant act of sexual penetration will constitute 
rape only if accompanied by coercion or force or threat of force against the victim or 
a third person, the Furundžija definition does not refer to other factors which would 
render an act of sexual penetration non-consensual or non-voluntary on the part of 
the victim, which (…) is in the opinion of this Trial Chamber the accurate scope of 
this aspect of the definition of international law.”446 
 
In contrast to the Trial Chamber´s definition of rape in the Furundžija case, the Trial 
Chamber in the Kunarac case derived other “common denominators”.447 However, the Tri-
al Chamber in the Kunarac case did not consider the national legal systems of the world 
 
“in order to identify a specific legal provision which is adopted by a majority of le-
gal systems but to consider, from an examination of national systems generally, 
whether it is possible to identify certain basic principles (…), “common denomina-
tors”, in those legal systems which embody the principles which must be adopted in 
the international context.”448 
 
The Trial Chamber in the Kunarac case found that the national legal systems considered in 
the Furundžija case when “looked at as a whole, indicated that the basic underlying princi-
ple common to them was that sexual penetration will constitute rape if it is not truly volun-
tary or consensual on the part of the victim.”449 The Trial Chamber agreed that the matters 
identified in the Furundžija definition – force, threat of force, or coercion, are “the relevant 
considerations in many legal systems but the full range of provisions referred to in that 
judgement suggest that the true common denominator which unifies the various systems 
                                                
446 Prosecutor v. Kunarac (438)  
447 Prosecutor v Furundžija (178) 
448 Prosecutor v. Kunarac (439)  
449 Prosecutor v. Kunarac (440)  
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may be a wider or more basic principle of penalising violations of sexual autonomy.”450 
The Trial Chamber quoted the Furundžija judgment:   
 
“(…) all jurisdictions surveyed by the Trial Chamber require an element of force, 
coercion, threat, or acting without consent of the victim: force is given a broad in-
terpretation and includes rendering the victim helpless.”451 
 
The Trial Chamber in the Kunarac case agreed that the definition of rape in the Furundžija 
judgment which focused on serious violations of sexual autonomy, was correct.452 It stated 
that in general, the “domestic statutes and judicial decisions which define the crime of rape 
specify the nature of the sexual acts which potentially constitute rape, and the circumstanc-
es which will render those sexual acts criminal.”453 However, the relevant law in force in 
the different jurisdictions at the time of the proceedings of the Kunarac case (2001) identi-
fied a large range of different factors, which were classified as relevant sexual acts as the 
crime of rape.454 The Trial Chamber found these factors to fall within three broad catego-
ries:  
 
(i) the sexual activity is accompanied by force or threat of force to the victim or 
a third party;  
(ii) the sexual activity is accompanied by force or a variety of other specified 
circumstances which made the victim particularly vulnerable or negated her 
ability to make an informed refusal; or 
(iii) the sexual activity occurs without the consent of the victim.455 
 
                                                
450 Prosecutor v. Kunarac (440)  
451 Prosecutor v Furundžija (80) 
452 Prosecutor v. Kunarac (442)  
453 Prosecutor v. Kunarac (441)  
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The countries defining rape under category (i) by force or threat of force, were of the Trial 
Chamber deemed to be Bosnia and Herzegovina, Germany, Korea, China, Norway, Aus-
tria, Spain and Brazil, and some jurisdictions in the United States of America.456  
 
Specific circumstances in regard of the vulnerability or deception of the victim were placed 
in category (ii). These specific circumstances provided that specified sexual acts will con-
stitute rape including “that the victim was put in a state of being unable to resist, was par-
ticularly vulnerable or incapable of resisting because of physical or mental incapacity, or 
was induced into the act by surprise or misrepresentation.”457 Penal codes of a number of 
continental European jurisdictions contained provisions of this type, countries such as 
Switzerland, Portugal, France, Italy, Denmark, Sweden, Finland, and Estonia.458 Japan, 
Argentina, Costa Rica, Uruguay, the Philippines, and some of the States of the United 
States of America were also mentioned in this category.459 
 
Section 192 litra b of the GCPC was formed to constitute as a second category of rape in 
the year of 2000, and is the equivalent of category (ii) in the Kunarac case.460  
 
In regard of the third category where the sexual activity occurs without the consent of the 
victim, the Trial Court noted that in “most common law systems, it is the absence of vic-
tim´s free and genuine consent to sexual penetration which is the defining characteristic of 
rape.”461 Commonwealth countries such as England, Canada, New Zealand, and Australia 
were found in this category. 462 India, Bangladesh, South Africa, and Zambia had also non- 
                                                
456 Prosecutor v. Kunarac (443)  
457 Prosecutor v. Kunarac (446,452)  
458 Prosecutor v. Kunarac (447-448)  
459 Prosecutor v. Kunarac (449-451)  
460 See chapter 2.1.3 of this article. 
461 Prosecutor v. Kunarac (453)  
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consensual definitions of rape.463 Belgium, traditionally belonging to the European conti-
nental legal tradition also criminalized rape as “[A]ny act of sexual penetration, whatever 
its nature, and by whatever means, committed on someone who does not consent to it”.464 
 
Seeking to find the basic underlying principle of the crime of rape in national jurisdictions 
through an examination of these three categories, the Trial Chamber found that:  
 
“(…) The basic principle which is truly common to these legal systems is that seri-
ous violations of sexual autonomy are to be penalised. Sexual autonomy is violated 
wherever the person subjected to the act has not freely agreed to it or is otherwise 
not a voluntary participant.”465 
 
In order to encompass all conduct of which negates consent as rape, the Trial Chamber 
concluded:  
 
“In light of the above considerations, the Trial Chamber understands the actus reus 
of the crime of rape in international law is constituted by: the sexual penetration, 
however slight: (a) of the vagina or anus of the victim by the penis of the perpetra-
tor or any other object used by the perpetrator; or (b) of the mouth of the victim by 
the penis of the perpetrator; where such sexual penetration occurs without the con-
sent of the victim. Consent for this purpose must be consent given voluntarily, as a 
result of the victim´s free will, assessed in the context of the surrounding circum-
stances. The mens rea is the intention to effect this sexual penetration, and the 
knowledge that it occurs without the consent of the victim.”466 
 
                                                
463 Prosecutor v. Kunarac (454-455)  
464 Prosecutor v. Kunarac (456)  
465 Prosecutor v. Kunarac (457-460)  
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 111 
The factual circumstances of the Kunarac case might explain why rape was defined as non-
consensual by the ICTY. Dragoljub Kunarac was a military leader of approximately 15 
soldiers of the Bosnian Serb Army.467 He initiated an attack on the Muslim population in 
the municipalities of Fo~ca, Gacko and Kalinovik from July – August 1992.468 Several 
Muslim women were captured and raped multiple times by himself and his men. The wom-
en were so traumatized that the following incident occurred:  
 
“The Trial Chamber is satisfied that it has been proven beyond reasonable doubt 
that D.B. subsequently also had sexual intercourse with Dragoljub Kunarac in 
which she took an active part by taking off the trousers of the accused and kissing 
him all over the body before having vaginal intercourse with him.”469 
 
D.B. had been threatened with death by “Gaga” prior to the intercourse, if she did not satis-
fy the desires of his commander, Dragoljub Kunarac. She therefore initiated the sexual in-
tercourse out of fear of being killed by “Gaga”.470 The Trial Chamber rejected Dragoljub 
Kunarac´s claim that he was not aware of the fact that D.B. only initiated the sexual inter-
course with him out of fear for her life. The Trial Chamber found it highly improbable that 
Kunarac could realistically have been “confused” by the behaviour of D.B., given the gen-
eral context of the existing war-time situation and the specifically delicate situation of the 
Muslim girls detained in Partizan or elsewhere in the Fo~ca region during that time.471 The 
witness FWS-75 was gang-raped by 15 soldiers while Kunarac raped D.B. in the adjoining 
room.472 
 
                                                
467 Prosecutor v. Kunarac (626)  
468 Prosecutor v. Kunarac (577- 593)  
469 Prosecutor v. Kunarac (644 – 646)  
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In regard to whether or not Kunarac was aware of the threat by “Gaga” against D.B., the 
Trial Chamber found it irrelevant as to whether or not Kunarac heard “Gaga” repeat this 
threat against D.B. when he walked into the room. The Trial Chamber was satisfied that 
D.B. did not freely consent to any sexual intercourse with Kunarac as she was in captivity 
and in fear for her life after the threats uttered by “Gaga”.473 Kunarac was found guilty of 
rape and sentenced to 28 years of prison.474  
 
In considering to which extent rape constitutes crime against humanity pursuant to Article 
3 (g) of the Statute of the ICTR, the Appeals Chamber of the ICTR in the Case of Akayesu 
from 1998 noted that there was no commonly accepted international definition of rape.475 
The ICTR considered the conceptual frameworks of rape similar to that of torture as “rape 
is a form of aggression and that the central elements of the crime of rape cannot be cap-
tured in a mechanical description of objects and body parts.”476 The ICTR defined “rape as 
a physical invasion of a sexual nature, committed on a person under circumstances which 
are coercive.”477 Jean Paul Akayesu was found guilty of Crime against humanity in regard 
of rape.478 The coercive definition of rape is thus broader than the non-consensual ap-
proach. 
 
However, the Appeals Chamber of the ICTR affirmed the lack of consent-based definition 
stated in the Kunarac case, in the Prosecutor v. Gacumbitsi in 2006.479 The Appeal Cham-
ber went even further stating that lack of consent could also be proved through coercive 
circumstances as stated in the Akayesu case.480 The Prosecutor in the Gacumbitsi case 
                                                
473 Prosecutor v. Kunarac (644-646)  
474 Prosecutor v. Kunarac (685) (ii), (686 – 687), (871)  
475 Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu (596) 
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478 Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu p. 179-180; 8 E-bok 
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sought a clarification of the law relating to rape as a crime against humanity or as an act of 
genocide. The Prosecutor argued that non-consent of the victim and the perpetrator´s 
knowledge thereof should not be considered elements of the offence that must be proved by 
the Prosecution, but subject to the limitations of Rule 96 of the Rules, where consent 
should be considered an affirmative defence.481  
 
The Trial Chamber had previously in the Gacumbitsi case found that the circumstances of 
were so coercive as to negate any possibility of consent. The Appeals Chamber agreed with 
the Prosecution that “the matter should be considered of “general significance” for the Tri-
bunal´s jurisprudence”, referring amongst to the definition of rape in previous Akayesu Ap-
peal Judgment.482 Having cited the definition of rape from the Kunarac case paragraph 127 
and paragraph 130, the Appeals Chamber stated that it “adopts and seeks to further eluci-
date the position expressed by the ICTY Appeals Chamber in the Kunarac et al. Appeal 
Judgment. Two distinct questions are posed. First, are non-consent and the knowledge 
thereof elements of the crime of rape, or is consent instead an affirmative defence? Second, 
if they are elements, how may they be proved?”483 
 
“With respect to the first question, Kunarac establishes that non-consent and 
knowledge thereof are elements of rape as a crime against humanity. The import of 
this is that the Prosecution bears the burden of proving these elements beyond rea-
sonable doubt. (…) As the Prosecution points out, Rule 96 of the Rules does refer to 
consent as a “defence”. The Rules of Procedure and Evidence do not, however, re-
define elements of the crimes over which the Tribunal has jurisdiction, which are 
defined by the Statute and by international law. (…) The Appeals Chamber agrees, 
moreover, with the analysis of the Trial Chamber in the Kunarac case: 
 
                                                
481 Prosecutor v. Gacumbitsi (147) 
482 Prosecutor v. Gacumbitsi (150) see also footnote 357 in the case 
483 Prosecutor v. Gacumbitsi (152) 
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The reference in the Rule [96] to consent as a “defence” is not entirely con-
sistent with traditional legal understandings of the concept of consent in 
rape. Where consent is an aspect of the definition of rape in national juris-
dictions, it is generally understood (…) to be absence of consent which is an 
element of the crime.”484 
 
The Appeal Chamber in the Gacumbitsi Appeal Judgment stated that “[r]ather than chang-
ing the definition of the crime by turning an element into a defence, Rule 96 of the Rules 
must be read simply to define the circumstances under which evidence of consent will be 
admissible.”485 The Appeal Chamber opened for a slight possibility that the accused “under 
certain circumstances” might raise reasonable doubt by introducing evidence that the vic-
tim specifically consented.486 Even if such evidence is admitted, “a Trial Chamber is free to 
disregard it if it concludes that under the circumstance the consent given was not genuinely 
voluntary. (…) Knowledge of non-consent may be proven, for instance, if the Prosecution 
establishes beyond reasonable doubt that the accused was aware, or had reason to be aware, 
of the coercive circumstances that undermined the possibility of genuine consent.”487 
 
Judicial scholars have favoured the coercive definition of rape in the Akayesu Appeal 
Judgment by the ICTR of 2 September 1998.488 An explanation to this might be that non-
consent does not have to be proved by the Prosecutor, only “the context of the acts, in par-
ticular focusing on factors which establish the existence of coercive circumstances. This 
approach is especially warranted in relation to international crimes, which typically occur 
during armed conflict.”489 Judicial Scholar Antonio Cassese stated in his commentary to 
Article 7 of the ICC Statutes concerning the definition of rape as crimes against humanity, 
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that the two definitions of rape set out in the Furundžija judgment and the Kunarac case 
“are in substance equivalent, for ´coercion, or force, or threat of force` in essence imply or 
mean ´lack of consent`.”490 
 
The coercive definition of rape is broader than the non-consensual approach taken in the 
Kunarac case, and the Furundžija-definition is narrower. However, in light of the above, it 
seems like the non-consensual definition of rape set out in the Kunarac case from 2001, 
confirmed in the Gacumbitisi case of 2006, has prevailed. In accordance with contempo-
rary international criminal law, rape as crime against humanity and war crime has occurred 
when the sexual activity has not been genuinely consented to by the aggrieved party. 
 
4.1.2.4 Other applicable treaties and principles of international law and their definition of 
rape  
4.1.2.4.1 The European Convention on Human Rights 
In the case of M.C v. Bulgaria, the ECtHR cited the non-consensual definition of rape stat-
ed by the ICTY in the Kunarac case. The ECtHR held that the true common denominator, 
which unifies the various systems of law, might be a wider or more basic principle of pe-
nalising violations of sexual autonomy than the one upheld in the Furundžija judgment.491 
Although the definition of rape in the Kunarac case “was formulated in the particular con-
text of rapes committed against the population in the conditions of an armed conflict, it also 
reflect a universal trend towards regarding lack of consent as the essential element of rape 
and sexual abuse.”492 
 
 
                                                
490 Cassese (2008) p. 110 
491 Prosecutor v. Kunarac (440), M.C v. Bulgaria (163) 
492 M.C v. Bulgaria (163) 
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4.1.2.4.2 The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against 
Women 
The Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women stated in the  
Vertido case from 2009 that lack of consent is the constituent element of rape. The Com-
mittee noted that “lack of consent is not an essential element of the definition of rape in the 
Philippines Revised Penal Code. (…) The Committee has clarified time and again that rape 
constitutes a violation of women´s right to personal security and bodily integrity, and that 
its essential element was lack of consent.”493 (emphasis added)  
 
CEDAW can be said to be close to a global Convention being signed by 187 countries.494 
The Committee´s definition of rape confirms ECtHR´s conclusion that there is a universal 
trend towards regarding lack of consent as the essential element of rape and sexual abuse.  
 
4.1.2.4.3 The Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence 
against women and domestic violence 
Article 36 of the Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence 
against women and domestic violence, obligates the contracting parties to penalize non- 
consensual sexual acts. Article 36 defines consent as consent given voluntarily as the result 
of the person´s free will assessed in the context of the surrounding circumstances. This re-
gional treaty confirms the international trend towards regarding lack of consent as the es-
sential element of rape and sexual abuse.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
493 Vertido v. the Philippines p. 16 nr. 8.7. E-bok 
494 https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-8-b&chapter=4&lang=en  
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4.1.3 Summary and Conclusion 
There are currently cases pending before the International Criminal Court expected to bring 
clarity as to how rape is defined in the light of the Rome Statute.495 Judicial scholars have 
described the Prosecutor v. Jean- Pierre Bemba Gombo “to be a key ICC case concerning 
sexual crimes.”496 Case law from the ICTY and ICTR has brought about three definitions 
of rape. The ICTR defined rape in the Case of Akayesu from 1998 as “a physical invasion 
of a sexual nature, committed on a person under circumstances which are coercive”.497 The 
ICTY Trial Chamber defined rape in the Furundžija judgment from 1998 as “the sexual 
penetration by coercion or force or threat of force against the victim or a third person”. In 
the Kunarac case from 2001 rape was defined by the ICTY as “sexual penetration without 
the consent of the victim”. Lack of genuine consent as the constituent element of rape was 
followed up by the ICTR in the Gacumbitsi Appeal Judgment in 2006.498 In its commentary 
to Section 102 (g) concerning rape, the preparatory works of the NPC held that the more 
narrow definition of rape stated by the ICTY in the Furundžija case would cover the actus 
reus of rape.499 This comment was also referred to in the preparatory works in regard to the 
definition of rape in Section 103 (d) war crimes.500 It is possible that the definition of rape 
in the ICC Rome Statute Article 7 (g), and Article 8 (e) (vi), clarified in Elements of 
Crimes footnote 16 to article 7 (1) (g), was negotiated as to be a more narrow definition of 
rape than held in the Kunarac case.501 However, the Rome Statute was adopted on a diplo-
matic conference in Rome on 17 July 1998, and entered into force on July 1 2002. The Fu-
rundžija case was made final on 10 December 1998. The Kunarac case was made final on 
                                                
495 Prosecutor v. Katanga and Ndjulu-chou, Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Prosecutor v. Jean- 
Pierre Bemba Gombo  
496 McGlynn (2010) p. 58  
497 Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu 
498 See Ot.prp.nr.8 (2007-2008) p. 278 E-bok 
499 See Ot.prp.nr.8 (2007-2008) p. 284 E-bok 
500 See Ot.prp.nr.8 (2007-2008) p. 286 E-bok 
501 See Ot.prp.nr.8 (2007-2008) p. 284 E-bok 
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22 February 2001.502 Article 21 of the Rome Statute might indicate that the ICC Statutes 
are meant to be a dynamic Criminal Code, where crimes are defined or redefined by the 
ICC in the same dynamic approach taken by the ECtHR. It is therefore likely to conclude 
that the definition of rape in the light of the Rome Statute is at the present unresolved. The 
ICC Bemba case will most likely bring clarity as to how rape as a crime against humanity 
and a war crime is defined. However, at the present it seems like lack of consent is consid-
ered to be the constituent element of rape as a crime against humanity and war crime.  
 
In the light of the above; “incapable of giving genuine consent” cf. rape as a crime against 
humanity cf. Article 7 (g) of the Rome Statute503, and as a war crime against a person cf. 
Article 8 (e) (vi) of the Rome Statute,504505 is to be understood as a non-consensual act of 
sexual penetration.506 “Consent for this purpose must be consent given voluntarily, as a 
result of the victim´s free will, assessed in the context of the surrounding circumstances.”507 
The stance taken in the preparatory works of the NPC in favour of the more narrow defini-
tion of rape in the Furundžija case in regard to the definition of rape in Section 102 (g) and 
Section 103 (d) of the NPC can therefore not be upheld.508   
 
 
                                                
502 Prosecutor v. Kunarac 
503 Rome Statute p. 4 see also St.prp.nr. 24 (1999-2000) p. 29,52-57 
504 Rome Statute p. 8 
505 LOV-2005-05-20-28 §§ 102-103 
506 Prosecutor v. Kunarac (438)  
507 Prosecutor v. Kunarac (460) 
508 See Ot.prp.nr.8 (2007-2008) p. 284 E-bok 
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4.2 Conflicting provisions between the definition of rape in Section 102 and 
103 of the NPC and the definition of rape in Section 192 of the GCPC 
The actus reus of Section 192 litra a and Section 192 litra b of the GCPC can be read as to 
cover most of the actus reus of rape as clarified in the Elements of Crimes Article 7 (g), 
and Article 8 (e) (vi) to the Rome Statute. The current definition of rape in the GCPC holds 
any person liable for rape after Section 192 litra a if that person “engages in sexual activity 
by means of violence or threats”, or “engages in sexual activity with any person who is 
unconscious or incapable for any other reason of resisting the act” cf. Section 192 litra b.509  
 
The preparatory works of chapter 16 of the NPC held in its commentary to § 102 (g) and § 
103 (d) concerning rape, that the more narrow definition of rape stated by the ICTY in the 
Furundžija case would cover the actus reus of rape.510  
 
In accordance with the definition of rape held by the ICTY in the Kunarac case, Section 
192 litra a and litra b seem to fall in under the scope of category (i) and category (ii): 
 
(i) the sexual activity is accompanied by force or threat of force to the victim or 
a third party;  
(ii) the sexual activity is accompanied by force or a variety of other specified 
circumstances which made the victim particularly vulnerable or negated her 
ability to make an informed refusal; or511 
 
The ICC Rome Statute concerning rape read together with Elements of Crimes footnote 16 
to article 7 (1) (g), natural incapacity of giving “genuine consent,” interpreted in the light of 
the Kunarac case, expands the definition of rape to a third category:  
 
                                                
509 GCPC 1902 p. 76, see also chapter 2 of this article 
510 See Ot.prp.nr.8 (2007-2008) p. 284 E-bok 
511 Prosecutor v. Kunarac (442), GCPC 1902p. 76, see also chapter 2 of this article 
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“(iii) the sexual penetration, however slight: (a) of the vagina or anus of the victim 
by the penis of the perpetrator or any other object used by the perpetrator; or (b) of 
the mouth of the victim by the penis of the perpetrator; where such sexual penetra-
tion occurs without the consent of the victim. Consent for this purpose must be con-
sent given voluntarily, as a result of the victim´s free will, assessed in the context of 
the surrounding circumstances. The mens rea is the intention to effect this sexual 
penetration, and the knowledge that it occurs without the consent of the victim.”512 
 
This definition of rape differs significantly from Section 192 as it stands today.  
Due to international obligations such as CEDAW and the Council of Europe Convention on 
preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence, to define rape as 
“lack of consent”, the Norwegian Ministry of Justice and Public Security has proposed to 
expand the definition of rape in Section 192 to another litra d, criminalising non-consensual 
rape.513 The draft of new legislation might indicate that the current definition of rape in the 
GCPC is not in compliance with the definition of rape held by the ICTY and thus interna-
tional criminal law transformed into Section 102 (g) and Section 103 (d) of the NPC. 
 
However, the nexus to rape as a crime against humanity or war crimes might constitute 
circumstances under which any non-consensual sexual activity could be subsumed under 
Section 192 of the GCPC as it stands today. Rape as a crime against humanity must be 
committed by a person as a part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any 
civilian population, with the knowledge of the attack cf. Article 7 of the Rome Statute cf. 
Section 102 of the NPC. Rape as war crime is committed as a part of a plan or policy, or as 
part of a large- scale commission of such crimes against persons protected under the rele-
vant Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949514 cf. Article 8 of the Rome Statute cf. Sec-
tion 103 of the NPC. These nexus to rape can implicate the coercive circumstances that 
                                                
512 Prosecutor v. Kunarac (457-460)  
513 Høringsnotat p. 33 E-bok 
514 Rome Statute Article 8 nr. 1, nr. 2.  
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underlies the provisions of Section 192 a of the GCPC. The Appeal Chamber stated in the 
Kunarac case “it is worth observing that the circumstances giving rise to the instant appeal 
and that prevail in most cases charged as either war crimes or crimes against humanity will 
be almost universally coercive. That is to say, true consent will not be possible.”515  
 
Similar facts of the Kunarac case516 occurred in the Norwegian Supreme Court verdict of 
Rt. 2006 page 1319.517 The offender had taken advantage of two sex-trafficked girls of 
which the perpetrator knew had been subject to violence and threats, causing the women to 
be at his “disposal”.518 Today this conduct would also have constituted a breach of Section 
224 of the GCPC as human trafficking.519 It is not clear from the Supreme Court verdict 
whether the accused had used violence or threats against the women in order to achieve the 
sexual activity. He was nonetheless aware that the two women were held in captivity and 
had been subject to violence and rapes, thus being too afraid to resist the intercourses.520 
Weight was put to the fact that the perpetrator knew that the aggrieved parties were under 
coercion or threats cf. Section 192 litra a, and that the aggrieved party would not have con-
sented to the sexual activity under normal circumstances.521  
 
Unlike D.B. in the Kunarac case, the women in Rt. 2006 page 1319 were victims of human 
trafficking. D.B. was a civilian being raped by military soldiers during a state of war. Hu-
man trafficking and crimes committed by soldiers against civilians in war- time may there-
fore fall under the same coercive circumstances which constitutes a violation of Section 
192 litra a of the GCPC as it stands today. However, the Supreme Court did stretch the in-
terpretation of the constituent elements of rape in Section 192 litra a in order to establish 
                                                
515 Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Appeal Chamber 12 June 2002 (130) 
516 Prosecutor v. Kunarac (644 – 646)  
517 See this arctile chapter 2.1.2.2. 
518 See also Andenæs (2008) p.142 
519 Rt. 2006 1319 (15) 
520 Rt. 2006 1319 (11) 
521 Andenæs (2008) p. 142 
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criminal liability for the offender under a more ”grave” penal provision. He himself had not 
used violence or threats in order to achieve the vaginal intercourses he had had with the 
women, being a prerequisite after Section 192 litra a. The defence appealed to the Supreme 
Court that his conduct amounted to a crime under Section 192 litra b, a “milder” definition 
of rape. Technically the accused did not engage in sexual activity “by means of violence or 
threats” cf. Section 192 litra a. The man knew that the women did not consent to the sexual 
activity, and that they were incapable of resisting the sexual activity being held captive. 
Such an interpretation of Section 192 litra a might constitute a breach with the principle of 
legality as it is currently practiced by the Supreme Court cf. Rt. 2011 page 469. The argu-
mentation of the Supreme Court in Rt. 2006 page 1319 seems therefore stretched and con-
structed in order to establish criminal liability for the accused.  
 
A lack of consent based definition of rape would have left no doubt that what the man in 
Rt. 2006 page 1319 did to those women was rape, and would have left no doubt as to 
whether criminal liability should be established under litra b rather than litra a cf. Section 
192 of the GCPC.  The Kunarac case serves here as an example. Kunarac, Kovac, and 
Vucovic appealed to the Appeals chamber claiming that rape could not be committed with-
out the use of force or threat of force, and that the victim had to show “continuous” or 
“genuine” resistance throughout the sexual intercourse.522 The Appeals Chamber agreed 
with the Trial Chamber´s consent-based definition of rape. It rejected the Appellant´s “re-
sistance” requirement, an addition that had no basis in customary international law.523 The 
Appellants´ assertion that nothing short of continuous resistance provides adequate notice 
to the perpetrator that his attentions are unwanted, was rejected by the Appeals Chamber as 
“bald,” and that it was “wrong on the law and absurd on the facts.”524 The Appeals Cham-
ber noted that the Trial Chamber appeared to depart from the Tribunal´s earlier jurispru-
dence in the Furundžija judgment paragraph 158. “However, in explaining its focus on the 
                                                
522 Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Appeal Chamber 12 June 2002 (126) 
523 Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Appeal Chamber 12 June 2002 (128) 
524 Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Appeal Chamber 12 June 2002 (128) 
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absence of consent as the conditio sine qua non of rape, the Trial Chamber did not disavow 
the Tribunal´s earlier jurisprudence, but instead sought to explain the relationship between 
force and consent. Force or threat of force provides clear evidence of non- consent, but 
force is not an element per se of rape. In particular, the Trial Chamber wished to explain 
that there are  
 
“factors other than force which would render an act of sexual penetration non-
consensual or non-voluntary on the part of the victim”. A narrow focus on force or 
threat of force could permit perpetrators to evade liability for sexual activity to 
which the other party had not consented by taking advantage of coercive circum-
stance without relying on physical force.”525 
 
4.2.1 Summary and Conclusion  
Non-consensual sexual activity has been defined as rape and thus a crime against humanity 
and war crimes, in order to avoid perpetrators evading liability for sexual activity the other 
party did not consent to. The nexus to rape as crime against humanity or war crimes might 
constitute circumstances under which any non-consensual sexual activity could be sub-
sumed under Section 192 of the GCPC as it stands today. The Supreme Court of Norway in 
plenary session has stated that the term “crimes against humanity” differ greatly from that 
of ordinary penal provisions in the GCPC of 1902, constituting a more serious crime.526 
This gives notion that the wording of the ´ordinary` statutory definition of rape in Section 
192 should also penalise non-consensual rape, constituting an ´ordinary crime`.527  
 
                                                
525 Prosecutor v. Kunarac Appeal Chamber 12 June 2002 (129) 
526 Rt. 2010 1445 (98-118) 
527 See also Ot.prp.nr.8 (2007-2008) ch. 3.  
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4.3 The implications of not ensuring compliance between Section 192 of the 
GCPC and International Criminal law cf. Section 102 and 103 of the NPC  
 
Section 3 of the NPC of 2005 and the GCPC of 1902 prescribes that if the criminal legisla-
tion has been amended in the period following the commission of an act, the penal provi-
sions in force at the time of its commission shall be applicable to the act unless otherwise 
provided. The penal provisions in force at the time a particular issue is decided shall be 
applicable when they lead to a decision more favourable to the person the provisions in 
force at the time of commission of the act.528 This implies that if the definition of rape in 
Section 192 of the GCPC is more favourable than the definition of rape in Secion 102 and 
Section 103 in chapter 16 of the NPC, the action would be subsumed under Section 192 
and not qualify as “crimes against humanity” or “war crimes”. This could result into that 
the perpetrator would not be prosecuted for serious violations of international humanitarian 
law, as the crime of rape would be “ordinary,” and not evoke the maximum sentence of 30 
years following breaches of chapter 16 of the NPC, and the social stigma that follows from 
being convicted according to such grave penal provisions. Failure to criminalise non-
consensual rape in Section 192 could also result into that the alleged perpetrator escapes 
criminal liability in Norway.529  
 
Article 97 of the Norwegian Constitution has been interpreted by the Supreme Court as to 
prohibit new legislation being used on actions only criminalized by international law at the 
time they were committed. The Supreme Court in a plenary session with dissent 11-6 con-
cluded in Rt. 2010 page 1445 that the provisions in chapter 16 of the NPC of 2005 concern-
ing crimes against humanity § 102 and war crimes § 103 could not apply to actions com-
mitted in Bosnia-Hercegovina in 1992. Chapter 16 of the NPC entered into force in 2008, 
and it would therefore constitute a breach with the prohibition of retroactive legislation in 
                                                
528 GCPC 1902 Section 3, LOV-2005-05-20-28 § 3 
529 See Ot.prp.nr.8 (2007-2008) p. 32 E-bok 
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Article 97 to penalize previous actions under graver penal provisions.530 “Law” in Article 
96 of the Norwegian Constitution was also considered to prohibit Norwegian Courts from 
convicting people for crimes with immediate legal authority in international law.531 
 
The legal qualification matters in order for the ICC, ICTY or ICTR to accept that perpetra-
tors of war crimes and crimes against humanity are brought to justice. For example, the 
ICTR has stated with referrals under the ICTR cf. Article 8 cf. Article 9, that it  
 
”may still try a person who has been tried before a national court for ´acts constitut-
ing serious violations of international humanitarian law` if the acts for which he or 
she was tried were ´categorized as an ordinary crime`. Furthermore, the protected 
legal values are different. The penalization of genocide protects specifically defined 
groups, whereas the penalization of homicide protects individual lives.”532 
 
Failure to prosecute and convict individuals who have committed crimes against humanity 
and war crimes would therefore be contradictory to the object and purpose of chapter 16 of 
the NPC.533  
 
4.4 Summary and Conclusion 
Due to the gravity and circumstances of which rape as crimes against humanity and war 
crimes are performed, even non-consensual acts would be subsumed under Section 192 of 
the GCPC. There are therefore no conflicting provisions between the definition of rape in 
Section 102 and 103 of the NPC and Section 192 of the GCPC. However, a non-consensual 
definition of rape would eliminate doubt concerning whether a crime has been committed, 
and can avert that clearly reproachable incidents of non-consensual sexual activity goes 
                                                
530 Rt. 2010 1445 (62- 127) 
531 Rt. 2010 1445 
532 Rt. 2010 1445 (111) 
533 See Ot.prp.nr.8 (2007-2008) p. 32 E-bok 
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unpunished in the future due to the Supreme Court´s strict practice of the principle of legal-
ity.  
 
 
5 The Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and 
Combating Violence against Women and Domestic Violence 
5.1 Introduction  
The Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence against women 
and domestic violence was opened for signature on May 11, 2011 in Istanbul, Turkey (Is-
tanbul Convention). One of the primary considerations of the Istanbul Convention is to 
achieve greater equality between women and men.534 The Istanbul Convention provides a 
regional harmonization of the definition of rape in order to promote equality between 
women and men and end discrimination of women by holding perpetrators accountable 
according to the same standard and definition of rape.535 Norway signed the Istanbul Con-
vention on July 7 2011.536  
 
5.2 The definition of rape in Article 36 of the Council of Europe Convention 
on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic 
violence 
Article 36 of the Istanbul Convention concerning sexual violence, including rape read as 
follows:  
 
1 “Parties shall take the necessary legislative or other measures to ensure that the fol-
lowing intentional conduct are criminalised:  
                                                
534 http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/convention-violence/thematic_factsheets/Equality_EN.pdf 
535 http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/convention-violence/thematic_factsheets/Equality_EN.pdf 
536 http://www.conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=210&CM=&DF=&CL=ENG  
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a   engaging in non-consensual vaginal, anal or oral penetration of a sexual 
nature of the body of another person with any bodily part or object;  
b   engaging in other non- consensual acts of sexual nature with a person;  
c   causing another person to engage in non-consensual acts of sexual nature 
with a third person.  
 
2 Consent must be given voluntarily as the result of the person´s free will assessed 
in the context of the surrounding circumstances.  
 
3 Parties shall take the necessary legislative or other measures to ensure that the 
provisions of paragraph 1 also apply to acts committed against former or current 
spouses or partners as recognised by internal law.”537 
 
The Explanatory Report concerning Article 36 of the Istanbul Convention stated that this 
“article establishes the criminal offence of sexual violence, including rape. Paragraph 1 
covers all forms of sexual acts which are performed on another person without her or his 
freely given consent and which are carried out intentionally.”538 The drafters sought to limit 
Article 36 litra a by requiring the penetration to be of a sexual nature, and thus avoid prob-
lems of interpretation.539 The Convention Parties were urged to take into account case law 
from the ECtHR in the assessment of the constituent elements of offences, of which the 
non- consensual definition of rape was mentioned in particular.540 
 
In regard of the implementation of Article 36, “Parties of the Convention are required to 
provide for criminal legislation which encompasses the notion of lack of freely given con-
sent to any of the sexual acts listed in lit.a to lit.c. It is, however, left to the Parties to decide 
                                                
537 www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/convention-violence/about_en.asp  
538 http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Reports/Html/210.htm Article 36 (189) 
539 http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Reports/Html/210.htm Article 36 (190) 
540 http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Reports/Html/210.htm Article 36 (191) 
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on the specific wording of the legislation and the factors that they consider to preclude 
freely given consent. Paragraph 2 only specifies that consent must be given voluntarily as 
the result of the person´s free will, as assessed in the context of the surrounding circum-
stances.”541 
 
In response to Article 36 of the Istanbul Convention and Norway´s signature of it, the Min-
istry of Justice and Public Security commenced and official hearing regarding the expan-
sion of Section 192 to an additional litra d, penalising non-consensual sexual activity, 
which closed on 1 June 2013.542 Norway´s signature of the Istanbul Convention has there-
fore already had a political impact towards criminalizing non-consensual sexual activity. 
 
5.3 The affect the definition of rape in Article 36 of the Istanbul Convention 
have on the definition of rape in Section 192 of the GCPC when it is not 
incorporated or transformed into domestic Norwegian Law 
 
The Supreme Court of Norway stated in Rt. 2001 page 1006 that Conventions Norway has 
ratified but not incorporated as domestic law, can affect domestic law through the “pre-
sumption principle.” The presumption principle is a principle developed by the Supreme 
Court of Norway and Judicial Scholars, which hold that domestic law is assumed in com-
pliance with Norway´s international obligations.543 The Court held in Rt. 2001 page 1006 
that by the internal use of Conventions that are ratified, but not transformed into national 
statutory law, one have to decide whether the provision in question is meant to give indi-
vidual rights, or if it expresses a legislative intent, or if it orders the member states to 
achieve a certain goal or minimum standard. The direct use of ratified Conventions, pre-
requisite that the provision is composed in such a way that it is useful for immediate use by 
                                                
541 Istanbul Convention Article 36 (193) 
542 Høringsnotat p. 33 
543 Cf. Rt. 2001 1006, Rt. 1997 580, and Rt. 2000 1811 
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the national authorities. Further, the provisions of the Convention must concretize to spe-
cific rights and obligations.544  
 
As of today, the Convention itself will not provide any citizens of Norway direct legal 
rights, as it is not ratified, nor implemented as statutory law cf. Article 76-78 and Article 26 
(2) of the Constitution of Norway. The strict interpretation of “law” in Article 96 and thus 
practice of the principle of legality by the Supreme Court of Norway cf. Rt. 2009 page 780, 
Rt. 2011 page 469 and Rt. 2010 page 1445 precludes criminal liability from being estab-
lished based on the Convention. Harmonisation in the realm of criminal law is thus pre-
cluded. This can be seen as a favourable practice towards the accused in the light of the 
principle of “Nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege”.545 
 
However, the Istanbul Convention of 2011 has already contributed to the process of revis-
ing Section 192 of the GCPC as to criminalize non-consensual rape. The Ministry of Jus-
tice and Public Security referred to the Istanbul Convention as a part of the reason for sug-
gesting in 2013 that Section 192 should be given an additional litra d in order to penalise 
non-consensual rape.546 
 
The Norwegian Supreme Court referred to the Istanbul Convention as a source of law of 
weight in Rt. 2013 page 588. Failure to follow the provisions set out in Article 36 might 
therefore in time constitute liability for the State of Norway towards its citizens for lack of 
legal protection against a third-party´s non-consensual sexual violation.  
 
Finally, the Istanbul Convention can be taken into account towards regarding lack of con-
sent as the prevailing constituent element of rape in Europe.  
 
                                                
544 Cf. Rt. 2001 1006 cf. Ot.prp.nr.3 (1998-1999) p. 11, 23-24 cf. NOU 1993:18 p. 10-106  
545 In this direction Rt. 2010 1445 
546 Høringsnotat p. 22-34, 31-35 E-bok 
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5.4 Summary and Conclusion  
The Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence against women 
and domestic violence Article 36 poses an obligation on the contracting parties to penalize 
non-consensual sexual activity as rape. The Convention is signed by Norway, but not rati-
fied. This limits the Convention´s immediate impact on domestic criminal law and the def-
inition of rape. However, the Ministry of Justice and Public Security has already referred to 
the Istanbul Convention as a part of the reason for suggesting in that Section 192 should be 
given an additional litra d in order to penalise non-consensual rape.547 The Supreme Court 
of Norway also referred to the Convention in Rt. 2013 page 588, which indicates that the 
object and purpose of the treaty is already recognised by leading legal institutions in Nor-
way.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
547 Høringsnotat p. 22-34, 31-35 E-bok 
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6 Final Summary and Conclusion 
The incorporation of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and the Conven-
tion on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) into the 
Human Rights Act, and transformation of the Rome Statute into the Norwegian Penal Code 
of 2005(NPC) has actualized the impact of international tendencies in regard of positive 
obligations under the Conventions to penalise any non-consensual activity as rape. Failure 
to comply with these international obligations provides different outcomes for the Member 
State Parties. At the present, the current definition of rape in Section 192 of the General 
Civil Penal Code of 1902 (GCPC) is in conflict with the international obligations of Nor-
way, as it does not penalise non-consensual sexual activity as rape. The ECtHR stated in 
M.C v. Bulgaria that the Member State Parties have a positive obligation to penalise any 
non-consensual sexual act cf. Articles 3 and 8 of the ECHR. Failure to comply with this 
obligation may give rise to damage liability for the State of Norway towards individuals 
subject to non-consensual sexual activity. The Committee of CEDAW urged Norway in its 
Eight Periodic Report of Norway to: “Adopt a legal definition of rape in the Penal Code so 
as to place the lack of consent at its centre, in line with the Committee´s general recom-
mendation No. 19, and the Vertido case.” In the light of relevant domestic statutory law 
and case law, this recommendation can be interpreted as a specific provision under 
CEDAW and thus a positive obligation for Norway to undertake. Failure to comply with 
this obligation might contribute to continued discrimination of women in law and practice. 
The Rome Statute was transformed into the Norwegian Penal Code (NPC) of 2005 chapter 
16 penalising rape as war crimes and crimes against humanity. Rape is not specifically de-
fined, but the preparatory works held that the specified provisions were to be interpreted in 
the light of, and in accordance with the international obligation. The definition of rape as a 
war crime and as a crime against humanity is at the present unresolved. There are currently 
pending cases before the International Criminal Court expected to bring clarity as to how 
rape is defined in the light of the Rome Statute. During the late 1990´s and beginning of the 
21st century, three definitions of rape were issued by the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). 
Current trends of international law seem to favour the non-consensual definition of rape 
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held by the ICTY in the Kunarac case. The object and purpose of transforming the Rome 
Statute into chapter 16 of the NPC was to prosecute war crimes and crimes against humani-
ty under Norwegian jurisdiction. Failure to revise or expand the definition of rape in the 
GCPC might prevent Norwegian Courts from convicting people accused of crimes against 
humanity and war crimes, contrary to the object and purpose of chapter 16 of the NPC. The 
situation with two different definitions of rape in Norwegian Criminal Statutes may be con-
sidered unsatisfactory. Even if there were no conceptual or systemic arguments decisively 
against maintaining this dual system, the International criminal solution may provide addi-
tional policy arguments in favour of redefining rape in the domestic Penal Code. The Con-
vention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence (Is-
tanbul Convention) confirms the international trend towards regarding lack of consent as 
the constituent element of rape. Case law, and reports from the ECtHR, Committee of 
CEDAW, ICTY, ICTR and ICC shows that these supranational organs refer to one another 
in deciding the common denominator of rape. The Constitution of Norway and the Su-
preme Court´s strict practice of the principle of legality limit the scope of the immediate 
affect of International Obligations in the realm of criminal law, in favour of the accused. 
Fulfilment of the International Obligations of Norway to penalise non-consensual sexual 
activity as rape is thus based on the consensus of the State.  
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